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Purpose
The purpose of this study of one university president’s role
as a boundary person is 1) to describe and analyze those functions

and activities that the university president carries out;

2)

to

construct a profile of the major agencies and interest groups outside
the university with which he must interact in the course of performing

his duties;

3)

to describe and analyze the demands or expectations

of the people with whom he interacts; and 4) to describe and examine
the coping mechanisms of the president in mediating between conflicting

demands and expectations.

Method
The case study was employed in this work to study the boundary

activities of one university president

.

Data collection techniques of

and
non— participant observation, interviews* analysis of documents

inforrecords, and reflective analysis were used to provide contextual

mation in portraying the role of the university president.

The intent

a complex dynamic
was to gain a qualitative, realistic assessment of

process

Summary
The study presents an analysis of presidential interactions
by form, frequency, flow, and function - for the purpose of showing
the process level pressures contained in the university president's
job.

Other managerial studies are used to place the statistical analysis

of this study in perspective.

The purpose was to denote some of the boundary pressures and demands
on the office of the university president.

To portray those demands

the study examined the communication flow between the university president
as the focal person and external groups in the university’s environment.

Individual acts on the part of the university president were then analyzed
to depict his boundary spanning activities over time.

The President's roles of monitor, disseminator, spokesman,

negotiator, disturbance handler, liaison, figurehead, and others
and pace of
became evident through the analysis as did the quantity

use of different media, the
his work, his interaction patterns, his

relationship between action
interplay between his rights and duties, the

relationships to a variety of contacts
and reflection in his work, and his
the year, 1972-73, were
Once the five major problem areas of

senders and their expectations
identified, all major external role

performance were discussed.
for the president’s role

General implica-

the
the university, after assessing
tions are drawn for the future of

external role senders.
expectations of the president's

Those impli-

internal and external central!cations showed a tendency toward

zation and reduction in institutional autonomy.

Role theory was used to analyze three mini-cases of the

university president's interactions with external role senders.
Examples of inter-sender conflict, intra-sender conflict, inter-role
conflict, and person-role conflict were presented and analyzed.

Also

some discussion of the coping mechanisms the president used to deal

with the four different types of role conflict were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1973 Ken Metzler

,

a journalist, published a Confrontation,

The Death of a College President

.

The book was a true account of a

man driven to a point of mental breakdown and, subsequently, to his
death, by the stresses of his job, that of the university presidency.

When Kenneth Pitzer was inaugurated as president of Stanford

University in 1970, John Gardner said in an introductory speech,
We have now proven beyond reasonable argument
that a university community can make life
unlivable for a president. We make him the
scapegoat for every failure of society.
We can fight so savagely among ourselves that
he is clawed to ribbons in the process. We
have yet to prove that we can provide the kind
of atmosphere in which a good man can survive
(Bennis, 1973, p. 59).
.

.

What was it like to be a university president in 1972?

What

were some of the major issues and problems that confronted anyone who
occupied that office?

Who are some of the principle "actors” outside

the university who either aid in the solutions to those issues and

problems or who add tension and polarity to those problems which eventually result in crisis?

Statistics seem to show that the office of university president
length of
is an extremely difficult position to hold for an extended
time.

list
Although the numbers are always changing, there is a large

carrying on presidential
of higher educational institutions presently

searches (Bennis, 1973, p. 17).

The average turnover annually for this

office is approximately 30% (Bennis, 1973,

p.

17).

The median for years

2

on the job is four and, of 1,222 polled, 86% (1,054) said
they had

held that position for the first time (Hodgkinson, 1971,

The position has changed.

p.

262).

At one time it was not uncommon for

a man to hold that office for twenty years or more.

For example,

Charles Van Hise was president of the University of Wisconsin from
1903 to 1918 and Lawrence Lowell at Harvard from 1909 to 1934 (Kerr,

1963, p. 13).

There was a time when men held these positions almost

like monarchs (Kerr, 1963, p. 13).

Lowell of Harvard believed a

president should "never feel hurried" or "work under pressure."
There was a time when a president’s attitude was to have an educational
plan and "though the faculty could have some say, the plan was not to
be subject to interferences or substantially altered" (Kerr, 1963, p.32).

The pace of academic administration has quickened.

The average

presidential tenure in 1960 was eleven years, in 1969 it was seven
(Metzler

,

1973, p. 162), and as previously stated in 1971 it was four

years (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 262).

Why the significant increase in the

turnover in this position in recent years?

Is it that search procedures

are so faulty as to select unstable or unsuitable people for the job?
Could it be that there are not enough qualified people in the nation to
fill the positions?

Or could it be that the job is so demanding and

must
conflict ridden that there quickly comes a point where the person
and health?
"bale out" or run the high risk of losing effectiveness

individual to
Poor search procedures, and the mismatching of the

ladders or administrathe particular institution, no established career
(Riesman, 1969, p. 81),
tive training programs with resultant amateurism
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and the pressures and demands inherent in the position itself are all

contributing factors which give rise to fluctuations in presidential
tenure and turnover rates.
The focus of this study will be the third cause, that of the

conflictful demands and pressures inherent in the office or role of
the university president.

Purpose

During the course of his day the university president interacts
with a wide range of people in the society to perform certain functions
that influence the course of action of the institution which he leads.

The purposes of this study are 1) to describe and analyze the functions
that the university president carries out;

2)

to construct a profile of

the types of offices or roles with which he must interact outside the

university in the course of performing his duties;

3)

to describe and

analyze the demands or expectations of the people with whom he interacts
the
in order to perform those duties; and 4) to describe and examine

areas,
coping mechanisms that help the president deal with conflicting

people in
expectations, or demands that arise from his interaction with
the process of carrying out his role.

examined at
There are three key variables to be explained and
purposes.
length in order for this study to achieve its

are

1)

Those variables

characteristics that
the university - its purposes, needs, and

the president will perform
set the stage for the types of activities

and interactions that result
(see Appendix A); 2) the actual activities
the university; and
from the president's efforts to serve

3)

the people

4

outside the university who shall be called the environment, that
give
raison d'etre and resources to the university.
In a theoretical sense this study will lead the reader to under-

stand the social geography of the university using the office of presi-

dent as the focal point.

To phrase it differently, the purpose is to

examine how the university president, who is the embodiment of the

relationships with the external constituencies, manages to create the
proper boundary transactions between the external constituencies and
the internal life of the university.
In a practical sense this is the study of the problems of a

university president in managing his organization, the environmental
impingements on his organization, and his own psyche.

This study will

portray what it is like to span the boundaries between two "worlds",
the university and the larger society it serves.

In a historical sense this study will be the account of one

president’s year in the process of managing a fairly typical higher
educational institution in the 1970's.
Need and Justification for Research

There are four major reasons for conducting this research:
First, the role of the president’s office in relationship to
studied systemthe external environment of the university has not been

atically or in depth.
quite limited.

The literature in regard to this question is

The tendency for the academic specialist to study

overcome by the demands
everything but the milieu he exists in is being
and behavioral scientists
of educators, administrators, sociologists
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alike, who now see a need for greater understanding of the university
and its social context.

Victor Baldridge, a sociologist, says:

As the University assumes a more critical
societal role.
.external influences encroach
more and more into academic halls, always
pushing and pulling the university toward
some particular image.
.

Unfortunately, organization theorists have
devoted little attention to the relations
between organizations and their environments
(Baldridge, 1971, p. 124).

Terry Lunsford, a research specialist at the Center for Research
and Development in Higher Education at the University of California in

Berkeley, writes, "The day of the university's isolation as an 'ivory
tower' probably is gone forever.

world is now inescapable."

Intensive interaction with the outside

Lunsford then begins to outline suggested

directions for research:

much more systematic attention should
be given to the roles of university administrators and trustees. Recent crises have
created new interest in the 'marginal' roles
of administrators and governing board members
in mediating between the values and demands
of those outside the university (Lunsford,
1968, p. 87).
.

.

.

Cincinnati and
Warren Bennis, the President of the University of
a leading organizational theorist,

says that part of the problem of

is trying to
change in organizations (specifically SUNY Buffalo)

forces impinging the
"appreciate" environmental factors or external
(Bennis, 1973,
university at the time change is attempted

p.

142).

and environments
A review of the literature on organizations

shows the apparent lack of
(Kahn, et. al., Lawrence and Lorsch)
of transactions at the
information and lacuna in quality studies

#
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interface between the environment and the organization.

The above

cited writings bemoan the lag in efforts to study this relationship
of organizations in general, to say nothing about this particular

problem in higher education.

Lawrence and Lorsch write:

It is no mystery that organizations must carry

on transactions with their environment simply
to survive, and, even more importantly, to grow.
Other analysts of organizational affairs have
consistently mentioned transactions with the
environment as a crucial if not the most crucial
issue.
It is an issue that has been dealt with
extensively by economists and by specialists in
business policy and strategy. They have dealt
primarily with the content of those relationships the actual kind and amount of goods,
services, and funds that are part of these transBut the issue has not been extensively
actions.
studied by specialists in the application of
behavioral sciences, and attention has not been
focused on such human aspects affecting the
quality of the information exchanged across
the organizational boundaries. What are the
major determinants of the quality? What are
Such questions have been
its consequences?
the relations between
of
asked many times
individuals and groups within the organization,
but the boundary-spanning relations have simply
not been subjected to comparable scrutiny
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969, p. 23).

—

A second reason why this relationship should be studied

is that

external environments surrounding universities are placing increasing
demands upon the university to adapt and respond in ways that are

different from the past.

Many different consortia-cooperative arrange-

grant college, junior
ments are forming by kind of institution (i.e. land
(Hodgkxnson, 1971,
college, university), by region, by state, by city
p.

20).

polled told of an addition
Over three-quarters of the presidents

with other institutions (Hodgkinson,
in the number of working relationships
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1971, p. 20).

Over one half of the 1,222 presidents polled reported

an increase in cooperative programs with local industry
and eighteen

percent felt there was an increase in the amount of influence in
state departments of education (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 21).

Thirdly, the boundary position is important because it oversees
a break-point in organizational purpose and may constitute a major area

for intergroup conflict.

People on the boundary are constantly in

contact with people on the outside and through interaction with them
are the first to sense discrepancies between what the organization

ought to be doing and what it is actually doing (Bennis, 1970, p. 43).

The last reason for this research is that boundary people may
find themselves in a position where their "role senders", the people
they interact with in the environment, hold conflicting and incompatible

expectations for their role performance.

These incompatible expectations

can bring about a great deal of tension and anxiety for the person

occupying this intersitial role.

Administrators, as well as behavioral

scientists, need to know more about how the boundary person handles these

problems in order to train more effective administrators.
There are many boundary positions in universities which could have

been studied.

However, the focus of this study is on the office of uni-

versity president for the reasons listed below:
1)

One main reason for this focus is that the president is the

main legitimized administrative leader for the organization
action.
and has a main impact on the university's course of
2)

centrality
A second reason for this focus has to do with the

most modern universities,
of the presidential office, the size of
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and the complexity of administration which magnifies the

conflict and ambiguity connected with the president’s job.
This places even more burden on an already difficult

boundary position.
The reasons why this relationship between the boundary person
and the organization’s external environments in most organizations in

general and in higher educational institutions in particular has remained

neglected are somewhat unclear.

One reason might be that organizational

structure facilitates internal examination because it tends to focus
troubles and unsatisfactory work relations on single sources, that is
the shared superior in the hierarchy.

Another reason why such a study

may have been neglected is that with boundary-spanning relations the
external people involved are under no obligation to cooperate with the

organization or with the organization’s boundary person.

Furthermore,

when there are several delegates from interacting organizations, it may
be difficult for the boundary person as well as for the researcher to

know which relationship to focus on in resolving conflict or understanding
differences of opinion.

A third possible reason is that the academic

disciplines such as economics and business have remained faithful to
behavioral
traditional academic divisions, and it is just recently that
crucial interscientists have begun interdisciplinary studies to examine
lines.
dependent relationships that cross traditional academic

need to understand
Whatever the reasons for non-examination, the

especially in higher education.
this key relationship is still with us,
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In summary, the four reasons for
conducting research on a

boundary person are:
1)

This role has not been studied in depth.

2)

The external environments of universities
are placing

increasing demands upon the university to adapt
and

respond in ways that are different from the past.
3)

A boundary position is important because it oversees
a

break point in organizational purpose and may constitute
a major arena for intergroup conflict.
A)

Administrators need to know about how boundary people
handle the conflict inherent in the role in order to

become more effective administrators.
In order to begin to delve into the problems of understanding

the boundary person’s role, some basic terms need to be explained.

This will be done in Chapter I.

CHAPTER

I

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Definitions and Criteria

The purpose of this study is to examine the interface
between a

modern urban university and its external environment;
more specifically
the office of a university president as it interacts with
external

people, problems, and agencies.

There seems to be some variance in the way the term environment
is used in the literature on organizations.

and Golembiewski

(

Schmuck and Miles (1971)

1972 ) use an Environmental Description Questionnaire

constructed to assess a variety of characteristics of organizational
climate such as openness and responsibility.
(

Halpin (1963) and Owens

1970 ) discuss the Organizat ional Climate Description Questionnaire

which measures such organizational characteristics as image and consideration.

It seems that both approaches try to assess the same basic

elements of an organization.

They are trying to define the organization's

atmosphere, climate, its tone or individual personality.

Because the concepts of climate and environment are often used

interchangably

,

they become confusing.

The writers mentioned above

conceptualize climate or environment as the quality of attitudes and
behaviors of persons who hold various positions within organizations.
Similarly writers in the field of leadership do not sufficiently

differentiate these concepts.

For example, Hersey and Blanchard (1972)

describe environment as those factors that may be subject to consideration
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by the leader.

"The environment consists of the leader
himself and

his followers, superiors, associates,
organization and job demands"

(Hersey and Blanchard, 1969, p. 109).

They go on to say that a

motivating environment is one that takes into consideration,
job
enrichment programs, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and Likert’s
scales

concerning organizational characteristics such as confidence and
trust, and friendliness of interaction.

For the purposes of this study the terms climate and environment

will have two separate and distinct meanings.

The term climate will be

used to mean the atmosphere, tone, or tenor of a particular sequence of
events or interactions.

Therefore, the statement "it is a climate of

the times", can be as well understood as, "the climate of that organiza-

tion is moving toward openness."

The term environment shall be defined

in the next section.

Systems Approach

Because a system’s perspective is taken in this study the term
environment will take on another meaning.

Although the word "system"

has been defined in many contexts, most writers agree that a system is
a set of parts coordinated to reach or accomplish a given set of goals.

An animal and a university are each, in their own way, a system.

There

are many ways to examine the process of how a system goes about reaching
its goals.

We could study a subsystem's relationships to other subsystems

and to the whole.

This would be akin to studying the office of university

of the
of president as a subsystem and its relationship to various parts

university such as the deans, the academic and non-academic divisions,
faculty and student groups, and so on, as other subsystems.

12

The study of a subsystem’s relationship
to other subsystems
and the whole seems an appropriate
response when the goals and the

process of reaching those goals depend
to a large degree on the

organization of those subsystems and the nature
of the subsystems’
interdependencies (Emery and Trist, 1967

,

p.

20).

This kind of study

would then be the analysis of internal processes
or of the relationships of subsystems in organizations to the
whole.

A second method would be the study of the relationship
of the
whole to other wholes or to the greater whole:

the environment.

This

is the perspective behind this dissertation.

Another dimension that helps to define what environments are
(beside the one already mentioned concerning structure or the relation
ship of parts to the whole) is the criterion of organizational purpose

Definitions of organizations combine structure and purpose in

a

way

which helps explain the distinction between environment and system.
Gross, Giacquinta and Berstein’s definition of formal organization is

typical and illustrative.

Organization Defined

A formal organization is
A rationally contrived, deliberately designed and
goal-oriented social system that organizes individuals in a formalized authority structure and in
a division of labor that links members to one
another as occupants of interrelated positions.
We use the concept of role to refer to a set of
expectations or standards applied to the behavior
of incumbents of positions (Gross, et. al., 1971,
p.

15).
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The three major ingredients of formal
organizations are 1)
division of labor, 2) coordinated effort,
and 3) common goals or

purpose (see also Schien, 1965, p.
7; Etzioni, 1964,

p.

3).

From

these characteristics the distinction between
system or organization
and environment can be made.

Environment Defined
By fiat then the environment is that which is not
"included"
in the purpose, coordination, and division of labor
of an organization.

To say it in another way, the environment is those people
who do not

directly work for the specific goals of the organization under coor-

dination and division of labor.

Purpose automatically defines and

divides organizations from each other, and at the same time defines
any one organization's environment.

The main purpose of a university

is different from that of a hospital or a city hall, and therefore

their task environments are different.'*'
It is possible to have two organizations with the same purpose

in the same basic environment as in the case of two universities in

one metropolitan area or two universities in two similar metropolitan
areas.

In both cases the quality of interaction of these organizations

with their environment depends then upon the individual organizations'
idiosyncratic needs and problems.

term task environment refers to those organizations external
to the focal organization which contribute to its goals and purposes.
•^The

14

Environments are, of course, relative to the system that is
focused upon.

Certain parts of the environment will differ depending

on whether the focal system is a hospital, governmental agency, or a

university.

Environments are relative depending on the scope or level

of the system focused upon.

For example, if the focal unit is a

college of Arts and Sciences then the subsystem would be the departments which comprise the college and the task environment would be the
rest of the university.
The problem of actualization of goals and purposes of the organ-

ization can be studied by either analyzing the subsystems or parts of
the total system that affect the attainment of these goals or by

analyzing the contexts or surroundings in which the total system exists
and draws from in order to complete and renew its purposes.

That con-

text or surrounding in which the total system exists and draws from in

order to complete and renew its purposes is essentially the systems'

environment
The purposes of organizations are to deal with different aspects
of societal needs; accordingly, the expectations and job obligations of

the members of the organization require somewhat different skills and

behaviors.

Different purposes also result in the need for different

services
resources from the environment and the returning of different
to the environment.
as open systems.
In this way organizations can be conceived of

physical object
It is like the difference between a

(a stone)

and a

itself certain types of
living thing that survives by "importing into

15

material from Its environment,
transforming these In accordance
with
Its own system characteristics
and exporting other types
back Into
the environment" (Emery and
Trist,
1967, p. 22).

Open System Defined
The open system is a
Dynamic system; that is, it is
characterized by a
continuing process of input, transformation,
and
output.
Organizational input characteristically
includes people, materials, and energy;
organizational output typically takes the form
of products
and services, although it may consist
mainly of
direct psychological returns to members.
The openness of the organization as a system means
that it
is externally dependent upon its
environment for
the absorption of its products and services
and
for providing the necessary input which
reactivates
the process of transformation, thereby maintaining
the organization in existence (Kahn, et. al.
1964
P.

12).

It is difficult to draw a clear distinction
between system and

environment.

When do outside resources become inside building blocks?

All the limited work on this interface cautions against the
possibility
of precise delineation of the term boundary (Kahn,
1964, p.

7;

and Trist, 1967, p. 20; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969, p. 16).

These

Emery

writers do, however, imply that some distinctions can be made to help
us understand this key area even though criteria for what is part of
the organization and what is not, who is in the organization and who
is not are always subject to constant qualification.

The boundary is semipermeable, letting in those resources it

needs to function and returning resources to the environment.

Most of

these transactions result in the process of resource procurement and

disposition.

A university may take in new laboratory supplies and return
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a new synthetic drug to the
environment.

It may take in a new faculty

member to teach and return Ph.D.'s
to the environment to be hired
by
other universities, industry, or
government. The criteria for what
is
internal to an organization and what
is external are difficult
to define

absolutely because just as the system
is evolving and changing, so are
the boundaries.

The organization is made clear and its
boundaries prescribed by
the relationships and interaction
patterns through which it carries out
the on-going cycles of input-transformation-output.

These, of course,

are comprised of numerous motivated acts of
human beings (Kahn and Wolfe,
1964, p. 13).

It follows that the organization survives and
functions

only so long as people can be motivated to perform the
behaviors needed
to maintain these organizational cycles.

Because all organizations depend on the behaviors that continue

organizational cycles and because of the great degree of specialization
in the process of those input-transformation-output cycles, one of the

basic needs of organization is dependability of role performance (Kahn
and Wolfe, 1964, p. 95).

The term role performance or behavior means

those behaviors which are system-relevant (not always in accordance with
the expectations and demands of others) and which are performed by a

person who is accepted by others as a member of the system (Kahn and
Wolfe, 1964, p. 18).

(These criteria of course will be reinforced by

the rituals and formalities of the organization such as employment

contracts, rewards and sanctions, status, etc.)

For the purposes of

this study these defining characteristics of organizational role were

used to distinguish between what was external and what was internal to
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the organization.
In order to draw this distinction, both
criteria of membership

and system relevance were necessary.

For example, take the case of

an alumnus or donor giving money to the university
because he is con-

cerned with certain aspects of its development.

Although this act

may be system relevant, it is not role behavior.

If,

a faculty

member

happens to bump the car next to him as he is parking his automobile,
this is also not role behavior.

He is a member of an organization,

but his action is not system relevant or role-related.

A critical underlying point in this theoretical view is that
the activities (patterned behavior) which define a "role" consist of

the expectations of the members of the organization with whom the focal

person interacts and that these expectations are communicated or "sent"
to the focal person or role occupant.

As has been stated the boundaries of organizations are semi-

permeable.

The degree of permeability differs with the type and idio-

syncratic nature of the organization in question.

Some organizations

have starkly prescribed rigid boundaries; others do not.

A monastic

order or convent would be an example of the former, while the major

political parties would represent the latter.

So open are the major

political parties that their boundaries are not clearly defined.

How-

ever, during times of crisis boundaries of almost all organizations

stiffen and become more selective to protect their structure and core

technology (Thompson, 1967, p. 39).
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Logically the organizations that
want to be relatively free
from environmental influence yet
sensitive to environmental pressures
must have very skillful people who
carry on boundary transactions.

Boundary Person Defined
Since the distinction between system
and environment is in many

ways a conceptual one, the boundary is
in a sense a psychological
concept.

It is easily thought of as a border,
a setting of limits,

a break point - a break point that
separates attitudes, expectations,

and behaviors that are different "inside" and
"outside" the organization.

A university boundary person is someone whose "principal
job is
to link the university organization and the outside
world (community

environment)

.

He tries to gain support from the outside world but at

the same time fend off pressures, to give the university
organization

enough autonomy to pursue its own destiny" (Baldridge, 1971,

Boundary people are internal

,

p.

125).

working for organizational purposes yet

constantly interacting with those who are not.
A boundary position is one for which some members
of the role set are located in a different system.
It is a rare person who does not have at least
occasional job-related contact with people outside
his work unit, but positions vary considerably
with respect to "boundary relevance." Two dimensions can be distinguished:
the amount of time
a person spends in business contacts with people
outside his work unit and the importance of such
contacts to the person's effective performance
on the job (Kahn, 1964, et. al.
p. 101).
Bennis terms boundary persons "variance sensors."
They
tion
As a
make

sense discrepancies between what the organizaought to be doing and what it is actually doing.
result they are under continual tension. They
This makes them, in
good problem identifiers.
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fact very useful company men although
at
times they may seem abrasive to others in
the company.
.

.

Properly encouraged they can act as a
scanner for the organization, letting the
household executives know what is happening
on the outside. We must reward these
people, they are intersitial, connecting
several worlds, they can provide excellent
information about social climate. They are
v it a l to the evolution of organizational
goals (Bennis, 1970, pp. 41-42).
There are many such pivotal boundary positions in modern universities:

the Admissions Office, the Registrar, the Development

Office, and in some urban schools, the Office of Metropolitan Affairs,
to mention just a few whose main responsibility is to interact on a

regular basis with people and organizations outside the university.

However it should be repeated that almost every role of the university
at one time or another has some contact with people on the outside.

Summary

In summary this study will examine the boundary position of the

university president in order

1)

to describe the nature and extent of

the boundary activity performed by the occupant; 2) to obtain a composite

picture of what major agencies and interest groups constitute "the
environment"; 3) to portray the stresses of the boundary clearly by

identifying the relationship between institutional demands, information
exchanged, and environmental demands, and

4)

to examine the coping

mechanisms of the boundary person used to mediate between conflicting
demands
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Even though the study has narrow
goals, there is still some

room for narrowing its character and
results.

There could be some

implicit expectations in the reader’s
mind as to what may be contained in this study that will not be
presented in this study.

The

following section should clarify these
expectations.
Constraints and Expectations of this Study
In these paranoic times of Watergate buggings
and Pentagon papers
it would be easy to expect this study to become
something it is not

meant to be:

namely an expose, a revealing of sensitive information,

the telling of the

and inaptitude.

real

man, the depiction of bureaucratic bungling

Many people asked the author, when they learned of the

access and candor which the focal person allowed, "what happens if what

you find is not favorable to the President, then what?"
The purpose and style of this study is to explain not evaluate,
to describe not judge.

The study is designed to make statements about

what happened and not to make statements as to how effective one man

was in the performance of his duty.

It concerns the parameters of the

office of university president not how well one man filled that office.
This is not a study that describes what could or should be.

Rather, the

focus is on the expectations and problems that found their way into the

President’s office.

The focus is not whether the President should be

educator and caretaker, creator or inheritor, pump or bottleneck, mediator
or initiator

(Kerr, 1963, p. 29) but on pressures, the behaviors required

by the pressures, and the President's responses to those pressures.

In

this approach something can be said about what the university president
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—

’

“hat functlons he

^ves.

The study will be more of
a role study

and be less concerned with
effectiveness, leadership style,
and decisionmaking.
It will focus upon leader
behavior patterns, communication
patterns and role expectations in a
system context.
The major components with which
this study is concerned are,
the individual’s '’location” in
the organization, the pressures
exerted

upon him by his role "senders”, and
the ambiguity and conflict he

experiences in connection with his work
(Kahn and Wolfe, 1964,

p.

52).

An implication and ramification of this
design is that the perceptions
and behavior of the role senders should be
gauged independently of the

perceptions and behaviors of the focal person toward
whom they are
directed (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 30).

It is not enough to measure

the behavior of the role senders in terms of the
perceptions of the

focal person because

we are committed to the hypothesis that his perceptions
are affected by the state of his interpersonal relations with role senders and by aspects of his own
personality.
Indeed we expect that some of his major
defenses against a difficult situation will involve
perceptual distortion (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 36).
This is a character study of an office rather than of a man.

For

that reason it is hoped that this work will be less secular and of use
to a wide range of people.

There was an effort to make the study as

readable to as many different audiences as possible by minimal use of
technical terms and jargon, yet retaining rigorous logic and clear
presentation.
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There has always been, and it seems even
more so now, a division
of interests and perspectives within
the structure and ethics of the

university.

Today, faculty, administration, and students
are antagon-

istically separate (Lunsford, 1968, p. 93; Baldridge,
1971,

p.

65).

The resultant "we-they" attitudes are predicated
to some degree on mis-

understanding and mistrust.

In the absence of face-to-face knowing,

typification or stereotypes are used as substitutes in explanation of
what each group does to and for the university.

Because of the intellectuals' traditional aversion for bureaucracy and initiative stifling "red tape", there is a tendency for the

administration to be understaffed and over-worked.

Within the focus

°f this study some statements will be made in an effort to show what

the university president does and if, indeed, he really does need more

staff assistance.

The author's opinion is that the university is in a dormant period,

trying to find its identity among its proliferated goals, a period of
quiet and crippling financial instability because (among other reasons)
the demands of the youth and their elders are not overwhelmingly clear
and evident.

This is not the time to mistrust, to be insular and to cling

to parochial interests and stereotypes.

Administrator and faculty must

come to understand how the climate and times of the society are calling
for, almost forcing, basic changes in university goals and structure.

The author would hope that the methodological approach of this
study can break down stereotypes generally held of the university adminis-

trator by various groups.

The research method used in this study was
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chosen specifically to provide the
reader with qualitative information
that would lead to greater understanding
of administrative problems and
parameters.

The following chapter is an in^iepth
explanation of the

method chosen.

CHAPTER

I

I

METHOD

The impact of any study rests not
only on what the conclusions
are but also on how the facts were
gathered that led to the premises
and conclusions.

To increase the usefulness of this
study this

chapter will present the method chosen, the
strengths and weaknesses
of the method, some alternative methods
used in other studies, the

components of the method used, the pitfalls of response
sets, the
author

s

acknowledgement of some of his own response sets, a rationale

for the choice of the research setting, and the flow of
the research

design.
One purpose of this field study was to yield a design in which

role expectations held by all relevant role senders could be specified
for one focal person, the university president.

These expectations,

together with the responses of the occupant of the focal office, would

allow for a definition of role conflict in terms of expectations (sent
roles) independent of the representations of these expectations in the

mind of the focal person.

Given the above purpose the following dilemmas needed to be
faced:

1)

selection of the office to be studied and the organization

which contained that office;

2)

identification of the set of role

senders for the occupant of a particular office;

3)

collection of data

from role senders so as to result in understandings and comparisons

among the expectations of individual role senders; and

4)

determination

of the hypothetical effects of role conflict and ambiguity.
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The office to be studied Is
evident and the reasons for the

choice have been elaborated in Chapter

I.

The case study was selected

to accomplish the three remaining
steps.

Orientation of Approach

It is difficult to substitute for
face-to-face knowledge of

people.

However, in a rapidly changing technological
society it is

often necessary that people know about more
people than they meet
directly.

Public decisions are often made and stances taken
toward

people on the basis of what is known about rather than
known directly

.

In the absence of face-to-face knowing, novelists,
journalists, film

makers have jumped into the breach to provide vicarious alternatives
(Lof land,

1971, p. 89).

Lofland has given some ingredients for what

a reporter's work should contain if it is to give the reader a true

sense of knowing.

1)

The reporter should have been close to the

people on whom he reports.

By "close" Lofland means close in the

physical sense of conducting his own life in face-to-face proximity
over a significant period of time and in a variety of circumstances

which results in a social sense of intimacy and confidentiality.

Also

he should so conduct his recording activities that they give close and

searching attention to minute matters (Lofland, 1971, p. 2).

reporter should be truthful.

3)

The

2)

The reporter's work should contain a

significant amount of pure description of people's activities.

4)

work should contain direct quotes from participants (Lofland, 1971,
P.

2).

The
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The above Ingredients are contained
in a case study method or

qualitative approach.

This method allows the reporter to
give the

reader a chance to know rather than know
about

.

The conclusions derived from a study
depend on the method of
the study.

Was it a qualitative or quantitative type
of study?

Lofland writes:
Inquiry or analysis is usefully thought of as
the attempt to answer one or more of only three

questions
1)

What are the characteristics of a social
phenomenon, the form it assumes, the variation it displays?

2)

What are the causes of a social phenomenon,
the form it assumes, the variation it displays?

3)

What are the consequences of a social phenomenon, the form it assumes, the variation it
displays?
(Lofland, 1971, p. 13).

When the form of the study endeavors to answer question one it will
be of a qualitative nature while if the form of a study tries to answer

questions two or three it will be quantitative in nature.
The qualitative analyst seeks to provide and
explicit rendering of the structure, order, and
patterns found among a set of participants.
Qualitative analysts ask such questions as:
what kinds of things are going on here? What
are the forms of this phenomenon? What variations do we find in this phenomenon? That ijs
qualitative analysis is_ addressed to the task
of delineating forms, kinds, and types of
social phenomenon, of documenting in loving
details the things that exist (Lofland, 1971,
p.

13).

Both qualitative and quantitative methods examine and depict social

phenomena.

Because each asks a different set of questions their concluding

statements are different.

The qualitative approach tends to be "here and now"
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oriented and the quantitative approach
tends to be past oriented.
The socio-psychological approach asks:
What
are the past experiences and characteristics
of participants that foster conflict?
But
one can ask, and this is the structural
approach:
What are the conditions in the social setting
that promote conflict? Both approaches
deal
with the influence of social conditions on
patterns of conduct but the former examines
the influence of past social conditions on
personality characteristics and hence on conduct, whereas the latter is concerned with
the influences of present social conditions
on conduct (Blau and Scott, 1962, p. 82).
As the reader can infer from the first chapter of this
dissertation, this study examines the office of the university president
from

the structural approach.

The purpose is to explain observed patterns

of behavior in terms of existing social conditions.

Holding in abeyance

"personality" or "social background", the method of this study asks what
features of the current social setting or organizational conditions would
lead almost anyone, regardless of personality, to behave in the particular

ways being observed.
Case Study or Qualitative Approach; Its Form

As has been stated the "case study" method was selected for this

dissertation.

There is no set format for the case study, no standard

research design:

it is a method established in the field using a

variety of data collection procedures, after considering the system that
it is designed to study and the goals of the study.

gathering procedures used in this study were:

The main data

interviews, analysis of

records and documents, and non -participant observation.

Even though
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the case study does not have an
established form but rather a roll-

your -own 1 quality about it, there are
some distinguishing characteristics which separate it from other methods.
The case study method is distinguished
clearly from other

scientific methodologies because of a reliance
on:

1)

the actual

on-site presence of the researcher at the activities
of the social
system being studied;
3)

2)

the sequential aspect of the analysis; and

the absence of quantification.

The on— site, visible presence of the field worker gives the

opportunity for face-to-face knowing referred to previously.

It allows

understanding of the milieu in which the subjects being studied
experience their "ups and downs."

It provides the chance for the field

worker to come to grips with small, quotidian, mundane details that will
breathe life into his study and humanness into the subjects observed.

During this study the author attended countless informal and formal
gatherings and tried to remember what occurred so it could be recorded
in the quiet hours afterward.

Meetings of large and small groups were

also recorded while the meeting was in progress, which, initially

resulted in some apprehensive glances being directed toward the researcher.
This apprehension will be discussed in the strengths and weaknesses of the

non-participant technique.

1

A phrase used by Bennis (1973, p. 6) to describe his search for a
method that would combine personal and theoretical insights.
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The second distinctive characteristic of
the qualitative approach
is the sequential aspect of analysis.

The technique of non-participant

observation results more in the generation of hypotheses
than in their
testing.

The author "floated" in the system for approximately
three

months before a focus was chosen.

"Floating" was necessary because to

make a choice of a focus required acquaintance and understanding
of the
system, a negotiation of what was possible given the constraints of

access and sensitivity, the construction of a cognitive framework that

would highlight possible areas for study, the building of trust and
credibility, and estimating what would be satisfying and worthy of study.

Dalton says that it "would be foolish and often impossible to
approach a complex or social system with preconceived hypotheses which
seem to have no great likelihood of being verified" (Dalton, 1959,

Intimacy with the social system must come first.

Strauss et

.

p.

confirm

al

that field work has a developing character to it by saying "A.

.

55).

general

.

characteristic of field work is its temporarily developing character.

The

field worker usually does not enter the field with specific hypotheses and
a predetermined research design"

(Strauss, et. al., 1969, p. 751).

These

are some of the drawbacks of this distinctive methodology which will be

further considered in the discussion of strengths and weaknesses.
The third characteristic previously mentioned is the absence of

quantification.

There are some investigations, such as Mintzberg (1971)

that do contain some basic quantifying data but these are exceptions

rather than the rule in non-participant observation techniques.
absence of quantification does not mean lack of evidence.

The

The evidence

and remarks
is qualitative in nature with the use of critical incidents
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to uphold conclusions.

Usually the data are drawn from a large
number

of sources In order to substantiate
possible conclusions; In this study

from correspondence, phone calls, meetings.
Interviews, and observation.
At times the study will make use of the
critical device known as the

representative ancedote", which Bennis defines as that
"singular event
with antecedents and consequences capable of consolidating
illuminations
that hold true not only for the described event but for
the entire class
of cases for which the ancedote stands" (Bennis,

1973, p. 9).

The

"representative ancedote" is quite necessary given the great amounts of

phenomena to be processed and conveyed.
To reiterate, the case study employed in this study used the non-

participant observation technique, interviews, analysis of documents and
records, and reflective analysis to provide contextual information in

portraying the role of the university president.

The intent was to gain

a qualitative, realistic assessment of a complex, dynamic process.

justification for why this method was chosen is a logical next step.
Reasons for Choice of the Method

The public sees only the product of organizational
decision-making, never the process. Organizational
behavior is typically perceived as monolithic.
Into every step taken by the 'administration' goes
a complicated pattern of meetings, disagreements,
conversations, personalities, emotions, and missed
.the public rarely sees the hundreds
connections.
of small tableaux, the little dramas that result in
It sees
a policy statement or a bit of strategy.
only the move, or hears only the statement and it
unreasonably assumes that such an action is the
result of a dispassionate, almost mechanical process
in which problems are perceived, alternate solutions
weighed, and rational decisions made. Given human
nature that is almost never the case (Bennis, 1973,
.

.

p.

2)

.

.

Some
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Because people and the systems In which
they interact are indeed
seen as monolithic, there is a greater
need for studies which show more
of the complexity and compassion of
the real situation.

Purely statis-

tical studies designed for census and survey
and laboratory data lean
in the direction of M n on-humanistic
appreciation:

they fail to see that

social science itself is produced in a variety
of styles" (Lofland, 1971,
P-

5).

Statistical order has dehumanizing effects but then
again the

goals of these types of studies are not humanistic
appreciation.

The

goals are instead, "the establishment of reliable generalizations
around

frequencies of social events and around associations among them"
(Lofland,
1971, p. 5).

The annoyance arises when exponents of statistical studies intimate
their work is the total scope of what individuals need in order to understand another (Lofland, 1971, p. 5).

Webb et. al., maintain that the dominant mass of social science

research is based on interviews and questionnaires (Webb, et. al., 1966,
p.

1).

This leads to the second reason for this qualitative method, which

is that reflection needs to be reestablished as a legitimate process of

inquiry for the social sciences.

This method of inquiry would integrate

new experience with analysis combining action and examination (Bennis,
1973, p. 6).

Although Bennis was using this rationale in defense of

participant observation, it still holds true for the case study method
or qualitative approach.
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The third reason for using the case
study or qualitative method
is that it can more adequately
depict the development and process
of

change, whereas experimental survey
techniques accentuate relationships

between static variables and fail to capture
the systematic process of
the development of change (von Bertalanffy,
1968; and also, Becker, 1958).
In summary it should be said that what the
census or survey method
in representative coverage of a population
is probably of no greater methodological signi-

ficance than the increased depth of understanding
and interpretation possible with participant
observation. This is evident when we contrast
the position of the survey analyst and participant observer when they both face the problem of
interpreting the meaning of a question. The desk
chair analyst can give at best an intelligent
guess based upon sketchy pretest and tabular data.
The observer.
can call upon the wealth of his
experience with the linguistic habits, the attitudes, values and beliefs of the group and provide
a much richer and probably sounder interpretation
(Vidich and Shapiro, 1955, p. 303).
.

.

Every method has, because of its characteristics, its own methodological weaknesses.
p.

1).

No research method is without bias (Webb, et. al.,

Because no research method is without bias, some acknowledgement

and discussion is necessary concerning the biases contained in the method

chosen for this research.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Method

Advantages of the Method
The case study method or the qualitative approach incorporates, for
the purposes of this study, techniques of non-participant observation,

interviews, and document analysis.

The approach and the techniques con-

tained therein each have inherent methodological strengths and weaknesses.
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The advantages of the approach have
been already described,

such as face-to-face knowing; attempts
to overcome dehumanization;
its suitability for adumbrating the
dynamic process and character-

istics of organizations; and the restoring
of reflection as a legiti-

mate process of inquiry in the social sciences.

Bennis makes a signi-

ficant point when he says that "most social science
writing about men
in institutions suffers from a sanitary concern
with causality, co-

herence, and a search for pattern which rarely exists except
in the

mind of the observer.

The result is fake, at times, destructively so.

Those elements of confusion, chance, ignorance, stupidity, recklessness,
as well as the many other qualities of man are simply not reckoned with;

they are selectively ignored" (Bennis, 1973, p. 7).
The advantages, however, of the researcher being able to secure

his data within the medium, symbols, and experiential worlds which give

meaning to his subjects, have their methodological shortcomings.
To reiterate, the characteristics of the qualitative approach

were:

1)

the absence of quantitative data, 2) the sequential aspect of

analysis and

3)

system studied.

the on-site presence of the researcher in the social

Each of the characteristics leads to certain limitations.

Disadvantages of the Method
Because there is an absence of quantifiable data, statements concerning cause and consequence are harder to substantiate.
for all cases can not be established.

rarely tested in any conclusive way.

Predictability

Hypotheses may be suggested but
In the words of Lofland:
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It is perfectly appropriate that one be
curious
about causes so long as one recognizes that
whatever account or explanation is offered is
conjecture.
In more legitimacy-conferring terms
such conjectures are called hypotheses or theories.
It is proper to devote a portion of one's report
to conjectured causes of variations so long as
one clearly labels his conjectures, hypotheses,
or theories, as being exactly that (Lofland, 1971,
p.

62).

The reasons why the hypotheses can not be validated by the qualitative approach are known widely in research circles and are often attri-

buted to a lack of representative samples, bias created by presence of

researcher, lack of breadth of samples and a lack of control of crucial
independent and dependent variables.

The purpose of this study is not

the confirmation of general hypotheses.

This study seeks to formulate

and suggest hypotheses, not to show their impeccable validity for all

university presidents.
A second characteristic which leads to a disadvantage is that of
the sequential aspect of analysis.

The lack of quantifiable data and

sequential aspects of analysis lead to more time and emphasis being placed
on the formulation of hypotheses and not on the critical testing of ab-

stract variables.

research:

Strauss et. al., discuss three stages to case study

the initial stage requires general observation where specific

problems have not been determined.

Toward the end of the initial stage,

the formation of hunches and hypotheses leads to the second phase.

This

second stage is marked by greater attention to particular events in the
field and by an emerging set of propositions.

The final stage consists

e_t^ al
of systematic efforts to pinpoint various hypotheses (Strauss,

1969)

.

.

that
Becker adds another stage which results when those hypotheses
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survive tests of daily observation are subject to
more controlled
inquiry and then incorporated into descriptive
models that explain
the data gathered (Becker, 1958).

The advantage of this procedure

is that it allows the researcher to develop
hypotheses that will be

well suited to the system studied and that can be modified over
time.
The obvious risk is that hypotheses may be suggested but rarely
tested
in a conclusive way.

The third characteristic of the qualitative method, the on-site

presence of the researcher, is the one which is the most critical aspect
for this study because it is the greatest source of invalid understanding.

Non-participant observation can be a threat to the credibility of the
conclusions.

In other words the reader may wonder if there was "built-

in" bias in the presence of the observer or in the observer’s perceptions.

Threats to the quality of data gathered by the non-participant observer

technique are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Sources of Invalidity to Non-Participant Observation

Threats to valid interpretation of what is being observed come from
three circumstances.

Webb, et. al., 1966 and McCall, 1969 describe the

same three effects.

Errors in observation result from 1) error that may be traced to
those being studied; 2) error that comes from the investigator, and

3)

errors associated with sampling imperfections (Webb, et. al., 1966,

p.

McCall claims that such errors may result from

1)

12).

the structural features

character
of the observer’s role relationship with subjects; 2) personal
and
istics of the observer, particularly his psychological functioning;
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3)

characteristics of the observer’s frame of
reference (McCall, 1969,

P.

ID.
The possibilities of these errors are
acknowledged by this

researcher and the following is an explanation of
the efforts taken
to overcome them.

Errors Resulting from Those Being Studied

The field study was an in-out process 2 in which the
researcher
was at times actively involved in watching meetings, hearing
people's

problems, watching them succeed and fail within the context of a large
university.

There were also times of distance, separation, and reflec-

tion which is not always afforded someone who is actively engaged in a
job.

The researcher had no "job" responsibilities other than this study

and toward the end of the study was visible only at meetings thought to
be key to certain mini-cases that would provide representative anecdotal

material.

In the first three to four months however, the researcher and

his wife (also doing doctoral dissertation field work) ware present at
as many meetings as possible in order to get acclimated to the system.

This could have created some of the effects set forth by Webb, et. al.
The effects they described are 1) the guinea pig effect (possibly the

Watergate effect), which is the awareness of being watched;
selection effect which can be exemplified by ’Who shall

I

2)

be as

the role
I

answer

these questions or do these tasks?'; 3) "the measurement as change agent"

author is indebted to Mark Karpel for this concept as well as
for a part of the conceptual framework for this chapter (see Karpel, 1973).
^ The
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effect, where questions asked by the
researcher or his presence at a

specific meeting might lead the respondent
to actually change his
behavior; and 4) built-in response sets of
respondents - for example,
the preference for a strong statement over
moderate or indecisive ones
in an interview (Webb, et. al.

,

1966, pp. 12-21).

How these reactive effects were overcome partly depended
on the
method of introduction and image presented to the system
upon arrival.
The researchers were introduced by a letter from the
Dean of the School
of Education at the University of Massachusetts as
two people doing field

work for their doctoral dissertation coupled with a letter by the university
president asking the university community to be as honest and as helpful
as possible.

The president would ask those people, both inside and out-

side the university, with whom he was meeting, if they had any objections
to one or both researchers observing the meeting about to begin.

no one objected to the meeting being observed.

Usually

It should be said that as

the researchers became known around the system access was almost automatic

and was never really an issue.

The openness demonstrated by most people

was extraordinary and heartwarming!

It seemed as if the academic community

could relate to the research purpose very quickly.

The reactive effects

associated with those being studied were more pronounced when the researcher
interacted with people outside the university.

This difference however can

also be accounted for because respondents within the university had more

interaction time with the researchers.
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The reactive effects of feeling like
’’guinea pigs”, of role

selection, and of the change agent, were
combatted by a number of

strategies on the part of the researcher.

One strategy was to

compare interview answers, with actions observed
in meetings and with

correspondence sent to and from the President’s office.

For consist-

ency and honesty, another strategy was to assure
confidentiality for
all interactions.

As credibility and trust increased, confidentiality,

combined with constantly explaining and seeking understanding
for the

purpose and focus of the study in progress, gradually resulted in
candid,
spontaneous answers and behaviors.

The procedure of asking for access

to meetings or for copies of documents gradually became taken for granted

as did the researcher’s behavior of jotting down notes during meetings.

A major factor which helped reduce the guinea pig effect was that
the President set the example for allowing the researcher to be visible

and prominent in all but a few meetings.

(The meetings were usually

one-to-one, such as between the President and a dean over a resignation.)
He also allowed full access to any and all records and files that came in

and out of his office during the academic year, 1972-73.

The main threat to the credibility of this study was the reactive

effects as to errors resulting from the researcher himself.
Errors Resulting from the Researcher
The observer has "response sets" (Webb, 1966,

distortion mechanism referred to by Bennis (1973,
dilemma."

p.

p.

10)

19)

or a built-in

as the "reflexive

This, said simply, is the emotional involvement of the observer

in the setting he is studying.

It results in the investigator having an
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investment in what happens:

he wants certain things to occur
so he may

influence or direct his observations which
of course changes the data.
Or the researcher's value system may
lead him to do or say things that

change the data.

As the study progressed, the researcher
began to under-

stand more of the subtleties of some of the
university problems and

consequently observing became extremely hard to do.
to pitch in and help, not merely stand by.

There was a desire

The investigator wanted to

share what had been seen in order to aid in possible
solutions.

This

dilemma of wanting to share yet not wanting to share provided
some
interesting conflicts for the researcher.

Emotional investment comes from two sources:

from the researcher's

own value structure and from developing a strong attachment for the people

being studied and their problems.

The researcher freely acknowledges that

there was an emotional involvement with many people in the system, especially
in relation to the University President who was the center of the study.

The resultant disadvantage of this caring relationship is that the

researcher may lose an outsider's perspective on what he sees.

The loss

of the outsider's perspective means in essence that he is susceptible to

whatever subtle influences, moods, or assumptions pervade the system.
This susceptibility, as Karpel says, can work for the researcher as well.
If he (the researcher) can sensitively draw back
and try to understand his own feelings and thoughts,
he may have a valuable phenomenological insight into
the experience of the other members of the system
and into the forces working in that system. Naturally
this sort of data requires careful checks through
observations of others' behavior and interviewing
members about their own reactions but it remains
true that as a participant the researcher can often
use his own emotions and reactions as a clue in
understanding the observations of the system he

studies (Karpel, 1973, p. 23).
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Even though losing an outsider’s perspective can work for the

researcher, it is still a risk.

The researcher may feel that his own

freedom to pursue delicate questions and publish his conclusions are
limited by the social relationships he has established.
Two other values held by the researcher that could have dis-

torted

what was seen are

1)

the author’s opinion that universities

need to change and 2) the author’s opinion that the direction of that
change must be toward community service and solving public problems.

Beside trying to look for as many different perspectives as possible
and trying to present those views equitably there is precious little
that can be done to compensate for values held by a researcher.
in research say that:

Experts

"Since the investigator has control over neither

his affective responses, nor their effects on his observations he must

contend with his. feelings as part of his data.

Only by increasing his

own awareness of them, their basis, and their effects on him, will he
be able to counteract their distorting influences" (Schwartz and Schwartz,
1955, p. 49).

My r dal says basically the same thing and offers the same corrective
action:

"There is no other device for excluding biases in social sciences

than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated,

specific, and sufficiently concretized value premises" (Myrdal, 1944,

p.

^Distortion is an unfortunate term because it suggests "objectivity.
or biases the reIt implies that if it were not for these interferences
for is interhope
can
we
most
searcher could see the "real" world. The
so with this
ignore,
project,
subjective agreement. Yet people do deny,
qualification, the term is used.

1045).

AO

The author has acknowledged and
stated what values he feels
may
have resulted In selective
distortion. How well these reactive
effects
were overcome. In observations,
Interviews and analysis of documents,
remains to be seen in the presentation
of the rest of this dissertation.

Errors In Sampling
The final source of error listed by
Webb, et. al., is the error
that results from the samples of the
observed phenomenon.

In this

study if meetings were not observed,
interviews not held, or documents
not read, the results would not reflect
all the role senders’ expecta-

tions or all the constraints of the university
context.

There were

many meetings and phone calls that were not possible
to retrieve because
the university President could not be 'shadowed'
twenty-four hours a day.
For the period studied, this was not possible because of
the constraints

on the President as well as on the researcher.

Because of the researcher's

relationship with different members of the groups inside and outside the
university, there was differential access.

Also distortion could come in

sampling because of the researcher's inclinations to accept what reactors
said at face value.

The policy of using more than one research technique such as observation, interviews, and document analysis was used to reduce the chances of

not catching all of the role expectations for the office of university

president
The credibility of this study must emerge from the methodology as

well as the data.

Considering the qualitative nature of the data the

credibility lies in the research methods and presentation of results.
order to give the reader the fullest access possible, the next section

In

41

represents an effort to make
explicit the relationship between
the author's
detailed account of role expectations
and the primary data used
to hypothesize those expectations.
Research Design
The following Is a brief outline of
how the data was gathered and
analyzed to meet the purposes of this
study.
The sources of data were
the observation of meetings, interviews
with key role senders, analysis
of all incoming and outgoing correspondence,
and the analysis of phone

calls and calendar of one university president.
The purposes of this study are, as have been
stated:

1)

to analyze

the boundary activity of a university president;
2) to obtain a composite

picture of the environment he interacts with;

3)

to analyze the role stress

of the boundary person; and 4) to analyze the mechanisms
used to cope with

the stress.

There were six basic steps of the research design used to reach the
stated purposes.

Briefly, they are the following:

a systems approach;

2)

1)

the delineation of

the explanation of criteria used to distinguish

between internal and external;

3)

an analysis of documents to reveal what

interactions occurred between the President and external people, and who
those external groups and people were; 4) an analysis of the demands

reflected in the interactions;

5)

a description of small cases buttressed

by in-depth interviews, and observations showing role conflict and ambiguity;
and 6) an analysis of the President's reactions to the pressures, his coping

mechanisms
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Steps one and two have already been
done to some degree in

Chapter

I

and further description of the university
as a system will

occur in Appendix A. ^

Criteria for external vs. internal have been

designated in terms of role theory.
To refresh the reader's mind, a person is said
to be internal

when he is seen to perform system relevant behavior
and these behaviors
are patterned so as to result in dependability of role
performance.

A

person is said to be internal if he is perceived by others as
occupying
an organizational role, having system membership, and if as a
member of
that organization, he is seen by others as performing system-relevant

functions
This system's perspective and these boundary criteria lead to
step three which is an analysis of presidential activities or contacts
in the form of correspondence, phone calls, and calendar.

were analyzed for form

,

i.e. mail, face-to-face meetings, phone calls,

etc.; by function or purpose

,

i.e. appointment setting, information sharing,

acknowledgements, etc.; by flow
by frequency

,

The contacts

,

i.e. who initiates contact with whom; and

i.e. how often contacts are made.

The classification system

used for function and flow are included in Appendix

B.

The results of the

author's analysis of form, function, flow and frequency are set forth in

Charts

I - IV,

found in Chapter III.

^The reader may wish to read this appendix before reading the following
chapters, in order to gain a perspective of the university system's problems,
future dilemmas and choices as well as a discussion of the university system s
qualities, flows of communication, and norms, that differentiate it from other
organizations.

Chapter III on boundary activities explains
the implications for
the occupant of the role of university
president.

The form, function,

flow, and frequency of boundary activities
place demands on the behavior
of the person occupying the focal position
to respond to the contacts.

These contacts "lead” the occupant to perform
certain roles or activities

which will also be depicted in the fourth chapter.
Chapter IV portrays a composite picture of the environment
with

which the university president interacts by discussing the
issues and
problems revealed through an analysis of presidential activities.

The

analysis of the flow and function of contacts should disclose the "causal
texture" of the environment.

The environmental factors that lead a presi-

dent to act and react, once disclosed and explained, will set the stage
for Chapter V.

Chapter V will achieve the third purpose of this study which is to

analyze the role stress of the boundary position.

A number of crucial

incidents will be traced in-depth to show the conflict, ambiguity, and

resulting stress from various conflicting or incomplete expectations of
the groups and individuals involved for the role performance of the

university president.

Each environmental group or internal group depicted

in the cases has needs for maintenance, production, and adaptation of their

own norms and frames of reference which may conflict with each other or

with the president’s role.
The content of the information exchange vis-a-vis specific issues and

problems must be delineated to show the potential areas of conflict and stres
Therefore, three environmental groups and associated issues will be analyzed
in depth.
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In order to distill the salient
issues or cases of potential con-

flict and stress, a power/dependency 5
model will be used.

After the

importance of the cases has been established,
the pros and cons of various
actions and the implications of those actions
for each issue will be

explored by an historical perspective detailing
what universities'
roles have been in the past.

Also, interviews with people inside and

outside the university will be conducted to determine
what their respective points of view are for the cases investigated.

A description of how the President copes with the problems, in
an
effort to maintain both his own equilibrium and the institution's will
serve to accomplish the fourth purpose of the study.

Chapter VI analyzes

the coping behaviors demonstrated by the President and hypothesizes what

other administrators can do to cope in similar situations.

Chapter VII

presents a summary of the major conclusions of this study and implications
for further research.

Rationale for Choice of Research Setting

The research described in this dissertation took place at the

University of Cincinnati.

The President studied was Warren Bennis.

The major
-*The model is explained in Thompson (1967).
that an institution is dependent upon its environment 1) in
the organization's need for resources or performances which
can provide, and 2) in inverse proportion to the ability of
to provide the same resources or performances.

The

premises are
proportion to
that element
other elements

Dependence can be viewed as the obverse of power. An organization
has power, relative to an element of its environment, to the extent that
the organization has capacity to satisfy needs of that element.
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most important single reason for choosing the
University of Cincinnati
was because Dr. Bennis was open and trustful enough
to grant the access

needed to do the study.

He made his office files and records open to

the researcher as well as paving the way for access to
sensitive meetings.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, the description and analysis of any changing social

system is a difficult and complex procedure.

The field worker has to

observe and record the relationships of a large number of factors over
time
It is a little like trying to catch a running
stream, freezing it and cramming portions of
it into little boxes to be stacked neatly for
casual perusal at a later date. At this point
researchers most often opt for some form of
organization around major dimensions of the

system settling for somewhat arbitrary but
discrete boundaries between areas (Karpel,
1973, p. 91).

The discussion in this chapter has been presented to sensitize the

reader to the considerations of the method used to research the role of the

university president.

The reader should by now understand the dilemmas

perceived by the author and by others who have written about research
methodologies.

The reader should also understand the corrective steps

taken to mitigate the potential pitfalls of "catching a running stream."

CHAPTER

III

BOUNDARY ACTIVITIES

.Nearly all organizational charts and job
descriptions belie the state of affairs regarding
the actual performance of work.
Organizational
charts imply that contacts are limited primarily
to the lines connecting the boxes, but the relationships necessary to get the job done are much
more complex (Sayles, 1964, p. 34).
.

.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interaction patterns
of one university president over one academic year starting from September
1,

1972, to June 15, 1973.

Who are those groups and individuals, inside

and outside the university, that telephone, write to, or spend time with
a university president?

contact him?
plex.

What purposes do they have?

How often do they

Sayles is correct in saying that the relationships are com-

The function of this section is to depict how complex they are, and

to show which behaviors, over time constitute the "job" of university

president.

The results of an analysis of the communication flow will

show who the role senders are and what their expectations were within
the context of organizational work.

An analysis of the communication flow

will also show a set or core of patterned activities, or roles, the Uni-

versity President performed as a boundary person which will be discussed
of
in the second half of this chapter using the leader behavior models

Sayles (1964) and Mintzberg (1971)
broken down
The communication flow within a formal organization is
into three

parts.

and phone calls.

They are the written contacts, face-to-face meetings,
processes."
In a sense the modern system is a "flow of

on the part of people.
Decisions are the result of interactions over time
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It is not just that people are placed
in organizational positions but

m

a very real sense they are participating
in and influencing a series

of relationships.

The university president does not have a neatly
bounded job with

clearly defined authorities and responsibilities.

Instead he is posi-

tioned in a system of relationships out of which he must implement
and

organize to accomplish his objectives.

There is no uniform interface;

rather the relationships vary, depending on the objectives and the

position of the "actors" with whom he must achieve a working pattern
of give and take (Sayles, 1964, p. 27).

Mintzberg (1971) and Sayles (1964), in their studies of managerial
work, both confirm that the manager or the executive defines much of his/

her own job.

The manager has responsibilities for this or that decision,

for this or that activity "but the dynamic elements of his job are left

unspecified" (Sayles, 1964,

p.

34).

Dodds says the same thing about the

university president.
He reveals where his heart lies and sets the character
of his administration by the choices he makes between
those functions to which he gives his most personal,
intimate and continuing attention and those which he
more generally leaves to others.
In doing so a university president will have to fight
for time to contend with the public's conception of
him as a sort of "jack of all trades" whose services
should be available on call. Accordingly, certain
answers as to how he can be an educator do not rest
with him alone but with trustees, alumni, the academic
community, and the public generally (Dodds, 1961, p. 2).
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The university president’s position has a great
deal of autonomy.

The man, to some degree, determines the role he will
play.

To what

degree the individual will determine his role is dependent on
those
he interacts with and on the demands and needs they have.

It is

precisely this unspecified latitude in role behavior that carries

with it the almost intolerable role conflict and ambiguity which is
the focus of this study.
For the sake of perspective, the purposes of this study bear

repeating.

In order to understand the problems of a university presi-

dent as a boundary person, the author will 1) examine the "boundary

activities" performed by the president;

2)

describe the environment and

hence the role senders with their accompanying expectations;

3)

explain

certain role conflict and ambiguity inherent in the position vis-a-vis
those expectations; and

4)

outline the coping mechanisms used in particu-

lar circumstances.

The logical place to start in order to accomplish the first purpose
is to examine the acts and activities performed by a university president.

By looking at what a president did, it is possible to understand with whom
he interacted and what expectations they held for him.

As has been stated

in the chapter on method, the design included the monitoring of phone calls

correspondence and calendar by form, flow, frequency, and function.

Thus

identified
the principle role senders, both external and internal, could be
be clearly
Once the role senders were identified, their expectations could

but
delineated not only through subsequent phone calls and correspondence

in-depth interviews.
also through observations of specific meetings and
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This chapter will outline with whom the
university president

interacted, the purposes or demands contained
in the contacts, as well
as how often, and in what form those
interactions took place.

All

interactions can be seen as having a content level,
the issues or
ideas involved, and a process level, i.e. the form,
flow, frequency,
and function of the interaction (such as to inform, to
negotiate, to

trade, etc.).

When the President receives two letters, one from the

faculty senate requesting information on budget figures and another

from a state legislator requesting medical school admissions figures
the process level of function and form are the same.

The content levels

are different in that the information requested is different and in that
the issues and problems those letters represent are different.

Both the content levels and process levels of the President's interactions and activities are needed to understand the role conflict and

ambiguity inherent in his organizational position.

This chapter will

discuss only the process levels of that interaction while discussion of
content levels shall be treated in Chapters IV and V.

This chapter will

deal with frequency, flow, and form of contacts in the first half, with a

discussion of the prevalent functions contained in the contacts and their
implications for the role behavior of the university president to follow
in the second half.

Form, Frequency, and Flow of the Process Level of Interaction

Six sets of characteristics dealing with

1)

the quantity and pace

of the President's work, 2) the patterns in his activities, 3) the rela-

tionship between action and reflection in his work, and

4)

his use of
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different media,
6)

5)

his relationship to a variety of contacts, and

the interplay between his rights and duties, shall be
discussed.

1

In this analysis it should be remembered that this study
is of

only one university president and that the size, age and type
of

university may change what the data of this study may suggest.

Since

the main strength of the case study method is a qualitative wholistic

description and not generalizable hypotheses for all university presidents, very few generalizations will be offered except for the President
studied.

There have been some studies, in managerial work however, that

tend to substantiate much of what has been found in the course of this
study.

Studies by Carlson (1951), Guest (1955), Sayles (1964), and

Mintzberg (1973) will be used whenever possible to show the similarity
of the president’s role as a boundary person to managerial roles in other

organizations

Quantity and Pace
The quantity and pace of the university president's activities is

unrelenting.
five.

Whyte says that chief executives work four nights out of

One night is spent at the office, one entertaining and the other

two nights he goes home, not to a sanctuary as much as to a branch office
(Whyte, 1954, p. 109).

Carlson mentions how chief executives have exces-

sive work loads which cut down on their opportunity to see family and

private friends and which result in much travel time and possible

of
Hluch of the organization of this chapter builds upon the work
Mintzberg (1973) and Sayles (1964).
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intellectual isolation (Carlson, 1951,

p.

51).

Studies of both upper

and middle managers show that they bring their
work home with them

while lower and lower middle management studies do
not show this to
be the case (Horn and Lupton, 1965).

According to this study, the

University President found it was necessary to entertain or
hold

a

meeting at least three nights out of four and to interact with
one
or two groups per night.

This study examined 293 calendar days of which Saturdays were

counted as work days for a total of 229 work days.

There were 37

Sundays, 24 of which had scheduled meetings, 12 Sundays having two or

more work— related meetings.

There were 27 Holidays and/or vacation

days (see Calendar Time Analysis, Chart I,

p.

52).

Those work days

averaged between 16 and 17 hours per day of meetings or travel time to
some work-related meetings.

During the day there is no let up in the work pace.

Guest (1951)

and Mintzberg (1973) show this to be the case in business, hospital, and

school settings.

Mintzberg, who studied the chief executive of a major

consulting firm, the president of a firm that produced technological
defense products, the head of a large urban hospital, the president of
an industrial firm, and the superintendent of a large suburban school

system, showed that there was "no break in the pace of activity during

office hours.

The mail (average 36 pieces per day), telephone calls

(average 5 per day)

,

and meetings (average of

8

per day) accounted for

almost every minute from the moment these men entered their offices until
they departed in the evening" (Mintzberg, 1973

,

p.

30).

This study shows
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CHART

I

CALENDAR TIME ANALYSIS

Work Dav

Sunday

September

30

4

October

31

5

November

31

4

December

31

January

Holiday/Vacation

Total Week Days

1

Trip Day

25

4

26

1

1

26

3

3

13

15

31

4

1

26

February

28

4

24

March

31

4

27

6

April

30

3

10

17

2

May

31

4

1

26

3

June

19

2

17

3

293

37

229

26

27

37 Sundays - 24 Sundays had meetings. 12 had two or more

5
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that the mall averaged between 30
and 31 pieces per day, telephone

calls averaged between 6 and

from

6 to 7

per day.

7

per day and formal meetings averaged

2

It seemed that there was one meeting
after another punctuated

by phone calls and secretarial interruptions
(because of the need for
a signature or for some clarification on
paper work that had to be

gotten out).

There were no specified breaks, not even for lunch
unless

the meetings themselves were luncheon meetings.

One out of every six

work days had a scheduled lunch meeting; one out of every
three work
days had a scheduled ceremonial of "business" dinner.

were often served during meetings.

If any

Coffee or coke

free time should arise this

was as a rule taken up by informal meetings with subordinates or unex-

pected callers.
It cannot be stressed enough that the work day is a demanding one.

The communication and work flow are endless.

When the day is "over" in

the formal sense the residue of the responsibilities are ever present.

From interaction with this President over the academic year it became
apparent that he could not escape the atmosphere that was cognizant of

^This study supports Mintzberg’s findings that there were five kinds
1) "catch-up days" usually aftef trips or heavy schedules, which
required time at his desk with unanswered mail, returning phone calls, and
making appointments; 2) "crisis days" where routine duties are put off to
concentrate on a major disturbance that had suddenly developed; 3) "free
days" in which few scheduled meetings are held and subordinates who have
been long-neglected are seen; 4) "heavily scheduled days" brought on by
the squeeze in everybody’s calendar; and 5) "normal days" with the usual
load of mail, callers, and meetings both scheduled and unscheduled.
of days:
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of his status and power nor could he retreat from his
own mind which

repeatedly searched for new information that might have some bearing
on the day's problems.

Patterns in His Activities

There is no question that the studies already done bear out the

data revealed in this study.

Guest (1955), Ponder (1957), and Mintz-

berg (1973) all indicated that for managers activity is characterized
by variety , fragmentation and brevity

.

The data of this study would

suggest that this is certainly the case for a university president.

These three elements can be documented by the phone calls, calendar,
and correspondence.
The variety is most clearly seen in the correspondence (see

Chart II - Analysis of Correspondence, p. 55).

The University President

interacted with 20 separate categories of external groups and 21 separate

categories of internal groups.

These categories can then be broken into

individual, constituent organizations and individuals who represent the

organizations.

For example, within the category of "industry

the office

of the University President corresponded with 76 separate organizations

and sometimes interacted with more than one or two individuals within that
one separate organization.

Within the academic year there was inter-

action with 41 separate categories, comprised of over 600 organizations
and outside the
or subunits and over one thousand individuals inside

university.

letters
This would mean that one out of every five or six

which no previous
would be from an individual or organization with

correspondence had occurred.

of
The content of the correspondence was,

55

CHART II

Mail
Operations

Mall

Pressures

News

Situations

Requests

&

Data
Reports

External

ions

Request

&

at

Individual

Initiated

on

in

Acknowledgements

Solicitations

Organizations

Ouestionnaire

ommend
Periodical

Reference
Percentage

Authority
Problems

Reports

General

Status
Events

Advice

of

Totals

Ideas

Self

Rec

If

Other Universities
and Colleges

28

18

1

2

Students

20

45

6

1

30

Independ ents

25

52

2

2

2

Industry

39

36

17

2

4

9

6

Legislators-^^

25

18

1

1

7

38

3

1

19

66

4

Board of Regents

65

5

7

14

Non-Prof it
Organizations

18

65

2

3

5

16

Federal Gov't.

11

16

2

5

17

42

Educational
Associations

8

26

4

3

18

14

Job Seekers

2

2

57

Alumni

19

13

1

6

5

Media

18

28

1

1

4
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course, varied; and although not meticulously
counted, it is estimated
that over a hundred major issues were
"pending" and had to be kept

track of while waiting for the latest
developments.

Examples of

major issues included affirmative action, long range
planning, the
budget review process, a management training program,
promotions,

faculty senate resolutions, the subsidy revision, enrollment
trends,
the abolishment of football, gay liberation recognition,
the seeking
of grants, negotiations of contracts with outside groups,
starting new

programs, consultant visits and reports on existing programs, campus
security, and alumni-giving among others.
The phone calls and the formal and informal meetings (see Charts
III and IV) show the same variety.

Although the same 41 categories are

represented, the range is not as great within the 41 categories.

Because

the range was not as great within the phone calls and face-to-face meetings,
it can be suggested that it is common that most attempts to initially con-

tact the University President come in written form.

This varied.

While

some groups both outside and inside never contacted the President except

through the mail; most of the "public" chose to express themselves in this
form.

The preference for the mail to be the mechanism for initial contact

could be explained because it is economical, saves time and energy, and be-

cause it allows for true feelings to be expressed without the emotion-charged

circumstances of a face-to-face meeting.
The fragmentation of the University President's work day is also

easily seen.
chapter.

It is evident in the charts that have been included in this

No one group, with the exception of his staff and administrative
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assistants had an overwhelming proportion
of contact (in regards to
the percent of meetings held).

Fragmentation naturally follows when

a limited amount of time is divided into
small amounts of contact with
a large number of interacting groups.

It should be emphasized and understood that
Charts II, III and

IV are frequency counts.

They represent the number of contacts either

by phone, mail, or face-to-face meetings that occurred
during the 229

work days studied.

These contacts are the ones that were recorded;

some that occurred on trips or at home did not get recorded and cannot
be part of this study.

It is felt that approximately 90% of the contacts

were recorded and, because most of what was found in this study can be
substantiated by other management studies, it is fair to suggest that
these frequency counts are representative of the University President's

interaction patterns.
The frequency count was chosen over the amount of time spent on an

issue or with a constituent group because total time is difficult to

estimate.

Because of conversations on other topics, interruptions in

a

flow of conversation, and the overlapping of issues, the number of contacts with a constituent group or individual was seen as a more accurate

measure of the significance of interaction patterns rather than the amount
of time spent.

There was evidence to suggest that the more salient the

issue or problem that was under consideration the more frequency of contact
was observed until some resolution was reached or the issue "blew

over.

This point is exemplified by the issue of medical school admissions.

As

different groups saw the need to increase the number of in-state students
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who were accepted into the University's medical
school there was

a

corresponding increase in the number of letters,
phone calls, and
meetings, with different groups on the issue.

Along with variety and fragmentation, brevity of
activities was
the third characteristic of the university president's
work day.

There

were days when there were as many as fourteen different formal
meetings
scheduled at thirty to thirty-five minute intervals.

These meetings

were punctuated by phone calls either placed by or received by the

President which lasted on the average of eight minutes [Mintzberg (1973,
p.

33) recorded a six minute average]

desk.

and by short work sessions at his

There were days when the brevity of his activity was not as acute,

yet the rule was "many meetings with many people over a myriad of issues."
The University President's day might be something like this:

8:15

am - a business and finance committee meeting; 10:45 am - the processing
of the mail with assistants; 12:00 noon - Chamber of Commerce Luncheon

downtown; 2:00 pm - meeting with the Faculty Senate Chairman; 2:45 pm

-

interview of a candidate for the directorship of the library; 3:15 pm -

meeting with Arts and Sciences Department Heads; 5:00 pm

-

meeting with

alumni-af fairs director; 7:30 pm - speech to a large local church group.
This kind of a day requires that the chief executive be prepared
to shift moods quickly and often.

The salience of his activities are

varied and occur in no particular pattern.

Because of these oft-required

shifts in mood, premium was placed on health and vigor with little tolerance
for fatigue or having an "off" day.

The office staff was always aware of

how late the President had stayed up the night before or of how tired
therefore
was and how that might effect his mood, his schedule, and

he
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implicitly, his performance.

There seemed to be a peaking sense
of fatigue

and anxiety just before long trips
and vacations and If a break didn’t

occur in the work load then, the
strain was detrimental to the staff
and
the President.

Carlson (1951) and Mintzberg (1973) both
suggest that brevity,

variety and fragmentation are chosen
characteristics of the executive’s
work day.

The chief executive studied in this dissertation
was protected

by his assistants and secretaries and there
is no reason to believe that

this man did not delegate his work properly.

By and large, this Uni-

versity President determined the duration of his activities
and contacts,
terminated most of them dependent on his schedule, and frequently
came
late and left early to attend yet another meeting.

He could almost always

determine what interruptions he would acknowledge and what meetings he
would attend.

Mintzberg offers the best hypothesis as to why brevity, fragmentation and variety are "chosen":
To some extent, the manager tolerates interruption
because he does not want to discourage the flow of
current information. Furthermore, the manager may
become accustomed to the variety in his work.
he develops a sensitive appreciation for the opportunity cost of his own time - the benefits forgone
by doing one thing instead of another. Thus he
takes on much work because he realizes his own
worth to the organization. In addition he is aware
of the ever-present assortment of obligations associin other words no matter what
ated with his job.
he _is doing, the manager is plagued by what he might
do and what he must do (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 35).
.

.

.

.
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Relationship between Reflection and Action
In alignment with other managerial studies,
this author found

that there was a strong preference for action on
the part of the

manager.

Reflection takes a "back seat" because of the oppressive

time constraints brought on by work overload.

Thirty-one point seven

percent of the correspondence was in-depth reports concerning
various
issues and units.

In other words careful analysis was already done;

what remained was that it be digested and decisions be made according
to priorities and constraints.

In addition, 27% of the formal meetings

held were with staff, administrative assistants, and vice presidents,

singly or collectively.

From observation it was established that over

60% of the time was spent in briefing, strategizing

,

or formulating

I

positions to be taken.
In this case, reflection or in-depth analysis was done by vice

presidents, assistants, and subordinates.

Prepared reports were reviewed

and rebutted at sometimes lengthy meetings and courses of action often

discussed.

The subordinates were many times more knowledgeable in a given

area than the manager who had to make the decision (as was expected)

.

These meetings were used to reach decisions that almost everyone could
live with given what was known concerning an issue or a given problem.

Because of the President's need to avoid wasting time, to participate only when the value of participation was tangible, and to avoid too
great an involvement with any one issue, there was a tendency toward

"having to mouth other people's words."

Often there was no time to reflect
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or analyze every detail of a
prepared speech or presentation.

result was that the particulars and internal
logic of

ment may have indeed felt "foreign" to the
President.

The

given argu-

a

Superficiality

is, no doubt, an occupational hazard of
managerial work.

In order to

become effective the university president must, in
a sense, "become

proficient at his superficiality" (Mintzberg, 1973,

p.

35).

tendency toward action could be seen in other ways.

The

mail was considered a chore and many times only those pieces that
required
action or response were dealt with, while informational mail got last
priority.

In addition just as Mintzberg found, the results of this study

show a proclivity for instant communication, where "hot" information came

frequently by "informal" sources.

Sometimes, given the urgency of particu-

lar issues, information which was second-hand was at times accepted in an

effort to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity.
It is easy to understand that in urgent circumstances, under pressure

for a decision without accurate information sources, why "gossip, specula-

tion and hearsay form an important part of a manager’s information diet"
(Mintzberg, 1973, p. 36).

Relationships to a Variety of Contacts
The President develops relationships with three main sets of people:

supervisors (the trustees or board), outsiders, and insiders (subordinates).
The chief executive links these groups in a variety of ways in order to guide
the institution.

Past studies have tended to underestimate or neglect the

relationships between managers and outsiders (Mintzberg, 1973,

p.

44).

Mintzberg found that 48% of the contacts of chief executives were with
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subordinates, 7% with superiors, and
44% were with outsiders (Mlntzberg, 1973, p. 45).
In this study It was found
that mall, telephone,
and face-to-face contacts over
a period of approximately nine
months
were somewhat different. Fifty percent
of the University President's

contacts were with external people, 43% with
subordinates, 4% with
superiors, with 3% personal or undetermined.

This varied with the form

of the contact;

the phone calls showed the highest number
of contacts

with outsiders.

Face-to-face contacts seemed to be preferred in the

President's relationships with the Board.

Average Number of Contacts with Three Main Constituents

Contacts with External
Contacts with Superiors

Contacts with Subordinates

Phone

Mail

67.1%

42.7%

38.9%

49.5

3.1%

1.4%

5.7%

3.4

20.3%

55.7%

50.4%

42.2

Meetings

Average Contact

Contacts undetermined

5.3%

-

1.2%

3.1

Contacts of Personal Nature

3.8%

_

3.5%

3.5

The highest number of contacts with subordinates come in the mail.

Twenty percent of all the President's mail was carbon copies or copies of
other people's correspondence marked "for your information" to keep him
abreast of issues.

A large part of the President's face-to-face meetings

were with his subordinates as might be expected.

(This figure does not

include the countless informal, one or two minute interactions with

assistants and staff in large group meetings or briefly with secretaries
at their desks.)
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What is perhaps more important
than the proportions is the
variety
of contacts with external
people or groups. The President's
office
corresponded with over 408 different
individual organizations and with
over 700 individuals.
To gain access to outside
information a network
of "sensors" or information relays
had to be developed.

Trade organiza-

tions, consultants, government people,
independents, and hosts of others

were in constant contact with the University
President.
outside contacts resulted in information-giving.

Not all of these

Depending on his own

personal reputation and that of the organization,
many times the President
was fed unsolicited information and ideas or
asked to provide information.
Almost 2% of the mail consisted of questionnaires,
two main sources of

which were other universities and the federal government.

Four percent

of the mail dealt with providing or sending recommendations
to other out-

side organizations, with over one-half of these requests coming from
other

universities.

Another 4% resulted from solicitations which required answers.

Job-seekers accounted for 57% of the solicitations.
dent

s

Because of this Presi-

reputation, most of the advice given was to other universities and

colleges.

All in all, the total amount of contacts specifically for

information or recommendations was 11% by mail and 19% by phone (see

information requests and recommendations, Charts II and III).
There is evidence that despite the wide variety of contacts and
average number of contacts with outsiders (49.5%) that much of a manager's
time is spent with subordinates and superiors.

contacts were with internal people:

Over 50% of the face-to-face

namely the Board and subordinates.

Mintzberg confirms that manager-subordinate relations take up the greatest
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amount of a manager's time (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 217).

Mintzberg (1973)

and Sayles (1964) found that the manager's average
contact with his

subordinates was shorter than his interactions with other groups, yet
he acted more frequently with them (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 47).

Subordinates placed a variety of demands upon the President
largely for authorizations, information, advice, and status requests;

while they sent to him a great amount of variety of information, through
reports, "instant communications", briefings, trade gossip, and carbons.

Subordinates used the phone to interact with the President less but when
they did it was to share information (see Chart III).

In return the

President would forward information obtained from the outside and delegate certain tasks to his subordinates
It has been stated in this paper that the university is much more

decentralized and "flat" in its organizational hierarchy than most other

organization (see Appendix A)

.

The phone calls show an extraordinary

number of interactions with individual faculty members, 39.5% followed by
23.4% with staff and 13.7% with the deans.

The meeting frequences show

30.3% with administrative staff and assistants, 17.5% with the faculty,
16.7% with the vice presidents and 10.2% with the deans.

3

The mail shows

31.4% with the vice presidents, 17.0% with faculty, 11.3% with the deans,
and 8.7% with assistants.

It can be suggested from these figures that the

organizauniversity is indeed a flat organization because the "top" of the

organization than
tion interacts more with the "bottom" (faculty) of the
the deans.
it does with the middle of the organization;

figure can
meetings with faculty
individual governance
with faculty groups.
3 This

the President 's
be broken down even further: 127. of
2.77 with
members,
faculty
members were individual
and 1.37
bodies,
governance
group leaders, 1.5% with
See Chart IV.
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This finding is somewhat mitigated by studies
Mintzberg (1973)
and Carlson (1951) performed which show a tendency
of executives to

by-pass formal lines of authority in order to satisfy the
need for
clearer and quick information.
Use of Different Media
By now it is probably evident that different groups preferred

different media for contact with the President.

Mintzberg found that

managers have an attraction for the verbal media (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 38),

because documentation requires the use of formal language and long feed-

back delays.

Also "verbal messages can transmit, in addition to the

messages contained in the words used, information by voice inflection and
by delays in reaction.

.

.

Face-to-face media carry information trans-

mitted by facial expression and by gesture" (Mintzberg, 1973,

p.

38).

It is the position of this writer that while the University Presi-

dent does cement relations, mediate conflicts, and carry on operations,
it is the character of the issue and the groups involved that determine

the medium used.

To illustrate this point the author compared certain

groups' use of different media.

Consultants were high on face-to-face

interaction and used the mail very little.
side press and TV.

This is also true of the out-

Independent citizens almost exclusively used the media

of mail and phone calls since both media could be used anonymously.

Industry used all three media showing

7

.

1 / of

the total mail contacts,

11.4% of the phone calls, and 7.2 % of the face-to-face meetings.

Other

phone 13.0%,
universities and colleges, while using the mail 11.1% and the
and cost of face-to-face
did not apparently want to give up the time, effort
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which were 4.4% of the total number
of meetings the President held
during
the year.

This would lead to the further hypothesis
that the urgency and

salience of the issue or problem probably
determine the type of medium
used.

Much of what characterized the interactions
between the President’s

office and other universities and colleges
centered around information-

sharing concerning procedures and operations,
recommendations for searches
and jobs, and general reports and advice about
issues in higher education.

Those meetings that did occur focused on trying to solve
a common problem
such as the State budget or discussing and confirming cooperating
or con-

sortium agreements.

Another example shows that consultants and media

people can only conduct their business on-site which might account for
their high face-to-face contact.
As will be described later, certain groups push for more verbal

face-to-face contact as the issue requiring contact comes to a "boiling"
point.

Such was the case with the legislators around the ensuing problems

of budget appropriations and medical school admissions.

Balance between Rights and Duties
It is the position of this study that the university president's

role is long on duties and very short on rights.

Many studies confirm that

the executive's role is characterized by reactive rather than proactive

behavior.

Neustadt says,

A president's own use of his time, his allocation
of his personal attention, is governed by the
the speech
things he has to do from day to day:
he
appointment
he has agreed to make, the fixed
cannot put off, the paper no one else can sign.
priorities are set not by the relative importance
of a task, but by the relative necessity for him
He deals first with the things that are
to do it.
.

.
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required of him next (Neustadt, 1960,

p.

155).

Mintzberg and Carlson also reinforce the concept
that the manager's role is one where he spends most of his time
reacting and not
initiating, planning or implementing.

^

One study showed that 32% of

the executive's verbal contacts and 26% of his mail
contacts were

initiated by the executive himself (Mintzberg, 1973,

p.

49).

This

study showed that 24% of mail contact were initiated by the
President

himself (see diagram #2, p. 78

).

It was observed during this study that the University President

could make certain types of decisions such as initial commitments to
his own long term projects; choosing to join external boards of directors
or certain committees; or yet still more ironically, he could set up his

own networks for information.

But once these choices were made, activi-

ties were more or less planned for him, making demands on his time and
energy.

Once his information networks were set up he did not control the

day-to-day information flow and more often than not those external information networks in times of crisis became "nets" of accountability.

The University President could be proactive at those functions or
in those activities that he had to engage in.

Many functions that he attended

resulted in opportunities to collect information or to inject his ideas into
the picture, yet these chances do not compensate for the overwhelming pressures

^For a more complete explanation of the phenomenon see Patricia
Zigarmi, "The University President and Organizational Change: Case
Studies." Ed.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1974.
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brought out in reactive conditions.

The expectations held from the

outside often made him responsible for the actions of those inside
the organization.

Various outside groups and individuals caused the

office of president to be a centralizing agent or force in the university.

The external centralizing tendency of the public resulted

in an essentially reactive stance for the President because of the

decentralized, flat, internal authority structure.

Now that the contacts have been analyzed in terms of frequency,
flow, and form, some things must be said about the function of the

contacts:

namely what were the demands contained in those contacts,

what acts were called for to respond to those demands?

Function of Process Level of Interaction

The academic year of 1972-73 was filled with many minor and

major issues for this University President.

Those issues ranged from

presiding over the alumni-day banquet to testimony before the House
Finance Committee to explain what the University was doing to cut costs
and increase services.

In many ways these two issues had a lot in common

despite their apparent differences.

There were many other issues dealing

with faculty positions, salaries, and policies; student programs, dissatisfactions, and behaviors; and over -all University functions, needs,
and purposes that required presidential action.

There were common actions

on various issues.
or roles the President performed throughout the year

seen throughout the
For example monitoring or auditing behavior could be

resolution of many issues.

Trading or negotiating behaviors (establishing
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terms of future working conditions) were required on many different
issues
The President was required to perform certain acts, the accumula-

tion of which over a period of time can be seen as patterns of behavior

called activities or roles.

For example, presiding over an alumni banquet,

testifying before the State Senate and conducting commencement exercises
all have something in common at the process level.
the President was representing the University.
of figurehead.

It can be said that

He was acting in the role

The content or context of the behavior was different on

each of these three occasions yet a common thread running through all of
these acts was one of being a figurehead by formally representing the

university.
In the example of presiding over an alumni banquet the content and

context of the President's behavior was alumni centered while the process
or function he was serving for the University was that of figurehead or

representative.

The work of Mintzberg and Sayles are drawn in the second

were
half of this chapter to depict the patterned activities or roles that

observed during this study.

The patterned behaviors or roles that were

observed by the researcher are best generally described by Mintzberg’
leader
twelve roles, and at times more specifically depicted by the

behaviors offered by Sayles.

Because some leader behaviors are more

groups required
prevalent than others and because certain constituent
of these two models will
only certain types of behaviors the discussion
to the Mintzberg model.
be brief with more of an emphasis given

examples will be discussed to
the models have been set forth some

Once
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particularize the models to the University setting and the University
President
The Leadership Behavior Models of Mintzberg and Sayles

From the onset it should be stressed that most studies of leader
behavior are essentially processes of categorizing.

The very "phenomen-

ology" of experience would make any categorization of experience some-

what arbitrary since behavior has many levels.

The somewhat arbitrary

partitioning of the manager's activities should only be judged in terms
of its usefulness.

Mintzberg Model
Mintzberg' s model is divided into three groups of behaviors - those

concerned primarily with interpersonal relationships; those that deal with
the transfer of information; and those that involve decision-making.

These

three groups are further divided into the following ten roles.

Interpersonal Roles

Figurehead, Leader, Liaison

Informational Roles

Monitor, Disseminator, Spokesman

Decisional Roles

Entrepreneur, Negotiator, Disturbance
Handler, Resource Allocator

the organization,
Because he is the formal authority or head of

have a way of turning up on
various issues from the outside and inside
the president's desk.

manager
The figurehead role is the duty of the

all matters of formality.
to represent his organization in

As exemplified

would mean occasions like commencement,
for the university president this
various
contracts and directives, and
alumni banquets, signatures on grants,

acknowledgements to donors and foundations.
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The liaison role results from the status
of his office and

enables the manager to play a linking role.

In the liaison role

the manager interacts with his peers and
other people outside his

organization to gain favors and/or information.

Often the chief

executive develops contacts in an informal setting that
later may
lead to use of those contacts in the formal organization.

Presidents

join external boards for contacts that will provide favors
and in-

formation; in return they pledge their time and expertise.

A network

of status contacts is built for information-sharing by joining boards

and performing public service work, attending conferences and social

events, and by answering simple requests that keep channels of com-

munication open (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 56).
The leader role denotes an executive role with his subordinates

which entails such behaviors as motivating, staffing, and so on.

The

executive role is clearly among the most significant the manager performs because it is present throughout all of his activities.

Each

time he "encourages or criticizes a subordinate he is acting in his

capacity as leader.

Most often, he does these things when he is

engaged in activities that have other basic purposes such as to transmit information or to make strategic decisions" (Mintzberg, 1973,

p.

61).

Some activities are considered primarily leadership roles:

staffing, hiring, training, judging, promoting, dismissing, innnovating
(starting new programs), and evaluating.

The purpose of the leader's

role in these activities is to effect an integration between individual

needs and organizational goals.

Also in this role what "position

the executive has is clearly manifested.

power
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The interpersonal roles of figurehead,
liaison, and leader

place him in a unique position to receive
information which result
in three informational roles.

The first is the monitoring role by

which the manager receives and collects
information enabling him
to gain a clear understanding of his
organization.

Analysis of the

mail easily shows that the University President
receives information

concerning internal operations and external events, through
general
reports and, reference data and pressures through reports on
operations concerning what his organization is doing or should be doing.

With this vast amount of data coming in, information overload
often results.
it takes too

Too much information that can't be digested because

much time to process and leads to a need for a certain

kind of information.

Time and critical decisions necessitate informa-

tion which is current and oftentimes undocumented and transmitted by

word of mouth.

Also executives in these circumstances will bypass

accepted channels to get the information they need.
The information that the manager gets is transferred in four
ways which are described by Mintzberg (1973, p. 78)

(see diagram

//l)

This study found that the University President did pass information on
to subordinates in the environment and vice versa

(as well, information

was passed from subordinate to subordinate and from environment group
to environment group).

In this study approximately 5,770 pieces of

mail were analyzed in nine categories to further document the flow of
information.

A nine-way flow of information was conceptualized; pro-

portions for each category were then estimated and illustrated in

Diagram #2.
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DIAGRAM

//I

DIAGRAM #2

TO

1.5%
3

2

1

1468
25.4%

88

37
.6%

Outsider

President

Insider

Outsider

FROM
14.3%

4.0%

7

343
5.9%

675

702
12.0%

President

6

5

4

1402
24.2 %

823

232

Insider

11.7%
8

9
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Category nine contained "aide memories"
and student contacts that
were not labeled internal or external.

Categories

1

,

2

,

4

and

usually

5

were carbon copies of letters for the President’s
information only.
The President would integrate information
to develop value posi-

tions for his organization, to solve problems,
to gain opportunities and

make decisions that directed the organization in
certain ways.

While

interpersonal roles were to ensure that information was
provided,

informational roles tie managerial work together (Mintzberg, 1973,
p.

71).

The two means used to give information are the spokesman role

to the outsiders and disseminator role to insiders.

The disseminator role results, Mintzberg says, in the executive

giving external information to his organization and transferring internal

information from one unit to another (Mintzberg, 1973,

information that is transferred is of two types
information.

It is the value information,

-

p.

71).

The

factual and value

the statements about what

should or ought to be, statements that are neither true nor false, that

apply subtle pressures on the President’s role performance.

It shall

be later discussed in greater detail how the value positions of these

groups which seek some control in the process of university decision-

making can be the source of much of the conflict and ambiguity contained
in the job of university president.

The spokesman role results in information being transferred to

external groups on behalf of the organization.
keeps two groups of influencers informed:

The chief executive

namely, the boards and middle
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management of externally-relevant public
and trade organizations such
as governmental agencies, the press,
prospective clients, etc.

The

manager keeps these two groups informed
about the organization's plans,

policies and operating results.

This role results in demands on the

University President's time, to make speeches,
attend meetings, benefits, and outside ceremonies.

The most important set of managerial activities,
according to

Mintzberg, is the decisional roles of entrepreneur, disturbance
handler, resource allocator and negotiator.
One clear conclusion emerges from my study:
the
manager takes full charge of his organization's
strategy-making system. To use other words, the
manager is substantially involved in every significant decision made by his organization. This
is so because 1) as the formal authority the
manager is the only one allowed to commit this
organization to new and important courses of
action; 2) as the center the manager can best
ensure that significant decisions reflect current
knowledge and organizational values; and 3)
strategic decisions can most easily be integrated
by having one man control all of them (Mintzberg,
1973, p. 77).
In this study things were not quite that clear.

Mintzberg almost

gives the impression that the system is leader-dominated which not always
is the case, especially in university systems.

Many times it is true

that while the University President did have substantial involvement he

was not able to influence the process as he wanted to.

Many times the

President could initiate change in the university but could not implement
it or follow through (Zigarmi, 1974).

81

The role of entrepreneur begins with the
monitoring role, the

manager’s role of scanning the organization
for needs, opportunities,
and problems.

The manager then functions as an initiator
and designer

of important controlled changes in his
organization by delegation,

authorization, and supervision.

These changes, Mintzberg says, take

place in the form of improvement projects, many of which
are super-

vised directly by the manager and all of which come under his
control
in one way or another.

Aside from a team-building or executive training program and an

administrative reorganization not many changes were under the President's
control.

In this study many of the major system-relevant issues required

a reactive stand because of the constraints of the office and the forma-

tion of the problem.

Long range planning, promotions, the internal

budget process, the external state allocations, affirmative action programs, and upcoming union negotiations all required more trading and

bargaining behaviors and less directive and supervisory behaviors on
the part of the manager.

In times of retraction because of financial

difficulties the University President lost even more of the little control
he had and became less of a resource allocator and more of a disturbance

handler and negotiator.
The resource allocation role is that of making choices involving

system resources such as money, time, manpower, materials and reputation.
The University studied had an operating total expenditures and appropria-

tions budget of approximately $57 million, counting its professional

School of Medicine.

Less than 2% of that 57 million was under direct
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control of the President.

The rest was either directly
specified by

the state as to the purposes the
money could be used for, directly

accounted for through bonds, tenure agreements,
notes, or interest
on loans to be paid.

Most of the budget had to be negotiated
with

a maze of faculty committees and administrators
having legitimate

reasons for how money should be allocated.

In the last three years

the University expenditures exceeded income by
$1.4 million, $.6

million and $1.5 million respectively, because of inflation,
enrollment trends, and reduced federal funding.

Because state laws require

balanced budgets these deficits were made up by borrowing from endowments which mandate repayment.

Because of these deficits the University President found himself
asking subordinates to cut spending by 3% in 1972-73 and
next two years.

6/

in the

Instead of allocating resources he was asking sub-

ordinates to do without.

allocated even if limited.

The author realizes that resources were
The point is that resources were not allo-

cated with the "control" depicted by Mintzberg but under enormous

political pressures and anxieties.

These kinds of "decisions" can

result in incremental strangulation, mediocrity, and poor organizational climate to say nothing of the reactive stance the constraints
of a situation such as this mandate.

The University President in this study was seen more as a negotiator because of circumstances already mentioned.

It suffices to say

that many of the year’s activities centered around money and finances.

The executive of this study spent a bulk of his time with external state

budget appropriations, internal budget allocations, and explaining to
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the University's various publics,
foundations, and governmental agencies

what the University could do in exchange
for money.

Negotiations of

course did take place around issues other than
budget such as increasing
the number of in-state students accepted into
the medical school yet

part of what was at stake even in this case was legislative
support for
a biennium budget increase.

The role of disturbance handler did crop up during the year, notably

around the issues of gay liberation, fire regulations, and affirmative
action.
a

Many small disturbances were also dealt with, from comforting

dismissed employee within a subunit, to accounting to

a

chagrined public

when a dean, trying to be congruent with his values of "people's" liberation brought his four month old baby to the office twice a week.

All of these disturbances had the quality of being unforeseen,

partly beyond the manager's control, and always requiring immediate attention.

These ten roles are in some ways arbitrarily divided yet together
they form a gestalt, a whole which gives some picture of the job of a

university president.

These behaviors have many levels, they involute,

build upon each other, and have cycles.
ever always show some of the subtleties.

Mintzberg's work does not howIt is here that Sayles' work

augments what has been said to more fully explain some of the actions or
roles of the President that he was "asked" to perform.
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The Sayles Model
The strongest aspect of Sayles' work is that rather than putting

labels on a collectivity of observed behaviors such as figurehead role
or disturbance handler, he speaks of the leader's actions in terms of

relationships or in terms of the types of behaviors used.

describes three main divisions in managerial behavior.

Sayles

They are the

participation in work-flow relationships, the manager-leader relationship, and the manager in monitoring relationships.

The gross quantitative dimensions of a given managerial position

already mentioned in this study, such as average number of contacts with
this or that group or a description of the form in which the contacts
come, do not really describe in behavioral terms the human relations

processes that make up the organization.

Sayles' model tries to depict

in behavioral terms those categories already substantiated through the

examples and frequencies presented thus far in this chapter.
Since there is much overlap with what has already been said, some
of the Sayles model will not be fully presented.

Only those behaviors

in
which have consequence for Chapter IV and V will be fully explained
is the focus
order to formulate a rich contextual background for what

of this study:

conflict and ambiguity in the President's job.

job into three basic
As has been said, Sayles divides the manager's

activities:

activities.
work flow activities, leader, and monitoring

activities.
Within these there are subcategories of

The monitoring

Mintzberg has discussed.
activities are much the same as what

Sayles
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however does distinguish a number
of interrelated steps or stages
in
the monitoring activity that have
not been fully discussed thus far.
Those stages are:
1)

Methods of detecting disturbances in the
work system in which the manager
participates.

2)

Development of criteria for evaluating the
significance of disturbances that are detected.

3)

Patterns of corrective action to be applied
and the assessment of their effect.

4)

Detection of continuing resistant sources
of disturbance in the work system and their
analysis

5)

Formulation of strategies of organizational
or structural change to cope with these.

6)

Implementation and validation of these structural modifications (Sayles, 1964, pp. 53-54).

It can be seen that Sayles is much more inclusive of those behaviors

subsumed under the role of monitor than what has been previously mentioned.

There were instances during the year when the University President manifested each and every one of these behaviors.

These activities were carried

on and demonstrated in the culminating act of an administrative reorganiza-

tion involving approximately ten upper echelon positions.

These monitoring behaviors were manifested in various issues; and

different mechanisms were used depending upon the information needed.

The

President used different monitoring processes when scanning the external
environment then he did when looking at subordinate work flow.

The process

of scanning the environment will be discussed in greater length in the next

chapter

86

Another set of activities Sayles discusses
is that of trading
relationships.

Trading relationships fall under the role
of negotia-

tor, entrepreneur, or liaison as previously
explained.

The author

feels that trading relationships should be
clearly delineated because
this behavior seemed very prevalent throughout
the year with various

external groups and helps explain some of the inherent
conflict contained in the President’s position.

Trading relationships mean those activities concerned with
the
terms by which some future relation is established (Sayles,
1964,

p.

60).

Because organizations are not static but are involved in an input-

transformation-output process the manager must at times expand the number
of internal "customers" for the work the organization performs, expand

the number of "buyers" of the service the organization produces, or

"buy" the resources needed to carry on the work process.
In higher education the university president is always involved

with the recruitment of students and faculty and the acquisition of
research grants or contracts with various groups for which services will
be rendered.

The president is responsible or accountable for the fulfill-

ment of those trading obligations, especially if he initiates the rela-

tionships through justification of existing services or the readjustment
of a previously established contracts.

Potential "buyers" and "sellers" seek to identify interests by

which the negotiation of acceptable terms of trade can result.
a wide variety of terms of trade to negotiate:

There is

what, when, how and for

how much, the work will be performed (Sayles, 1964,

p.

61).

The initial

stages of trading have their roots in the information flow and in contacts
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developed over time.
The early steps may require delicate
probing.

may encounter indifference, rebuffs or

The "seller"

a "let me see you

attitude on the part of the buyer (Sayles,
1964,

p.

62).

prove it"

Somehow

it must be communicated to the buyer
that the work will be successful

and enhance the buyer’s prestige in association
with it (Sayles, 1964,
p.

Also the work must seem feasible, reasonably predictable
in

62).

scope, complexity, and completion time, and without
a doubt, in the

resource capability of the seller (Sayles, 1964,

p.

62).

The later stages of trading find the "customer" spending more
time with the "vendor" in order to understand possible defects, limita-

tions and uncertainties that may arise (Sayles, 1964, p. 63).

These

investigatory contacts should also result "in the implicit understanding
that the vendor will gain something extra in the way of improved know-how,

some technical breakthrough, the opportunity to secure work for his people
that they are anxious to do, over and above the ’price’ he receives.

Skilled vendors insist on this extra margin to improve the overall position of their groups.

.

.

and the buyer must recognize that need (Sayles,

1964, p. 63).
To recapp, the three sequential stages of the trading relationship

are:

1)

the "missionary" work or search activity involving widely dis-

persed contacts to seek various "buyers and sellers";

2)

the confirmation

of the actual terms of the trade contract; and 3) the exchange by the

parties involved of rather than full information about their respective
needs and capacities (Sayles, 1964, p. 65).

The third stage enables both

parties to ant icipate problems and make intelligent decisions when

88

unexpected problems arise beyond the
scope of the original agreement
(Sayles, 1964, p. 65).
It should be said that trading
can be a matter of reciprocating

some function or activity or both; and
it does not always have to involve

establishing a "service" relationship.

As a rule trading relationships

are short-lived.
It can also be seen that trading can lead
to politics.

Parson’s

model, in which non-profit organizations must
gain support for their

functions at the institutional and managerial levels, in
some ways hinges
on the "trading" capacity of the institution's function
or "product".

It

may indeed rankle the heart of the true academician to view
behaviors such
as teaching, research, and community service in this way, yet if
the ex-

pectations held from the outside are such and outsiders operate on those
perceptions, some consideration of those perceptions are in order.
There is no doubt that external groups view the university as a

service institution; that its purpose is to return functions to the
support source.

The purely aesthetic purpose to produce knowledge for

the sake of producing knowledge, to understand phenomenon without the

possibility of use is not what the "public" is paying for.

The next

chapter on the environment will show specifically which external groups

viewed the university as a service institution.

Examples shall be given

to corroborate the propositions that much of the President’s activity

with outside groups had its roots in trading or service relationships
and that the expectations these groups held for the university president
as a boundary person were often incompatible with expectations internal

groups held for his role performance.
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There is more to the Sayles model than
just the behaviors in-

cluded in the categories of "monitor" and
"work flow" activities which
include trading and service activities, as
well as advising relationships, auditing, stabilizing and innovating
relationships.

The third

category, that a leader, is very similar to those
behaviors already

mentioned in the discussion of Mintzberg's work.
The fact that Mintzberg and Sayles overlap, involute and
dovetail, shows to some degree the arbitrariness of any division
of behavior.

When the university president says to his assistant, "I want you to help
me prepare my testimony to the House Business and Finance Committee so
please get the necessary budget figures to prepare our case", many roles
are being fulfilled.

The president is at the same time a monitor in

obtaining information; a leader, in that he sets

a

model that the sub-

ordinate might later follow; and he is performing the initial steps to
prepare himself for being a figurehead and performing a spokesman role.
Yet there are times when he is fulfilling one role, more than the
other, for example when he is attending commencement, starting a new

program or actually testifying before the House.

As has been stated,

to get at the multi-dimensional aspect of phenomena broken down into

possible components is contingent on purpose.

The purpose here is to

denote some of the pressures and demands on the office of the university
president.

To portray those demands we have examined the communication

flow which shows individual acts of the focal person.

These individual

acts were analyzed in terms of frequencies and functions which can depict
a sense of acts over time, better called activities or roles.
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The president

s

roles such as monitor, disseminator, spokes-

man, negotiator, disturbance handler, liaison figurehead, etc. became

evident through analysis as did the quantity of the President's interactions, the pace of the work flow, the pattern of his contacts, and
his use of different media.

Summary

In summary, this chapter has presented an analysis of presi-

dential interaction by form, frequency, flow and function - for the
purpose of showing the process level pressures contained in the uni-

versity president's job.

Other managerial studies were used to place

the statistical analysis of this study in perspective with other mana-

gerial positions in other organizations.
It was asserted that some activities are more prevalent than

others and that groups in the organizational environment held certain

views which necessitate these prevalent activities.

It now remains to

be shown through what specific issues these views are reflected, which

mandate certain action and reactions.

And it also remains to be shown

what the president's role was in dealing with those specific issues.

CHAPTER

I

V

THE ENVIRONMENT

What was going on outside the University
in 1972-73?
the President know what was going on outside?

How did

What specific outside

pressures were brought to bear on the President and
who were the groups
that manifested those pressures?
sures reflected?

Around what issues were those pres-

Did the "environment” in any way limit managerial

autonomy?
This chapter examines the scanning behavior that made the

President cognizant of what was going on outside the University.

The

chapter will also discuss what the environment looked like as a result
of scanning; what groups leveled what specific pressures at the Presi-

dent’s office around which specific issues; and the conclusions that
can be drawn from the President's interaction with the environment.

Most of the information received by the University President
as well as contacts made, resulted from the organization, with the

President as its recognized head, trying to carry on the input-

transformation-output cycle, trying to fulfill the goals and functions
the University is expected to accomplish.

Just as there are expecta-

tions inside a university for what the president should do (internal

role expectations) there are also external role expectations for his

role or job.

External expectations for the president's role are

intricately interwoven with expectations held for the university's
purpose.
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People outside the university hold expectations for what the

university’s function should be.

The specific categories of exchange,

i.e. products or services, vary from one type of organization to

another, but in each case the exchange rests upon prior consensus

regarding purpose.

There is a set of expectations held by members

inside the organization and by those outside, about what the organization will or will not do.

In order for exchange (input-transformation-

output) to take place over the environment /organization interface,

those people outside must have some expectations, some role for the

organization to play, or some need to be met by the services or product
yielded by the organization.

Because there are those expectations, an

organization can carry on its function.

It can be said to have an

"organizational role set."
As has been stated much of the President's day, his time, contacts,

correspondence, and thoughts are used to form, enhance, adjust, and clarify
the University's role set to external and internal constraints, though not
so much the latter.

Many external contacts are the result of expectations

being held and not being met.

Some contacts are the result of satisfaction

and are therefore congratulatory and praising.

Sometimes expectations can

program
be negotiated such as a city governmental unit wanting a training
or the university vying for a governmental grant.

value and
In order to make decisions, both of routine, operational

expectations must be obtained.
of a strategic nature, information about

whose expectations will be
The chief executive must understand what and
expectations will not be met.
met by certain actions, and what and whose
negotiation.
He must know where there is room for

The process of obtaining
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information on which to base strategy and action is called
scanning
behavior

There is very little literature concerned with scanning behavior 1
and none could be found in the context of higher education.

Much of

what shall follow will be tentative in the sense that it was true for

one university president.

Any attempt to generalize beyond one case

would be hypothetical or speculative.
Scanning Behavior

The information the university president receives is always much
less than what he wants and sometimes more or less than what he needs.

Time is a crucial factor in the process of getting information and using
it for strategy and action.

In the office studied there were systematic

attempts to formalize scanning activities in order to keep abreast of
political, economic, social, and technological developments which might

directly or indirectly affect the University's operations.
The difficulties in trying to keep abreast of all those areas and

using them for strategy-making are enormous.

Part of the difficulty

comes from the dimensions of the task of strategy-formulation; some of
the difficulty comes from the limitations of human beings as agencies
for data collection, and some from the problems of data— transmitting

and data-interpretation.

organizations,
If indeed there is a "receptor mechanism" in
the final analysis it is people.

in

Sources for external information include

found were
iThe only two works concerning scanning behavior to be
the business
scanning
with
dealt
Aquilar (1967) and Aserios (1971). Both
environment
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people both outside and inside the organization.

In fact a majority of

information concerning specific external issues in this case was gained
from internal sources.

If a leader gets

only certain incomplete informa-

tion, if he only gets hazy, sporadic, piecemeal information, it may not

just be because the information "in reality" is incomplete, hazy, or

piecemeal.

If the leader gets poor information from the "sensors" of

his organization, it could be 1) because the leader doesn't give enough

time or emphasis to the quality of information, thereby setting norms

concerning the degree of sensitivity and completeness for the information
he receives; 2) because his "sensors" are not sensitive enough or dis-

criminating enough to pick up information needed, or 3) because the
"sensors" may not make the right choices about what information is valuable
or important enough to be forwarded through the ladder of communication to

the President.

Compounding the problems of scanning with "sensors" is the fact
that the sources of potential data that could be used are many; therefore
the factor of appropriate choice is crucial.

The information that could

and should be used for strategy and action is almost limitless.

Scanning

requires the tapping of many sources of information often without order
to
and completeness and is many times constrained by the time it takes

obtain and process the information.

Add to this list of difficulties,

fact that some
the rapid rate in which the information changes and the
is strategic
information can not be gotten because the information needed

easy to understand the myriad of
to the "opponent’s" position and it is

problems in the scanning process.
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Furthermore, Aquilar wrote that scanning
must move farther and
farther away from the organization's immediate
surroundings to a search
for basic trends.

In other words the emphasis in scanning
behavior needs

to shift from immediate areas in which the
organization competes to the

industry as a whole and thence to the collective general
economic, technological, political, and social sphere.

Each outward step multiplies

the number of salient considerations and also the volume to
be considered

(Aquilar, 1967, p. 9).

Each outward step also introduces increasingly

tenuous relationships (Aquilar, 1967, p. 9) and complicates the organiza-

tional leader

'

s

scanning role.

Something should be said about how the President looked for information.

Aquilar refers to the process of the executive looking for informa-

tion as "modes of viewing" (Aquilar, 1967
of viewing.

,

p.

17).

There are four modes

They are:
1)

undirected viewing which is general exposure to
information with no purpose in mind to use the
information. An example of undirected viewing
would be reading a newspaper.

2)

conditioned viewing which is directed exposure
to a specific content area with no purpose in
mind. An example of conditioned viewing would
be listening to a report being given by the
Vice President for Business and Finance on the
financial status of the organization or going
to a Chamber of Commerce luncheon and listening
to the business gossip.

3)

informal search which is a relatively limited
effort to obtain more information through informal procedures. An example of informal
search would be going to an event with the
expectation of learning about some undefined
information that would have some bearing on a
particular problem.
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A)

formal search which is a conserted effort to
obtain specific information. An example of
formal search would be a report from a subordinate on the latest federal grant guidelines in a particular area (Aquilar, 1967.
P.

17).

All four types of viewing were used by the University President
in
this study.

Many times choices were made to go to some meeting or other

with the hope that some information could be gained.

Often the President

attended a social event with the hope that without really consciously

searching for information, that what he learned might be stored to be
retrieved and used at a later date.

It has been said in Chapter III

that the interpersonal roles of figurehead, leader, and liaison performed

by the University President give him excellent opportunities to obtain
some information that bears on the institution’s operations.

For the purposes of this study, the means used by the University

President to obtain information were categorized in four ways.

unsolicited - i.e. chance encounters, conferences,
visual presentations

verbal
solicited - i.e. consultants, other associations,

Outsiders

unsolicited

i.e. newspapers, trade journals,
publications, carbon copies

written
solicited - i.e. regular and general reports and
copies F.Y.I.2

2

f.y.i. means for your information.
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unsolicited - i. e

.

gossip and "instant" communication

verbal
solicited

Insiders

unsolicited

i.e. verbal reports of meetings,
observed
presentations and scheduled meetings

i.e. general reports, carbons,
F.Y.I.'s

written
solicited

i.e. scheduled status reports such
as

annual reports

The category of "solicited" is self-explanatory.

"unsolicited" requires further clarification.

The term

Unsolicited would mean

that someone either felt that the information would
be important to

the President and therefore "sent" it to him or that
some individual

directed information toward the President with the hopes of
getting
corrective action, some information, or satisfaction in return.

Un-

solicited could also include written sources such as publications and
newspapers.

In either case the President had little control to vary

the means of acquiring information from unsolicited sources since he

could not change what was published in journals, newspapers, and reports
nor could he set standards for the "for your information" carbons that

crossed his desk.

Examples of unsolicited information would include

the independent outsider who compliments or complains about some facet
of the organization or an educational association which sends some

report or guidelines for policy-making without a request from the

President
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The President received two types of information
from people

internal to the organization.

He received information about the

organization such as cost reports and information about
operation
and policy; he also received information from his
subordinates about
the environment and its changes.

Because units were specialized into

functions like public relations, academic affairs, metropolitan affairs,
and business and finance, the information solicited and unsolicited

was narrowly grouped into areas.

The information was specific, unit-

oriented in terms of the unit's specialty, and often concerned with
an immediate issue of operation.

The information received from the outside was concerned more with
the environment and its changes.

For example, it included information

on changing federal grant guidelines, information on affirmative action

policies from an educational association, and letters from independent
citizens writing to compliment or complain.

Although there was no

official count made, it is judged that external contacts resulted in
more unsolicited information about the environment while the internal
contacts resulted in more solicited information about internal operations and the environment.
In each case, whether from an internal or external source, the

information that was received was specific, issue-oriented and emphasized
the reporting unit's point of view.

Even newspapers and journals con-

tained reports which were limited in scope, time, and analysis.

Because

information that came in was specific and issue-oriented, it was incremental.

environment
By that it was meant that a wholistic picture of the
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had to be pieced together and that
data had to be synthesized and
interpreted in a time span that was
appropriate to allow for effective action.

Since role ambiguity is a direct result
of the disparity between
the information available to a person
and that which is required for

adequate performance of his role, it is easily
seen how and why the

ambiguity that is part of the university president's
very existence,
is so great.

Much of the solicited and unsolicited information the

university receives about its environment, however
complete or incomplete, converges on his office:

it is his task to integrate,

synthesize,

and formulate an estimate of existing circumstances and possible
courses
of action for the institution in light of those circumstances.

Throughout the year in which this study took place, there were

many issues that were going on simultaneously or that overlapped.

In

most cases information was needed before these issues could be acted

upon or resolved.
in small,

Because information sometimes could only be obtained

specific, incremental pieces, many issues were prolonged, and

resolution delayed.

Ambiguity was therefore not only great, but constant

over time.
One further point should be made concerning information in incre-

mental form.

Often it could be said that the University President was

in danger of information overload.

Overload is the condition that results

when too much information is received, in too short a space of time to be

effectively processed and used to make a

decision.

Information that

reached the President's desk, especially from his assistants and vice
presidents, often was not analyzed in terms of the total picture, nor
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in terms of the President’s more
up-to-date information.

provided him therefore required
integration and synthesis.

Information
If time

to make that integration was cut
short because of the urgency of the

issue, the pressure associated with
adequate job performance increased.

The President did not always experience
ambiguity or overload.
The process of obtaining information was
determined by many factors.

Scanning depended upon external environmental
conditions, the particular
issue the information was needed for, the time
needed to process the

information, the accuracy of the source of information,
and the history
of the issue up to date.
ib is impossible to talk about how much time the
University Presi-

dent spent in scanning because almost every interaction and contact

resulted in some small bit of information about the environment.

Talking

to a vice president about a promotion for a faculty member often resulted

in a discussion of what other universities do in a similar situation and

in an exchange of environmentally-relevant information.

In other cases,

formal search procedures were used (see Aquilar above)
One formal procedure was to have the Public Information Office
read and clip local and national newspapers for articles that mentioned
the University’s name or were of major concern to the field of higher

education and to submit those clippings to the President's office for

him to skim.

The President would also scan the local papers and trade

papers such as the Chronicle of Higher Education

.

Another formal scanning behavior on the part of the University
President was to periodically request subunits whose principle activities
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were boundary-spanning in nature to submit
reports of their activities
and possible new trends in their fields.

m

This was particularly important

the area of enrollments and recruiting
since enrollments were down all

over the country during the academic year of
1972-73.

Subunits such as

alumni affairs, development, research and public
relations were constantly

being asked to provide information bearing on the
environment.
Two other formal scanning behaviors observed during the
course of
this study were 1) the contracting of consultants to report
on develop-

ments in higher education at the state and national levels, and

President

s

participation on national commissions.

2)

the

For example his choice

to serve on a Panel for Alternative Education might have been prompted by

his need to know more about new models of undergraduate and graduate

education.
One last formal scanning behavior on the part of the University

President was that of making speeches to outside groups in which the last

portion of his talk was devoted to questions from the audience.

This

resulted in his gaining awareness of the major concerns on the minds of
the people outside the University other than what was reflected through

the mail.

Information concerning the environment was received from every major
group that the President interacted with (see Charts II, III and IV in

Chapter III), either directly through solicitation or indirectly through
interaction.

Formal scanning of the environment resulted from a specific

need to know information about specific issues.

In addition, the President

himself was constantly trying to be a "bell weather" for his institution
on changing environmental conditions.

He was constantly trying to
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reconstruct the environment from the personal
interactions he had with
persons outside the university and from the
information contained in
reports, journals, newspapers and letters he received.

From these

sources he would try to synthesize and assess "environmental
conditions"
and their implications for his actions.
In sum, the scanning behavior of the University President
might

be described at times as both deliberate and random, specific
and

general, formal and informal, although, for the most part, his scanning

seemed to be connected with specific issues which had some common threads

running through them.

There seemed to be five major problems or concerns

at the heart of most of the President’s contacts through his mail, phone

calls, and meetings.

Major Issues of the Academic Year 1972-1973

These issues were identified because more than one external group
showed concern by directing specific information and expectations "toward"
the President’s office.

Often these five issues were interrelated.

Some-

times one external group showed high concern and involvement in the resolution of all five issues.

All the external groups showed some signs of

trying to influence, in one way or another, the outcome of these issues
by promising support or withdrawal of support if certain actions were taken.

The five problems that were found to be most significant in the

year during which this study was conducted were:
1)

Problems related £o budget and costs

.

Federal spending and

higher
priorities were changing which resulted in cutbacks in funding for

education.

or
The State subsidy was not enough to match cost of living
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inflationary increases.
could not be raised.

Enrollments were falling off and tuition fees

Costs for fuel, lights, paper, and maintenance

were rising and faculty members wanted a salary
increase to at least

match the cost of living increase.

In order to balance the budget it

seemed as if the University would have to draw on its
endowment funds.

Relationships with internal and external groups had to be carried
on
against a backdrop of cutbacks and deficit spending.
2)

Problems related to affirmative action

.

The recruitment and

minorities and women in the University’s work force was a

major concern in boundary spanning activities during 1972-73.

Specific

concerns in the area of promotions, job classification, grievance procedures, salary equity, maternity leave, child care, and admissions to

professional schools were the subject of communications with outside

Affirmative action concerns touched the faculty, students,

groups.

administrative staff, and non-academic staff.

Specifically, minorities

were being admitted with special needs and concerns, that the University

system had not traditionally accomodated.

There were pressures to increase

the number of minorities and women in key administrative and faculty

positions, admit more blacks and women into medical and law school, and
to provide blacks with more financial aid, remedial programs and Third

World courses.
3)

Problems related to public services

.

It would seem logical that

external groups would be concerned with the University’s commitment to

public service.

There were communications concerning the dropping of

programs, the starting of new programs, the negotiation of training

programs, cooperation with other
schools to provide joint services,
and
cultural programs. There were pressures
from various groups directed
toward the cost-efficiency and
accountability of existing programs.

External groups' demands were manifested
and felt specifically in the
areas of continuing education, night school,
athletic programs, cooperative programs, and in the area of federal
and city training programs.
4)

Schools

.

Problems related to enrollment and admissions to
Professional

Enrollments were tapering off in higher educational institu-

tions because of the expiration of the draft and because
employment was
no longer assured through a college education.

students were seeking alternatives.

Hence, prospective

In addition the baby boom had

passed and the applicant pool was levelling off.
also contributed to a decline in enrollment.

sized in the State:

could do so.

Open access was now empha-

any student who wanted to go to college theoretically

The shift from a meritocratic to an egalitarian institution

taxed the University in new ways.

tion resulted.

Rising tuition costs

Problems of recruitment and accomoda-

There was, however, an unprecedented number of applicants

to medical and law schools; as many as 250 applicants for one opening.

The demand to accept those who had "pull" was great.
5)

Problems related with moral or quasi-legal concerns

of the in-state residency criterion was in question.

.

The issue

The House bill which

set up punishments for student rioters was passed, and the question of how

lawful was homosexuality came up during 1972-73.

Issues of sex and drugs,

of getting black students to stand for the national anthem, and of safety
and security standards in the dormitory halls are other examples of problems
the University President faced.

Research ethics regarding the use of human
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subjects, students' use of profanity on the radio,
and the issue of a

dean bringing his four month old baby to work with
him caused mail and

phone calls to be levelled at the President's office
with very explicit

demands from external groups.
The five major problem areas were manifested in the communications
the University President had with external groups.

Each external group

that he interacted with had its own idiosyncratic viewpoint, with its
own

subtle trade-offs as the President chose one course of action over another.
These problems or issues were always on-going.

They had only brief

incremental explanations and never any lasting resolutions.

Wherever the

President made speeches, attended luncheons and banquets, or went to
meetings, he was faced with discussion and explanation of these problem
areas.

His phone calls and mail reflected external groups' concerns with

these problems.

There also was demands from internal groups and individuals

concerning these issues.

How the President dealt with these problems deter-

mined the support he received from both internal and external groups and

ultimately the course of action the University would take.
In order to fully describe the complexity and conflicting demands

that converged on the President's office there must be an explanation of

which specific groups actually made their demands known and what the implications of those demands were for the President and the institution.

There

were 21 groups (see Chart II, Chapter III, p. 55) reflected in the mail
that conveyed certain demands, shared information, and required appropriate

action on the part of the President.

The mail (supplemented at times with

range of
interviews and observation notes), since it reflects the greatest
will be used as
external pressures on the President and on the University,
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the basis for explanation of external demands.

External Groups and Demands

The order of discussion will be in order of frequency
of inter-

action by mail (Chart II, p. 55).

Since the mail contains the greatest

number of contacts, 5,770 total contacts, in contrast to 1,231 total

phone calls and 1,177 total number of meetings, and since the contents
of phone calls and meetings were not always known, written documents are

the more easily used to obtain a general sense of what groups and what

demands the President was being exposed to.

A brief general sketch of

each group’s demands will be presented as well as the range of organizations or individuals contained within each group in cases where a group's

demands were articulated by several organizations and individuals.
Other Universities and Colleges
The University studied was one of twelve state assisted universities in the state.

There was an inter-university council made up of the

presidents of these twelve institutions.

During the hearings on the

passage of the biennium budget the council had agreed to share information and to lobby together for an increase in higher education appropriations.

Many of the general reports (20% of the mail between other

universities and colleges) had to do with reports on legislators and
on the implications of projected budget figures for each university.

There was also a tremendous amount of information seeking and

sharing by other universities and colleges around new programs and positions.

An estimated 72 higher educational institutions were in contact
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with the President

1)

asking information on what his institution was

doing in areas of program evaluation, metropolitan affairs,
continuing

education and co-op programs, and

2)

asking for recommendations to search

committees for presidents, deans, and provosts.
amount of "trade talk" exchanged.

There was a tremendous

Ten percent of the mail with other

universities and colleges centered around seeking and gaining advice;
10% concerned acknowledgements for favors or information exchanged; 17%

concerned recommendations; general reports comprised 23%.

Formal question-

naires represented 5% of the President’s correspondence with other colleges
and universities.

Much of the mail initiated by the President was concerned with the
formation of cooperative consortia, information on cooperative programs,
and critical analyses of the Regents’ state budget proposals.

Eleven

percent of the mail with other universities and colleges was initiated
by the President.

The mail did contain some overt pressures, such as one president

trying to get more of his undergraduates accepted into the University’s

Medical School, demands by other presidents to get the chief executive to
pressure a specific recalcitrant Regent to appropriate new money, a warning
that there would be problems with a possible AAUP — State Faculty Senate

coalition, and an attempt by one president to seek consensus and cooperaagreement
tion on a proposal that would force students to sign a contractual
held liable
with the University upon entering, in which the student could be
for creating a disturbance.

Two other problems that surfaced centered around

of continuing
pressure to disclose faculty salaries and the territoriality

education programs.
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Much of the interaction
between the President and
other college,
and universities (55%)
occurred between the President
and the twelve

institutions of the Inter-University
Council.

It tended to be on-going,

and was somewhat informal as
evidenced by hand-written notes.

The

remaining 45% of his correspondence
with other colleges and universities
was with institutions all around
the
country.

For the most part these

were formal requests that required
sporadic correspondence.
Other universities and colleges, on the
whole, were formally cooperative, sharing information readily,
although not so much resources
or time.

Most of the contacts were by mail; most
organizations were

supportive and understanding of the financial
squeeze that all institutions of higher education seemed to be facing.

Cooperation was tenuous

at best between the twelve state institutions.

Each was trying to get

its piece of the pie without cutting into each
other’s domain.

Historically, institutions of higher education have been competitive captains in a sea of plentiful governmental, state and
local resources
but this is not the case in the 1970's.

Independence may change to inter-

dependence, competition to cooperation, as scarce and limited resources

become crucial.
Students

Student contacts came essentially through the mail and meetings.
The President often held ’’open hours” when anyone could come in and talk

with him about any problem or concern he had.
students.

Most of those who came were

The President also taught a course for honor students entitled

Sociology of the University

.

These two kinds of meetings accounted for
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most of the student verbal contact time with
the President.

The student

governance leaders also had easy access to and were
in constant contact
with the President.

The President interacted with over one hundred
in-

dividual students in conjunction with various issues.

Acknowledgements of awards, elections, and various accomplishments
by students accounted for 11% of the mail between students
and the Presi-

dent.

Twenty-five percent of the mail resulted in students asking the

President to provide more financial aid, to keep the ombudsman position,
to untangle record foul-ups, to free students from dormitory contracts,
to drop the intercollegiate football program, to put a graduate student

representative on the Board, and to give evening college students more

representation and facilities.
The President initiated 23% of the the mail with students and
student groups.

His contacts with students were concerned with appeals

to the University Judicial Council, retention of a law school professor,

writing recommendations for students, the ombudsman position, better
financial aid, and the clarification of the in-state classification of
students for fee purposes.

Others concerned complaints of poor teaching

and a proposed counseling system.

Problems that specifically resulted in concerted pressure and demands

were focused around the closing of a home economics program, an art history
program, and a textile course.

As well, the President was pressured by

students to install more security phones across the campus, to make more
financial aid available, and to appoint a student representative on the
Board.

A large bulk of time and energy was spent on black demands that the
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University be more responsive to
Third World needs.

A task force was

appointed to respond to and resolve
thirty-three specific demands and
grievances brought by black students
to the President's office during
open hours. The demands covered
such points as more black faculty
and
administrators, more financial aid, more
coverage of black events in
the University press, more emphasis
and recognition of black student

programs, and more programs designed to
aid blacks to stay in college
once they have been admitted.

Hodgkinson says that his findings show that pressures
to accomodate minorities will be forthcoming in many
institutions of higher

education because "the admission of new kinds of students
to higher
education has not been matched by development of programs designed

specifically to meet their needs" (Hodgkinson, 1971,

p.

222).

There were only two observed attempts by students to ask the

President to take a stand on national issues.

One occurred during open

hours when a student group tried to pressure the University President to

mandate that the food services support the Chavez lettuce boycott.

The

other incident involved a student group asking the President to take a

formal stand on the Viet Nam war.
The vast majority of demands manifested by students were practically,

domestically, or locally-oriented issues that required immediate but short
term attention.

Students were primarily concerned with issues of programs

and courses, with services and costs and secondarily with issues of repre-

sentation and student rights.

Ill

Independents

Independents were usually private citizens, not representing
any institution or organization.

In general they were more interested

in the quality of instruction than the quality of research,
the notable

exception being that some independents were concerned with the ethics
of research in the use of human subjects.

concerned with the institution's image.

Independents were constantly
Most of the complaining and

displeasure was concerned with the "extrinsic"

characteristics of the

University's services.
The independents seemed concerned with the questions of sex and
drugs, maintaining football, a dean that brought his child to work, and

with blacks "getting everything."

They were also concerned with tuition

costs, the cutting of programs, security and safety in dormitories and

admission, but, less so, than with the other issues identified above.

A good public image for the University meant higher enrollments,
increased alumni giving, a political base for legislative support, and
the ease of decision-making that comes with public goodwill, credit, and

understanding.

The correspondence was scrupulously answered with care

not to alienate or displease.

Concerted efforts were made to explain all

decision, and to appease all dissatisfactions.

^Prestige or image is based on extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of
For example, the intrinthe product or service (Perrow, 1961, p. 338).
while
sic aspect of an automobile would be its durability and efficiency
status symbol
the extrinsic characteristics might be its desirability as a
in a tight
Both extrinsic and intrinsic characteristics are valuable
do not relate
which
characteristics
extrinsic
competitive market, yet the
of the University
directly to the quality of service are the only aspects
independents seemed to complain about.
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Twenty-five percent of all correspondence
with this group involved
complaints and compliments. The compliments
were acknowledged (14%) and
complaints were explained or appeased.

Complaints focused around poor

parking facilities, record foul-ups,
tuition costs, drugs, sex, commencement ceremonies, profanity, black demands,
and the dropping of programs.
The compliments focused mainly on faculty
performance and service to non-

profit organizations.

The President received letters both praising
and

complaining in an approximately 40/60% ratio respectively
yet because the

spectrum of complaints were wider, they seemed more numerous.
Thirty percent of the mail with independents required action:

there

were requests to attend to record foul-ups, for confirmation of
admittance
to graduate school, for explanation of program cuts and requests for
informa-

tion on programs and policies.

Some letters asked how independents could be

of help to the University.

Direct problems and pressures from this group were the highest of any
group except alumni.

Independents

pressured the President to retain the

intercollegiate football program, to influence admissions to medical school,
to retain certain academic programs, and to institute a child care center.

They also wanted action to force blacks to stand when the national anthem
was played at public events.

They wanted students to adhere to standards

of morality and complained about security in dormitory halls.

The independents were constantly bringing up issues of accountability
and efficiency.

They showed concern that faculty were not teaching and

spending more and more time with personal pursuits.

They wanted adminis-

trators to show more force in running the institution.

faculty to be anti-business and socialistic.

They did not like

They held the administration
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accountable for faculty and student
behavior.
The tone of most of the letters
from Independents that were complaints or that required a response

was one of demanding accountability:

what was the President going to
do about the Issue that concerned
them?
Some letters were unsigned; similarly
some of the phone calls were anonymous.

These anonymous contacts were at times
belligerent, caustic, and

personally accusatory towards the President.

It can be suggested that

there was a direct Increase in mall and
phone calls with an Increase in
the amount of publicity the University
received or the amount of exposure
the President received.

Industry
This group had a wide variety of contacts with the
University President.

There were at least seventy-six separate organizations that
inter-

acted with the President's office, and they were more organizationally
astute.

Industry's correspondence with the President shows candor and

consideration yet was articulate enough to make its demands clear.
group

s

This

feedback to the President as to how the organization was viewed

in the business community left room for explanations and at the same time

required accountability.

The utmost courtesy and protocol was observed

at all times as evidenced by the single largest type of contacts between

the President and this group, namely acknowledgements (22%).

The President received a great many requests for speeches or public

appearances.

These requests accounted for almost 20% of the mail contacts

with industrial-business groups.

When the President did make a speech,

discussion almost always centered on issues of cost, programs, and admissions.
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Industry seemed extremely sensitive
to the trade-offs that could
involved in its interactions with
the University.
The University
was the second largest employer
in the city spending over
$9 million
each year. Where the University did
its banking, investing, and
Insurance
business was always a sore point with
the many banks and insurance agencies in the city.

The President would intermittently
receive offers and

pressures to change the accounts to other firms.
The University was consciously considered to
be a resource by

industry.

The business community used the University as
a lure to draw

talented young executives and technicians to the city
by promising that
they could further their education at the University and
thereby add to
their chances of promotion.

Also their wives and children could get the

education they needed at the University.

Industry also made use of the

technical expertise in several University departments, for example,

Chemistry and Engineering.
Not only was the University used as a drawing card by industry for
its employees, it was also used to draw other industry into the city.

The National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety and the Environ-

ment Protection Agency were two other organizations that came to the city

partly because of the research capacity and resources at the University.
These organizations brought more federal jobs and money into the area.

Much of the direct feedback and contact that did not focus on
acknowledgements or invitations was concerned with the cutback in programs,
in night courses, with changes in cooperative work/study programs without

notification, with lobbying for applicants to medical school, and with

recommendations for the appointment of a faculty member or dean.
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It should be stressed that many
of the subtle pressures that
this

group applied would not come in written
form to the President but through
his meetings, by phone, or indirectly
through corporate giving and support
for athletics.

If the public image of the University
was poor or being

tarnished by bad publicity, a negative reaction
from the business com-

munity could be expected
Through dialogue the researcher had with some members
of business
and industrial groups, it was found that their criticism
of the University

was not specific.

This group frequently cited that the University adminis-

tration did not care about athletics and could not be trusted to keep
programs if the going got tough, and that the administration was weak and
could not exercise its authority to stop rising costs or to increase

productivity.
The University stood to lose much by not meeting the expectations
of industry.

Sixty-nine percent of all private giving resulted from

corporate giving.

The University was proud of its private giving record.

It was in the top ten in the nation and second in the State.

In addition,

if the University was to branch out into the continuing education field to

widen its student pool and income from tuition, employers in corporations

needed to be convinced that the University was a credible institution.
This would take the cooperation of leaders in business and industry.

Historically, most of the industry in the city has been individually
owned although this condition is changing and giving way to corporate

ownership.

Industry, because of its private ownership, has carried the

brunt of financial giving but as this has begun to change more responsibility
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is falling on community organizations.

Industry now "coordinates" the

activities of fund-raising through the Chamber of Commerce.

For

example, the University's fund-raising efforts have to be timed with
other charity and fund-raising drives such as the United Appeal Campaign.

Finally, there is a strong leaning toward voluntarism in the city as

evidenced by a large number of influential civic organizations and
general public support of cultural institutions (art, music and theater),

charity organizations and social welfare associations on which the

University depends.
In sum, the "economics" of the University was the most important

concern of industrial and business organizations in their relationships

with the University.

The University was treated according to its services

and image, its costs versus its returns to the community.

These kinds of

economic concerns were also prevalent in the legislative and state agency
group.

Legislative and State Agencies
This group includes the House and State Senate, the Governor, and
agencies such as the state employment agency, state environmental protection agency, the state auditor's office, the civil rights commission,
and the Governor's business and economic council among others.

The

or
President interacted with approximately 62 separate organizations

individuals in this group.
particularly hectic
The year during which this study occurred was

President and the State
and required constant interaction between the

appropriation for higher
because of deliberations on the biennium budget
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education.

In addition, the membership
of the House and Senate changed

as a result of the November,
1972, elections which caused the
President
to have to interact with many
young new Republican legislators who
were

unfamiliar with the University's problems
or case.

The Democratic

Governor’s proposed budget was less than what
was needed, not providing
for increased expenditures in some areas.

It was seen as a cost-reducing

budget designed to keep public spending down.

If there was to be an

increase in higher education appropriations, delicate
negotiations and
lobbying with Republican legislators who did not want
to be seen as
spendors, would be required.

Other areas in the budget such as Welfare

and health appropriations would have to be adjusted.

Protocol was high in the interactions between the President and
legislative groups as evidenced by the number of acknowledgements:
of the mail and frequent contacts by telephone for this purpose.

16%

Face-to-

face meetings between this group and the President usually resulted because
of unresolved issues.

For example, the President was asked to testify

before the Senate and House Appropriations Committees.

The general reports

and technical figures needed to study and plan for the implications of

State appropriations on the University resulted in 25% of the mail contacts

between this group and the President's office.
Most of the mail that the President initiated with this group was in

efforts to increase the State subsidy or to ask United States Senators and

Representatives to lobby for bills that were being deliberated at the
national level to influence the awarding of research contracts from HEW.
An example would be the bill for the education of the handicapped that
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would result in a loss of $26 million for the
Office of Education and
consequently a loss in government research contracts
for the University.
Other examples include the President sending complimentary
football and

basketball tickets to representatives of this group and his
response to
a manpower report from the Department of Economic Development.

Contact from State legislators required Presidential actions in

matters which included the recruitment of minorities, the replacement
of a representative to a state PPBS task force, medical school admissions,

and faculty teaching time.

The legislature had control of tuition hikes and of pay raises for

civil service employees.

The Governor and the legislature had approved

a 5% pay increase for State employees but because the University was part

private and part public,^ the University has to absorb a majority of the
costs.

Legislators were more or less in agreement that there would be no

tuition increases during 1972-73.

A subsidy increase or a revision in the

subsidy formula were the only ways the University could bring in new funds
to balance the rising costs of academic programs.

The University had to increase State appropriations and because this

need was apparent, legislators were in a position to "push" for their concerns.

Black legislators wanted help for black businesses, more blacks in

professional schools, and more responsiveness to their minority constituencies.

Legislators in general wanted more accountability and demonstra-

tions of cost effectiveness as well as increase in

Shis will

be explained at length in Chapter V.

productivity

in the
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University.

There was a bill that eventually got defeated which
would

have required faculty to put in a set number of hours
of teaching and

counseling with students per week.
The situation was compounded because the University was seeking

special appropriations for its Medical School which had expanded through
a

federal building grant.

The University did not, however, have enough

money to hire the new faculty required by the expansion.

It will be

seen in the next chapter how the special medical appropriations from the
State cost the University some internal control and autonomy.
The Board of Regents

The Board of Regents technically was supposed to be the bargaining
and planning agent for the 12 state universities as well as for the two-

year and community college systems in the state.

This was somewhat diffi-

cult because individual university needs were not "coordinated."

things more difficult, the Regents had an acting Chancellor.

To make

While the

search was on for another Chancellor, the Regents essentially lacked the

power to create the groundswell of public opinion that was required to

pressure the legislators to change the appropriations to higher education.

Universities could create this groundswell through their alumni much more
effectively.
In an interview with the Governor's assistant on Higher Education

was going
it was revealed that the Governor did not think enough planning

on in higher education.

The Regents had not taken into consideration the

change in local and state needs.

The Governor felt that faculties were

not being responsive
not "pulling their load" and that universities were
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to changing job markets.

Lack of planning had resulted in unused dormi-

tory and physical plant spaces.

The Regents had not been anything but a

rubber stamp for the large universities.
The Governor circumvented the Regents when he appointed a task
force to study the problems in higher education, when he tried to get

nine student and faculty representatives on university boards, and when
he backed the proposal to give more financial aid directly to the students

and not to universities.

The Governor wanted some tension and dialogue

around the planning and purposes of higher educational institutions as
a platform for his ideas and proposals.

Apart from putting a freeze on further construction, the Regents
could do little except fulfill formal administrative duties such as

requesting enrollment figures, prescribing guidelines for submitting
budgets, and sending out information about budget appropriations.

Forty-five percent of the mail contacts between the Regents and
the President were general reports, agendas for meetings, and guidelines
for budget and operating procedures.

Thirteen percent of the mail con-

tacts were concerned with setting policies:

for out-of-state student

residency requirements, faculty service, subsidy increases for the twoyear colleges, and with providing information about collective bargaining.

Ten percent of the mail contacts were requests by the Regents to the

President to provide them with information concerning committee representation, enrollment statistics, meetings and schedules.
in
Fourteen percent of the mail was initiated by the President

appropriation for the
order 1) to present his rationale for a special

Medical School,

2)

to seek
to seek approval for technical programs, 3)
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a planning grant for a continuing education proposal,
and 4) to answer

charges that the University was "log-rolling" vis-^-vis
other uni-

versities in requesting appropriations.
During 1972-1973 the University began to lobby for its own
case independent of the other universities.

In an effort to get money

for its Medical School and an increase in State subsidy, the President

launched a program in which alumni would contact congressmen on behalf
of the University.

his case.

The President tried to get press coverage to plead

He also invited legislators for breakfasts in order to get

the opportunity to forcefully present his case to legislators from

neighboring districts which the University served the most.
However, the Regents were supposed to perform a centralizing and

coordinating function for the universities' lobbying efforts.

The Regents

felt that the case for twelve universities was stronger if done together,

therefore there were strong pressures for conformity.

When the President

lobbied for special appropriations for the Medical School he was accused
of "budget busting tactics that would destroy the Regents'

student based

formula for distributing available funds equitably among all universities"
(Akron Beacon Journal, 4/20/73).

Specific pressures and problems that can be identified focused

around accusations of log-rolling tactics by the Regents; requests to
counseling;
submit records of faculty time spent in teaching, research, and
a

and
request for measures to be taken to improve management practices;

Regent pressures to admit students to the Medical School.
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In summary, between the Regents, the Governor,
and the Individual

legislators, the President had his work cut out for him
in order to get
an increase in subsidy money and to get the special
appropriations needed

for the Medical School expansion.

Communication was predicated on poli-

tical and organizational trade-offs:

each group trying to get something

in return for actions taken.

Non-Profit Organizations
This group included organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce,

Community Chest, Red Cross, Art Museum, the Playhouse in the Park, Kiwanis
Clubs, and the Junior League of Women in the city.

The demands placed on

the President and upon the institution were requests to give time, money,
or expertise to certain charitable causes.

Fifty percent of the mail con-

tacts were requests for the President to take part in meetings, to be on

boards (or to appoint a delegate)

,

to endorse a public statement showing

his support, or to actually conduct a campaign on behalf of a charitable
cause.

Fourteen percent of the mail contacts were acknowledgements of

work that the President had done or that others in the University had done
for non-profit organizations or answers by the President saying he could

not do what was asked.

He also received reports about how the institution or parts of the

institution were perceived by various non-profit organizations.
of the mail was in the form of reports on operations.

Ten percent

The problems that

parking,
arose from this group concerned the discontinuance of programs,

and record foul-ups.
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Most of the demands from this
group taxed the President's and
the University’s resources for
charitable donations, in the form of
time, money and expertise, with the
notable exception of the Chamber
of Commerce.

When the President spoke to these
organizations he found

that they were concerned with many of
the same things that independents

had on their minds:

questions of student morals, faculty accountability,

education for jobs, future costs of education,
faculty tenure, and
affirmative action.
In sum, although non-profit organizations could
be good for public

image, the production of "ground swell", and information
contacts, there

was always some kind of exchange.

There were two or three requests per

month from a charity organization requesting aid from the University
in
some form or another.

Federal Government and Departments
The impact of the Nixon administration on universities has been

pervasive because it represented a change in priorities that placed higher

education in the unaccustomed position of "oddman out."
had literally been there any time universities wanted it.

In the past, money

During the 60 's

money was easy to get but this has not been the case in the 70 's.

The

President's interactions with governmental agencies reflect this trend.
The President interacted with approximately twenty-two different federal

agencies such as HEW, The Fund for Post-Secondary Education, the National
Institute for Health, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Department
of the Interior, the Department of the Army and Navy, and others.
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Most of the mail was comprised of
general and specific reports,
49% describing changes in agency policies
and cut-backs.

The govern-

ment applied very few overt pressures of
any kind except as it required
compliance with affirmative action procedures.

The pressures were

covert in that they were based on the absence of
support for all

institutions of higher education.
Most of the meetings and phone calls the President had
with this
group concerned ongoing contracts or programs with separate
agencies.
The University was involved with a degree granting program
with the

Department of Labor personnel.

Also the President invited the Deputy

Director of the National Science Foundation (an alumnus of the University)
and the Assistant Director of the Fund for Post-Secondary Education to

speak to the top administrators of the University.

On both occasions

federal priorities as represented by both agencies were articulated.

For

example, administrators were told at one seminar that National Science

Foundation grants in the future would focus more on applied research and
the use of knowledge to solve some of the nation's social problems.

The

National Science Foundation Deputy Director also felt that education should
be uncoupled from research

.

The federal priorities that were brought to bear on the University

during 1972-73 included:
- Decentralizing government to regional, state and local levels

in both decision-making and spending of public funds.
-

Consolidating, integrating and eliminating federal government
agencies, and cutting "red tape", while upgrading the quality
of people in government, especially top management.
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- Reducing federal taxes
or at least holding the line and
making

some adjustments in the tax structure.
- Developing more effective
cost-benefit criteria for federal

programs and an increased sense at the local level
of account-

ability for the expenditure of public funds.
- Reducing the federal budget and
cutting federal spending, for

example, by withholding funds appropriated by Congress
and by

delaying the implementation of new programs.
These priorities were reflected in various ways in the University.
The President knew that revenue sharing would necessitate closer work with
the state and local governments.

NIH and capitation grants would stop as

of 1975 which meant a loss to the University of $3.5 million in federal

funding.

A phasing out of traditional student aid programs with an enact-

ment of a program which provides money directly to the student brings market

mechanisms into play at institutions of higher education that are not
meeting consumer needs in that it forces institutions to woo students on
the basis of the schools' program offerings.

Dependence on federal funds is covert in its influence on the uni-

versity because it doesn't lead to the university developing its own
priorities and iong range planning.

As patterns of federal funding change

with the expediency of political pressures, the institution tends to try
to keep up, tends to try to keep attracting federal dollars by shifting

priorities to respond to the shift in federal spending.
The effects of the federal grant on universities during the 40' s,
50's

,

and 60's are discussed in Appendix A.

In the 70's, the vacuum left
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by the disappearance of most
federal money added to the budget
crunch

that all institutions of higher
education were experiencing.

The only direct pressure the University
felt from the federal

government was Executive Order 11246 which
in effect said that no
higher educational institution receiving
federal money through federal

contracts could discriminate "against any employee
or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin"
and that the institution "will take affirmative
action to ensure that

minority and female applicants are employed" (H.E.W. Higher
Education
Guidelines, 1972).

Also employees must be treated during employment

without regard to these factors.

If a

contractor does not comply with

the Executive Order, all federal contracts with that institution may
be cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in part and the con-

tractor may be declared ineligible for further government contracts"
(H.E.W. Higher Education Guidelines, 1972).

was easier said than done.

Compliance with this order

It required a management information system

and staff assistance to say the least, as well as time to change profes-

sional, faculty attitudes and norms that had had decades to form.

The President appointed a knowledgable person to lead the institution in compliance with this order and the task was just under way at the
time of this study.

There is no question that this order caused direct

pressure to be brought to bear on the University.

The University had no

real choice but to allocate money, time, and personnel to this task.

It

is a clear example of institutional and managerial autonomy being influenced

by direct environmental pressures.

The entire "pattern" of hiring practices

in the University is likely to be changed as a result of this pressure.
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Not enough time had elapsed during the course of this study
to

significantly assess the impact of this external pressure on the role
of the University President.

searcher

s

There is no doubt however, in the re-

mind, that before compliance will be accomplished, there

will be direct and conflicting pressures focused around the President's
office.

Educational Associations
This group was comprised of approximately thirty-eight organizations, divided into two distinct types:

accrediting associations and

lobbying-information sharing associations.

Each type interacted with

the President through different communication forms and held different

expectations for his role performance.
The lobbying-information type organizations such as the American

Council on Education, the American Association of Colleges and others,
did not apply any "real" pressures on the President except in soliciting

his cooperation in support of information sharing and occasionally by

offering him the opportunity to serve on a national panel.

In return

for a membership fee these associations sent the University (the President)

information about the state of higher education, the national "picture",
and governmental priorities.

This type of organization communicated mostly

affirmative action
by mail and 32 % of that mail was written reports about

guidelines, national priorities, and new funding possibilities.

Twenty-five

and requests to the
percent of the mail were invitations to serve on panels

discontinuation of certain
President to share information about how the
institution.
federal programs and grants would effect his

These organiza-
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tions tried to coordinate and
coalesce higher educational
inatitutions
to fight across-the-board
program cuts at the federal
level.

The accrediting associations
interacted more with the President
on a face-to-face basis and
used the mail only to coordinate
and set up

meeting times for the most part.

The pressures inherent in this
type

of organization are based on
the University's need to
substantiate the

quality of its services.

When the client using the service
is not

really qualified to judge the service,
yet the institution has a need
to enhance its image, claims to
quality can be made through qualified

validating groups who have appropriate
experience and resources to
attest to the service's worth (Perrow,
1961,

p.

337).

In the case of an accrediting agency the
implications are clear for

the President.

If

the accrediting agency's visit confirms the
product's

worth than the visit is mostly protocol.

If, on the other hand, the school

being evaluated is in danger of non-accreditation, then
the meeting takes
on the aura of a doctor telling the patient he is sick
and here is what he

must do to remedy the situation.
In times of budget stringency there is a temptation for adminis-

trators to make the "easy" decision of cutting money cross the board from
all programs and schools rather than trying to evaluate the strong programs
and schools and to maintain their quality at the expense of "weaker" programs.

What results from these types of decisions is mediocrity across the board
and crucial visits from accrediting agencies.

When the accrediting team,

made up of professionals in the field they are evaluating, come in to tell
the President that one of his money-making schools is on the verge of not

getting accreditation unless certain steps are taken that usually require
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the allocation of money and resources, it
is easy to see the conflict-

ridden dilemma the President experiences.

This was the experience of

the President studied on at least one occasion
with the College of

Education.

Job Seekers
This group does not have much leverage and, although treated

courteously, was not given much attention.

Sixty percent of the con-

tacts with this group through the mail were concerned with looking for

job openings.

form of vitas.

Twenty-two percent of the mail was reference data in the
Usually after contact by mail, those who were in the

running for an open position would call or come to the University for
an interview.

Over 60% of all contacts with job seekers were from

people randomly writing institutions with the hope of finding an opening.
During the year there were very few openings.

This group brought no

real pressure to bear on the President except that it increased his

paperwork.

Alumni
The key factors that lay at the bottom of most of the President's

contacts with this group were money and image.

The University needed a

favorable image in order to encourage alumni-giving.

Since alumni tend

not to visit the institution through alumni functions (58% had never been
to an alumni function in a survey taken by the alumni office), the image

they have of their institution is formed by media, sports events, and word
of mouth.
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Much of the mail received by the President from alumni was in
response to newspaper articles.
(25/6)

Most of the problems and pressures

received through the mail focused on the maintenance of an inter-

collegiate football program that the University was thinking of dropping
because of its cost.

In most cases the alumni would threaten not to give

money if the program was dropped.

Other displeasures voiced by alumni

were around giving minorities "everything they wanted", academic programs
that might be cut, and in one case objection to the possibility of R.O.T.C.

being cut.

There were also some letters concerning blacks not standing

when the national anthem was played; other letters concerned the morals
of students.

Phone contacts with alumni were rare with most communications
coming through the mail and alumni club and association meetings at

which the President would make formal speeches.

The development offices

after contact with alumni would ask for the President's time and commit-

ment for fund-raising purposes.

In an alumni poll it was found that 15 /

of the responding alumni would come to hear the President speak, 13 / to

hear a distinguished faculty, 67% to hear a distinguished alumnus, 43% to
hear another top administrative officer, 31% to hear a student, and 25%
to hear a coach.

The upper middle economic class of alumni would be more inclined
to give after personal attention from the President.

Donating alumni set

image was closely
standards for the President's personal behavior as his

linked with the University.

When the researcher would interview alumni

that their view of the President
at official alumni gatherings it was found
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varied according to the alumni 's age and
view of what the function of
the University should be.

This can be confirmed by Spaeth and
Greeley,

1970.

After interviewing staff members

(7)

in the Development Office

who were concerned in one way or another with
alumni-giving

,

they all

confirmed that the President's personal presence at
alumni meetings

resulted in more alumni energy, enthusiasm and concern for
the Uni-

versity and its future than most other speakers that the Development
Office could provide.

The President's personal touch on the acknowledge-

ment of gifts, invitations and contact with influential alumni and the

President's conformity with the alumni 's idea of a discrete, conservative,
punctual gentleman would assure steady alumni-giving.

The mail and inter-

views with alumni and development people did however show a split in the
type of alumnus attitude.

Recent alumni after 1961 showed less commitment

to their University and more commitment to specific colleges, which resulted

in less overall giving, more tolerance of extrinsic image issues, and more

concern for the cost, efficiency, and quality of education.
The total giving rate of alumni amounted to 18% of the private funds

giving that the University received.

The national average was 22%.

The

University has approximately 70,000 alumni with 50,000 in the State and
local area.

Over 22,000 have graduated since 1961.

alumni only 15% have given gifts to the University.

Of that group of recent

Recent alumni who have

given have clearly specified to what college or department their gift was
to go to whereas older alumni more often give unrestricted funds.
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Most development people felt that the
impersonal nature of the

University caused by its large size and
complexity, was not gaining
the allegiance that had been built when
the University was smaller.

Recent graduates are more concerned with the
quality of teaching rather
than with the quality of research, more oriented
toward the possibility
of new academic programs rather than toward the
continuation of non-

academic athletic programs, and more with the intrinsic
value of

a

liberal arts education rather than to the projected image the
President
sets for the University, which may or may not be an accurate
representa-

tion of educational quality.

These differences between the preferences and values of older and

more recent graduates have left the President in the middle.

more recent alumni require programs of different types.

The old and

Instead of just

building alumni programs around athletic events (homecoming, alumni weekends, etc.) more of an effort has to be taken to do something for recent

alumni to gain their commitment and involvement.

Often the President

found it difficult to authorize one type of program at the expense of

another in a time of scarce resources.

The football program was an

example of the conflict and ambiguity experienced by the President concerning his relations with the alumni group.

It created ambiguity

because if the University decided to drop the intercollegiate football

program there was no way of assessing the impact that would have on
alumni giving since students, faculty, and alumni were divided and

lobbying for both positions.
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In sum, the alumni required both
the President’s time and his

ability to fit an image of what the
old alumni wanted and to provide
the quality services the young
alumni were asking for before they

would show allegiance to the large complex
organization that they
once were a part of.

Donors
The group called donors should also be included,
to a degree, in

what has been said about alumni.

The mail the President received showed

that most of the concerns manifested by alumni were
also manifested by

donors.

Concern for programs being dropped or mistreated, football, and

the moral behavior of students can be seen in the content of the
mail the

President exchanged with this group.

Forty-four percent of the mail with

this group was in the form of an acknowledgement from the President to a

donor for a gift, a birth, sickness, or death.
The difference between this group and alumni is that more time and

concerted effort was spent by the President and the Development Office to

maintain contact with potentially large donors.

Image and status were the

precious commodities of exchange and if large gifts were given, many times

annual reports were made to the donors on the University's growth and on
the use of the money given.
It should be said that interactions between the President and

prominent donors and alumni were often enjoyable social interactions.
Many of the donors were public figures who did much for the institutions
of the city.

This description of soliciting funds is not meant to imply

any insincerity or non-authenticity on the part of university personnel.
The negotiations for private giving require delicate probing and under-
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standing with the possible result of mutual
benefit for all concerned.

Media
The media can make the President's life miserable
or it can be a
tool which he can effectively wield to aid his
institution.

The media

is the medium in which all organizations transport
their ideas through-

out the total environmental system.

Media is the main vehicle by which

most people, outside and inside the University, were informed of
decisions
and actions that were taken by groups and individuals inside and outside
the University.

This transportation system of ideas could be used to

sound the alarm if the University was in financial trouble or it could

be the vehicle through which the University's prestige and image could

be built or destroyed.
As the President once wrote, "The media, particularly T.V., makes
the academic cloister a global village in a goldfish bowl.

By focusing

on the lurid or the superficial, the media can disrupt a president's

proper activities, while contributing nothing to the advancement of knowledge" (Bennis, 1973, p. 44).
The media took up much of the President's time - 9.6% of his

meetings, 7.3% of his phone calls (usually either to set up appointments
or to request information), and 3.3% of his mail contacts were with the

media.

Mail contacts were mostly status or information requests or

confirmation of scheduled appointments.

The media had a preference for

verbal contacts which might be accounted for because of the "temporary"

nature of the information they handled.
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Much of the mail that was not information
requests or confirmation
of appointments (35%), was acknowledgements

(22%) or mail initiated by

the President to correct misinformation
in stories that had been printed.
In one instance budget figures were printed
that were totally incorrect
and misleading.

Misrepresentation was the President's nightmare.

It

could create a flood of calls and letters which took
many manhours to

straighten out and still the image remained tarnished in
the minds of

many community people.
The kinds of pressures the press represented for the President were

concerned with demanding a clear and articulate expression of the University

s

position on various issues.

How could the President accentuate the

positive while forthrightly and diplomatically acknowledging the negative
aspects of a given issue?

How could the President get the media to repre-

sent the heart of the matter and not to become fixed on largely peripheral

points or often quoted comments?
A clear presentation of an issue was often difficult because the

situation was complex and because information was not always available,
or it was incomplete.

Reporters at times were ignorant of the subtleties

of the issues they were describing, or if they understood the nuances,

they could not take the space needed to explain them.

Because problem

description always preceded suggested solutions, more often than not an
image -wrecking dilemma was printed without sufficient follow-up on a

constructive resolution.
There were opportunities for some columnists to make value judge-

ments based on their own biased frame of reference that in turn brought
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pressure to bear on the President.

For example, when the University

was considering dropping football
a sports writer for one of
the city
newspapers blasted the administration
with a headline, "University of

Cincinnati Athletics:

February 11, 1973).

Does Anybody Really Care" (Cincinnati
Enquirer,
This article appeared at a time in
which the

University community was polarized around
budget constraints and
academic program cuts which made the
consideration of the football
issue even more volatile.

Faculty and students were squarely divided

on the issue of the continuance of the
football program and many people
did care.

Many people did care about athletics but in the
framework of

declining enrollments, inflation, and reduction of
academic programs,
felt that the intercollegiate athletic program should
be cut first.
The total picture of constraints and pressures operating
on the University

around this issue was not presented in media accounts of decision-making.
The President got reasonable treatment by the media for the most

part and was able to use it to promote the image of the University by

making the financial dilemma known to citizens in the State.

If

people

did care about their higher educational institutions they were told they

could give money or contact their congressman.

The media is a double-

edged sword however, ready to make news out of any issue - news that could

either be destructive or constructive to the institution's image.

In

this case, because the University was a public institution, it was even

more visible and vulnerable to media pressures.
City Groups
This group contains twenty or so individual departments including
the city solicitor, the city council, the city manager, the parks and
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recreation commission and the city police.
time solely supported by a city tax levy.

The University was at one

The University still receives

3.2% of its operating costs from the city.

The amount has stayed con-

stant over the years while inflation and operating
costs have risen

making the city’s contribution to the University diminish
in significance.
The city also contracted the city hospital to the University
for operation
in conjunction with its Medical School.

During the year this study was

conducted that contract was renegotiated.
Most of the mail between the President and city groups, aside from

acknowledgements (22%), was in the form of status reports and requests
(24%).

Those status reports concerned the hospital contract, the con-

tinuation of existing programs, and the addition of new programs.

During

this year the University decided not to give partial tuition waivers to

city employees because of the financial bind the University was in.

The

city government, needless to say, was not happy with that decision.
The President, when he took office two years before, had pledged
to make the University a truly urban university, "the university should

be, along with City Hall, the command post of all the operations to

reclaim, renew, rebuild, revitalize the city.

.

.this will mean more

adult education and greater emphasis on education at mid-career.

will mean devising new degree programs to meet changing needs.

.

It
."

(Bennis, 1972, p. 23).

Because of this commitment the President has husbanded two training
programs with city organizations:

the city police and the city managers.

Much of the contact with city groups was concerned with the initiation and
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maintenance of programs with these two groups.

The hospital contract

and programs for city police and city
managers account for a large part
of the meeting time, calls, and mail between
the President and city

groups.

The subtle pressures experienced by the
President from this

group will be depicted in detail in the next chapter.

Friends
This group really applied
cance.

no^

pressures that were of any signifi-

Most mail and phone calls were of a personal nature,
conveying

information about subjects not necessarily related to higher education.

Ninety-seven percent of the mail contacts were acknowledgements sent by
bo the President concerning awards, book reviews, and personal matters.

Occasionally a friend would ask for a recommendation or seek to set up a
dinner.

Most of the contact from this group functioned as a brief respite

to other activities in the President’s day.

friendship contacts in some cases may

have,

It is also possible that

resulted in eventual business

contacts

Associations
This group was comprised of approximately twenty-three separate

organizations and included associations such as the International

Association of Applied Social Science, the Ohio Academy of Family Physicians, the Blind Veterans Association, the World Health Organization,
the Black Medical Association of Michigan and others.

All of this group

had as its purpose the maintenance of a profession or some kind of expertise.

These associations served a particular small segment of people not

necessarily connected to the academic community.
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Most of the contact with this group was by mail
(2.5%), none by

face-to-face meetings, and 1.3% by phone.

Most of the mail was seeking

membership or recommendations for nominees for membership or for election to office.

There were some pressures from the medial association on behalf
of existing programs or for starting a new program.

There was some help

offered by a few associations to pressure legislators for a subsidy
increase.

There were also some invitations to attend banquets or make

speeches.

For the most part there were no "real" demands leveled at the

President by this group.

There were two notable exceptions, however,

that demonstrate how quickly the environment could change and how politic-

ally egocentric organizations in the environment could be.
The Medical School dean wrote to the Association of Medical Colleges,

through which accrediting teams are drawn that inspect medical school

qualifications, asking the association to pressure the legislators.

The

Dean’s plan was to force the legislature to grant the University its
special Medical School appropriations by getting the association to

threaten non-accreditation of the Medical School in the next year's
inspection.

The Dean then wrote the President explaining what he had

done to "help".

The President’s response was, "you call that help?"

The other example was the Women's Health Project charging discrimi-

nation towards women in the city hospital.

In both examples the associ

own
ations were applying pressures in various ways according to their

pressures will
specific interests without really understanding how the
systems.
affect other systems or the entire relationship of

It should
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aiso be stressed that the interaction
of this group with the University
is political.

Baldridge expresses the true implications of
the above example
and defines the word "politics" in Power
and Conflict in the University

.

Pressures emerge from the complex fragmented
social structure of the university and its
publics', drawing on the divergent concerns
and lifestyles of hundreds of minature subcultures.
These groups articulate their
interests in many different ways, bringing
pressure on the decision-making process from
any number of angles and using power and force
whenever it is available and necessary. Power
and influence, once articulated, go through a
complex process until policies are shaped, reshaped, and forged out of the competing claims
of multiple groups.
All this is a dynamic process, a process clearly indicating that the
university is best understood as a policitized
institution - above all else the political
university (Baldridge, 1971, p. 20).

Consultants and Speakers
The highest percentage of face-to-face meetings of all the Presi-

dent's interactions were with this group; 16.1%.

while phone calls were 5.8%.

Mail contacts show 2.1%

This can be explained by a number of factors.

Forty-three percent of the contacts by mail were general reports bearing on
the consultants findings while 42% of the mail was concerned with setting
up client-consultant relationships and meeting times.

This means that

consultants had little to say initially except to firm up arrangements in
order to get them to the location where they could do their work.

Once

on-site, the President spent time with them so they could come to understand his organization more clearly.

The general reports were submitted

by the consultant after he had left to formalize the feedback given to
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the President during the formal visit.

Phone calls were used at the

last minute to make adjustments in schedules
or to cancel appointments.

The President had two reasons for inviting
consultants to the

University:

1)

He needed evaluations or outside opinions
on various

colleges, departments, and institutes, and

2)

he used the consultants

as speakers for management and team building seminars
for his top

administrative staff.

The pressure placed on the President by the

function was like that of the accrediting agency without the

consequences of non-accreditation.

The consultant would provide in-

formation concerning problems in a unit and state what might be done
about it.

It was up to the President to act.

It is hard to assess what pressures were invited by the President

through the on-going management seminars.
to built effective management processes.

Through them, he was seeking
The education of his staff

might have required some behavioral changes on the President's part.
Since the seminars were new during the year that this study was being
conducted, no attempt was made to get at some of the expectations for
the President's behavior that may have resulted.

Speakers were less frequent at the University but operated basically as consultants except that they submitted no report.

The speaker

came in, provided his on-site service, and left (sometimes with an

honorary degree)
Religious Groups
The interaction with this group was minimal.

There were mail and

phone calls concerned with getting the President to speak or to be on
committee.

The pressures and problems with this group were very much

a
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like those of the non-profit organizations.

Contact with this group

at times resulted in a platform on which the University President

could explain the functions and problems of the University.

He could

raise the prestige of his organization by being visible and credible

while in return performing charitable acts by providing time and expertise for committees and panels.

Education Panels and Studies
This group served the function of informing the President about

technological advances in the field of higher education.

Sixty percent

of the mail between the President and this group was concerned with

general reports which contained information about innovations in under-

graduate and graduate education.

The meetings the President attended

were to serve on panels for recommending alternatives to traditional
graduate and undergraduate programs.
The mail he received that was not reports was concerned with his

reactions to various reports or drafts about innovations or trends in
education.

There were no other real pressures from this group except

the more
that the more prominent the President was on national panels

grants.
contacts he made that might lead to foundation or federal

In

expertise in participating
exchange he was expected to share his time and
on the panels.

Foundations
contact with this group of
The absence of any long substantive

mostly to the shift in emphasis
approximately twelve organizations was due
of foundation priorities.

massive
In the past foundations had poured
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amounts of money into higher
education with the hope of reform for
example in medical education, urban
education, interdisciplinary
studies, and in increasing university
involvement in world affairs
(Kerr, 1963, p. 105).

This is not the case in the 1970’s judging
from the interactions
the President had with this group.
if

There seemed to be little money and

there was any money to be obtained, it was won
in the face of stiff

competition.

Meetings were initiated with various foundations but
they

resulted in very few grants.

In sum,

foundations did not play a great

part in the year's activities.

Public Schools
This group was not of much consequence in its interacts with the

President during the year.

Most of the contact with this group was con-

cerned with invitations to attend meetings or ceremonies or to make speeches.
An honors program was initiated by a nearby high school to allow some

juniors and seniors to take college courses for credit in escrow.

For

the most part however interaction with this group was minimal.

Conclusions

There are many conclusions that can be drawn from a review of the

President's interaction with the University's environment.

In the first

place from the description of interactions in this chapter it is difficult
to understand how internal constituents can maintain the image of the

university as an autonomous cloister.

The evolution of the university

and its environment can no longer tolerate the internal mypopia to external

forces that has fed the myth of the Ivory Tower in the past.

There were
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many factors that led to that myopia:

1)

abundant resources that did

not require coordination because institutions
were small;

2)

the

expectation of independence that comes from academic
specialization;
3)

the insularity of departments and colleges;
4) a sense of public

trust that the function of a college education was
intrinsically

worthwhile; and

5)

rapid growth at economic, social, and technological

levels.
The abundant resources are gone; the growth has slowed down to

next to nothing; and from what has been seen in this chapter faculty/

university isolation and function are being questioned for cost, efficiency, accountability and service.

It can be seen that the questions

are not coming from just one or two groups.

Numerous groups vie for

the President’s attention to express these demands.

The many small

constituencies have their own intricate interests that must be balanced
and coordinated if the total organization is to maintain some semblance
of autonomy and self-direction.

From analysis of the many external groups and the five problem
areas already discussed some general implications can be drawn for the

future of the university.

Those implications are focused around two

themes, namely that the "condition" of the environment will continue to

influence the university in more direct ways consequently lessening
institutional autonomy and that environmental influence will lead to
centralization.

Reduction of Institutional Autonomy
The reduction of institutional autonomy will result from three

conditions in the environment:

1)

a

reactive stance because of change.
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2)

possible ineffectiveness because of
scarcity and accountability;

3)

and further politization because of many
funding constituents.

Each of these will be discussed separately
in the paragraphs that
follow.
1)

From the discussion in the beginning of this chapter
it is

clear that the intensity and nature of the President's
scanning behavior
is

influenced by the environment and by environmental changes.

If the

environment is turbulent and rapidly changing as in the cases of
enrollments, federal funding, legislatures, and alumni, to mention a few, the

information needed to plan and act is complex and difficult to come by.

Decisions are then made not with certainty or calculated risk, but uncertainty, beyond risk, beyond even a calculated understanding of what
could result.

Lack of information and uncertainty in decision-making

lead the university to be more reactive than proactive and result in
less

autonomy and self-direction.
2)

A review of the five major problem areas and external con-

stituencies in this chapter revealed a tenor to the environment characterized by a concern for finances and accountability.

This climate in

turn influenced the University's exchanges with outside groups.

The

processes in the environment itself which are among the determining

conditions of the exchange is called the causal texture of the environment (Emery and Trist, 1963, p. 220).

educational environment in the 1970'

accountability

s

The causal texture of the higher
is one of change, scarcity, and
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The scarcity /account ability syndrome
can have a spiral effect.

Scarcity and change prolong reflection
on available information and

alternatives which increases inertia.

Inertia can lead to lack of

satisfactory responses from the service organization
(in this case,
the University) which causes the client
to increase his monitoring

activities and his frequency of interaction with the
organization in
efforts to direct its services.

The net result is more anxiety, more

time lost in providing the service, more accountability,
and a reduc-

tion in the effectiveness of the service organization.
3)

As we have seen, the contact the President had with external

groups occurred on many levels.

Pressures and demands made themselves

known in many issues and areas.

Economic, political, technological and

social ideas permeated the President's relations with outside groims.
These ideas and demands resulted in value judgements and interests so

numerous that reconciliation was impossible and displeasure an almost
certain result.
At the same time, the university depends on many external groups.
The dependency is based on a need for clients, for money, and for legit-

imization of its purposes.

In order for the university to obtain those

needed resources, organizations outside the university that supply those

resources must have a need for the services the university provides.

In

times of scarce resources clear reasons for establishing priorities among

competing demands must be provided to those outside units that grant the
university needed resources.

Politicization of the university results

from competition for limited resources of external groups who have special
interests to be served in granting the university the resources it needs.
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A second implication of environmental
influence,

a

in addition to
lessening of institutional autonomy,
has been a tendency toward in-

creased centralization.

Centralization
Centralization is encouraged by the environmental
conditions not
only internal but external to the university
as well.

External centraliza-

tion is resulting because the problems of
information and alternatives,

scarcity and accountability and politicization are
better handled if

universities cooperate with each other rather than compete.

centralization is

bom

External

out of the fact that more and more college con-

sortia are being formed.

Consortia result in a wider variety of combined

services at lower costs and reduced uncertainty in shared decision-making.
Internal .centralization results from
the president

s

office and from

2)

1)

information converging on

the need for increased responsiveness

to consumer demand.
1)

Contacts between the president and other external organizations

result in contacts between the president and usually someone of equal
status from another organization.

Neither is the boss.

There may be

considerable ambiguity in interaction patterns and in the exchange rate.
Also there is a likelihood that the parties operate on different standards
and have conflicting objectives because the rewards are different within
the different organizations.

High ambiguity and different standards can

and often do result in difficult, lengthy, tension-filled negotiations
and relationships.

These difficult relationships are only maintained by

the high level of information and concentration that comes from being in
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an administrative position.
In this study, the President
received information because he was

perceived by external units as having the
power to direct the University
and to change internal dynamics so that
they were responsive to outside

needs.

It is evident from an analysis of
contacts that the President had

with various external groups that their needs
must be met
are to be forthcoming.

if

resources

Because those needs were articulated to the

President^ and because internal information concerning the
feasibility
of meeting those needs also converged on the President's
office it would

seem that he should have the power to make decisions that would
result in
the acquisition of vital resources.

Internal centralization also resulted from the need to be increasingly

responsive to consumer demand.
2)

As wq have seen, external groups were concerned with the procure-

ment and disposal of functions of the university and not with core processes.

They were concerned with admissions and grades, hiring and grievance procedures, the starting and dropping of programs, and extrinsic characteristics

such as parking and student conduct.
In most cases, external groups were more concerned with the product
of teaching rather than with the core function of teaching.

They were

concerned with the opportunity function, production function, and the
service function.

They were concerned with education as a means of social

^External groups articulate most of their needs through the President
either because the subunit that can be responsive to the external group’s
needs is not known or because there is not subunit that could be responsive
To whom, for example, would a private citizen write
to the particular need.
With whom would HEW
if he wanted the blacks to stand for the national anthem?
correspond to assure compliance with Executive Order 11264?
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mobility for everyone.

They were concerned with whether or
not education

provided the training for professional,
technical, and social roles in
society and they were concerned with education
as a means to solve social

problems that might lead to a better society.
External groups were concerned with education as a
consumer good.
They were concerned with teaching before research
and with applied research

before pure research.

External groups held the President accountable for

the University's capacity to provide the services they needed
and saw as

relevant to their view of the University's function, because resources

were forthcoming to the University only if the University was responsive
to external needs.

Because external groups recognized the President as

the "authority" that could direct the University to be responsive,

centralization toward the President's office resulted.

CHAPTER

V

ROLE PRESSURES ON THE
PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE
up to this point there has
been a discussion of the
unique
characteristics of the university as
an organization and
institution
(Appendix A) , a discussion of the
activities and roles the president
performs and a discussion of some of
the issues and accompanying

expectations that external groups hold
for the university as reflected
through the President's boundary
activities. What remains to be discussed are specific instances of role
conflict and ambiguity that the
President experienced during the year of
this study that would be

indicative and representative of the total
year.

The coping mechanisms

he used to deal with the conflict and
ambiguity he experienced will be

discussed in Chapter VI.
Three mini-studies including a University-external
group consortium, the University's relationships with State
legislators on the question
of budget appropriations, and issues concerned with
moral or quasi-legal

matters were chosen as the best representative anecdotes.

These mini-

studies contained elements and examples of conflict and ambiguity found
in all the other issues and areas that could have been chosen.

The

University-external group consortium was chosen because it was ongoing
throughout the year and at the finish of this study was unresolved.

The

appropriations-admissions issue did find resolution by the time this study
ended.

Quasi-legal concerns were chosen because of the unexpected nature

of the problems that often required a reactive stance and a tolerance for

high ambiguity.
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Before the discussion of the mini-studies
some definitions are in
order to further the reader's understanding
of role models and concepts.

From a model of role behavior will come the
organization of the ministudies

.

Role Theory
The organizational role theory is a prime building
block upon which
the organization gains dependency and consistency of
behavior from those

people who carry on the input-transformation-output cycle of the organization.

With turnover in personnel and uncertain environmental conditions,

consistency and stability are necessary between internal unit relationships
or,

in the final analysis, between patterned and motivated acts of human

beings, if the organization is to maintain the input-transformation-output
cycle.

Organizational stability and consistency is psychologically achieved
"as long as attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, habits, and expectations of

human beings evoke the required motivation and behavior" (Katz and Kahn,
1966, p. 173).

People act on other people in a set of ongoing relation-

ships that result in consistency and dependability of organizational work
or patterned activity.

What particular organizational space or office a

person occupies will be determined by a structure of interrelated offices
and the patterns of activities associated with them.

Office is essentially a relational concept, defining
each position in terms of its relationship to others
and to the system as a whole. Associated with each
office is a set of activities or expected behaviors.
These activities constitute the role to be performed,
at least approximately, by any person who occupies that
office (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 173).
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The populations with which a person in a
particular office interacts in his work activities or role, are called
his role set

.

The role

set or people with whom the focal person interacts
hold certain expecta-

tions for his performance.

The key to role theory is that activities

which define a role are maintained by the expectations of
other people
who interact with the focal person and that those expectations
are com-

municated or "sent" to the focal person (Katz and Kahn, 1966,

p.

175).

A role set is made up of many individual role senders who have expectations for the focal person and who communicate to the focal person certain

prescriptions and proscriptions for his behavior.
The "sent" role expectations may include demands with respect to

specific acts and personal characteristics or styles; they may be con-

cerned with what the focal person did, is doing, or should do, including

how he should relate to others.

Not all role expectations are restricted

to job, yet, for the purposes of this study, only job demands will be

discussed.

It must also be understood that role expectations can be

communicated but the focal person does not always have to comply.

The

focal person will respond to expectations in terms of his perceptions
of these expectations.

Thus, for the focal person there is not only a sent role consisting
of the influential and communicative acts of the role set, but there is

also a received role consisting of the focal person's perceptions and under-

standings of what is expected.

The congruency between the sent role and the

received role will depend on the content of the expectations, the clarity
of the expectations and the properties of the senders.

It is the received
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role that will be the

Mediate

source of the focal person's
motivation

for role performance or role behavior.

Dlagramatlcally what has been

said thus far can be represented as
follows.

ROLE EPISODE
(Kahn, et. al., 1966, p. 26)

Feedback

This diagram is, of course, simplistic.

There are many factors not

included that would influence sent role, role behavior, and feedback to the
role sender.

Influential factors would be past interaction or history

between focal person and role senders; attributes of the persons involved
i.e. motives, values, fears, defense mechanisms; and organizational factors,

such as position of the role sender in organization, the organization's size
and reward system.

This study focuses on sent roles that occur outside the focal person's organization.

It has been suggested by the author that there are

some constraints implied in external interactions between the President
and external groups.

In Chapter IV it was said that these contacts are

usually between the President and someone of equivalent position in an
external organization and that therefore there is substantial ambiguity

154

in his pattern of interactions.

It was also said that the relationships

may have conflicting objectives and entail
different standards of rewards
and performance.

These conditions can result in lengthy,
tension-filled

relationships requiring considerable negotiating and
communication skills.
In the boundary transactions dealt with in this
chapter the role

senders

expectations, sent role, and organizational position will
be

described.

As well, some of the organizational constraints that the

President was operating under and his resultant role behavior will be
discussed.

These five factors will be used to depict role conflict

and ambiguity (see Diagram #2 below)

Diagram #2
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As the diagram shows, sometimes
the external role sender is

independent of an organizational
position, Figure (A); at other times
he is part of an organization
exemplified by Figure (B)
Sometimes
.

the feedback to the sent role (Line
1) occurred through the actions
of a subordinate University unit

(Line 2) and sometimes the feedback

to the sent role resulted from
direct Presidential role behavior

(Line 3).

This study will not focus on presidential
or external group

motives, values, fears, defense mechanisms, past
history of interactions, or size and rewards of the external system
except when it
has direct bearing on the explanations of sent role (Line

1)

and

associated conflict and ambiguity.

Role Conflict and Ambiguity
Role conflict is defined as two or more sent roles occurring

simultaneously so that compliance with one makes compliance with others
difficult or impossible.
diction.

Many times sent roles are in direct contra-

There are four different types of role conflicts:

intra-

sender conflict, intersender conflict, inter-role conflict and person-

role conflict (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,
1)

p.

19).

Intrasender is defined as different proscriptions and prescriptions from a single role sender (Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 19).

An example might be the legislature voting a 5% increase in
pay for civil service employees of the University knowing the

University budget is in the "red"; at the same time refusing
to appropriate any new monies while requiring the University
to balance its budget.
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2)

Intersender conflict is defined
as one sent role in contra-

diction with one or more role
senders (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,
P.

19).

An example would be the legislature
requesting the

President to increase the quota of
in-state students admitted
to medical school while the faculty
of the medical school see
it as its prerogative to determine
admissions standards and

tell the President it will not change the
quota.
3)

Inter-role conflict is defined as role pressures
associated

with membership in one organization in conflict
with pressures
stemming from membership in another group (Kahn and
Wolff, 1964,
p.

19).

For example, the fact that the President spent so much

time at his job that at times he did not get a chance to spend

enough time with his family.

In this case university president

and husband and father roles may have been in conflict.
4)

Person-role conflict is defined as conflict between the needs
and values of the focal person and the demands of his role set

(Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 19).

An example was the President

having to officially block recognition of a Gay Liberation
group because of Board pressure even though his personal values
as a civil libertarian mandated that he do otherwise.

Role ambiguity is related to the amount of role-related information

needed to perform the role adequately (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,

p.

22).

The

focal person must know what kinds of behavior will be rewarded or punished,

what kinds of behaviors will be satisfying or frustrating for the role sender,
what alternatives and opportunities there are to the present situation and
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what the consequences of these alternatives
are if acted upon.

Ambiguity

may be a condition of existing information
that is inadequately communicated,

cannot be gained, or is non-existent.

Expectations have several dimensions to them that will vary
and
therefore may result in more clarity and influence on the
part of the
role sender.

Those mentioned by Katz and Kahn are:

1)

the magnitude

of the sent role or strength of the influence attempt,
2) the specificity
or extent to which the expected behaviors are made concrete and
detailed,
3)

the designation, prescriptive or proscriptive, and 4) the intensity or

extent to which the focal person is allowed freedom of choice in complying
or refusing compliance.
In the following mini-cases these four dimensions and the four types
of role conflict in the analysis of the interactions depicted.

The mini-

cases will be discussed in order of background, chronology of events,

analysis of key events, and summary.

University-Police Consortium

Background
The police consortium had been in the works since September of 1971,
the first September of the President's tenure.

Preliminary initiation had

been made by the City Police who gave the President two proposals they had

written for the training of top police leadership.

The President took

these proposals and circulated them to selected department heads, faculty,
and deans to get their comments on the proposals and on the feasibility of

providing the services needed to meet the proposed requirements.
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The City Police were in a
hurry to get some kind of
commitment
from the University because they
were trying to get the funding
for
these proposals from the National
Police Foundation. The Foundation's

subcommittee came in March of 1972 and
something had to be firmed up
by then.
If they moved fast enough there
was a possibility of obtaining
a $6 million grant.

The President had given major
responsibility for

the consortium to the Vice President
for Academic Affairs and to a Task

Force of various people from the different
schools of law, community,

psychology, sociology, education, and business.
The feedback on the proposals was that they
were concerned with only

selected practical aspects of police work such as
selection of officers,
training, community relations, and supervision of
patrols but did not

deal with organized crime or the causes of crime.
also heavily weighted in the area of evaluation.

The proposals were
The grant requested

was for $478,600 with an additional $191,500 for evaluation of the program.

$80,000-$115,000 of that money was to be used for a large scale

survey.

The University people responding to the proposal generally agreed

that the University could provide services in the area of selection,

training, evaluation, group dynamics, systems analysis, and operations

research.

There had surfaced in these responses to the proposals, an attitude
of doubt and criticism toward the police, their approach, their attitudes,

and their unwillingness to accept feedback on their proposals.

Also,

some members of the University who had given feedback to the President
as to the feasibility of University service were not on the best of terms
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with the City Police.

Some of the University people who had
done work

with city government or with community
service programs had had prior
experiences with the police which were not too
rewarding.

In sum, the

University's approach in response to the proposals
was to do what

it

could and to provide what services it could.
The Vice President for Academic Affairs (Provost)
and the Police

Chief met repeatedly during the Spring of 1972, to reach
an agreement
on services that would be presentable to the foundation,
always keeping
the President informed.

The urgency of the mutual endeavor made it seem

like a high priority item for both institutions.

It was also clear by

September, 1972, that the University would not be able to fulfill all
the aspects of the proposal because of a lack of expertise and that

consequently other universities would need to be contacted.

The police

for their part had already set out the norm that they were going to use

other institutions for other services.
As the project developed various members of the Task Force began
to share the Foundation's attitude toward the City Police Force.

The top

levels of the Foundation had come to see the City Police Department as
insular and complacent and concluded that if they wanted this money they

would 'have to shape up".

On their part some members of the Police Force

had a certain amount of paranoia about "outsiders and eggheads".

The Agreement or Set of Expectations
The goals for the police program that were funded by the Foundation
in April, 1972, were reached by "three weeks of extensive, and at times,

discursive rank and file, command staff and community participation in
for
departmental self-examination and program planning" (Police Proposal
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Development of Top Police Leadership).

The goals were In the area of

police/ community relations, operations,
personnel, and training and

education.

Specifically they were:

Police Community Relations
1)

:

To develop a viable and enduring rapport
between members of

the Division and the community they serve
resulting in a

reduction of police insularity from the community
and
increasing police responsiveness to community needs.
2)

To develop programs aimed at greater citizen involvement
in crime control.

Operations

:

3)

To fully develop the neighborhood -based team policing concept.

4)

To maximize the effective use of the police officer's time by

developing alternatives to arrest in certain types of cases,
by using different kinds of people and skills to perform the
different major components of the policeman's job, and by

developing more efficient reporting, information, and intelligence systems at the operating level.

Personnel
5)

:

To establish standards for selection and employment which are

more closely related to the variety of tasks performed by the
police
6)

To develop a multi-level system of police employment which can

more effectively carry out the major police functions.
7)

To increase the level of minority representation at all levels
in the department.
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8)

To expand the utilization of
individuals who possess profes-

sional skills.
9)

To develop systems of internal
communication which increase

the flow of information in all
directions, thereby encouraging

greater rank-and-file input in decision-making
and the develop-

ment of greater understanding and support
for division objectives
and policies.

Training and Education
10)

To develop basic training systems of greater
relevance and

effectiveness
11)

To develop comprehensive and functional systems for the

training of first-line supervisors.
12)

To devise a model for a university-police division consortium

which is transferable to other communities.
13)

To design and implement systems and procedures for the develop-

ment of executive and leadership skills in the management ranks
of the division.

The police wanted the University to develop programs that would

address these goals.

The University saw that they had resources that could

contribute to the consortium in the areas of selection, training, evaluation,
group dynamics, systems analysis, and operations research.

An effort was

made to pull them together into a coherent, integrated package.

The

Provost and the Dean of the Business School worked hard to get a mechanism

made up of police and University people going, that would begin to work out
programs that would meet the needs and goals identified in the police proposal.
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The University for its effort would
receive money, practical

areas for research, a chance to develop new
programs, and a place

where students could intern.
benefit.

It seemed that both organizations would

The President was well on his way to fulfilling
the promise

made on the day of his inauguration; to make the University
a truly

urban university - "the command post of all the operations
to reclaim,
renew, rebuild, revitalize the city" (Bennis, 1971, p. 23).

As a result

of the consortium arrangement academic theory could be tested against

reality; students could get their training in relevant surroundings;

new populations of students could be included in the University; and

a

spirit of cooperation could flourish.
In September, 1972, the Provost, Task Force, and the Police had

reached an agreement as to the type of mechanism and agreement that would
suit both the needs of the City Police Force and tap the University's

resources.

The consortium was to be formally announced and the two

groups joined by a formal mechanism including program coordinators and

an advisory board.

Chronology
The chronology is made up of descriptions of key correspondence,

phone calls, and meetings that depict the developments of the consortium
and the goals the University and the police hoped to accomplish in the

year the researcher observed its operation.

There were several complica-

tions in the consortium's development - each predicated on the shaky ground
of two different organizational outlooks and norms, the change over of

University personnel and questions of authority.

These complications will

commentaries.
become clear with a reading of the chronology and accompanying

163

September 22, 1972

Formal meeting of University Police Consortium
advisory board
and program coordinators - dinner and
press release.
Commentary: The advisory board was comprised
of six Lt Cols, from the Police Force
and one
program manager, six civilians, four faculty
members and three deans with the University
President, Provost, Police Chief, and Police
Director of Safety as ex-officio board members.
The program coordinators were one faculty member
from the School of Business and a civilian program coordinator from the Police. Also in
attendance was the recently hired Vice President
for Metropolitan Affairs and the Vice President
for Public Relations from the University (see
Diagram #3 - Organizational Chart)
.

October 6, 1972

Memo from the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs calling
the University half of the advisory board together to discuss "alternative approaches to the University’s collaboration with the City Police".

Commentary: The Vice President for Metropolitan
Affairs had just been hired. He had not been on
most of the last year’s deliberations. He was
black.
He saw the purpose of the meeting to
discuss the function of the advisory board, the
chairmanship of the Consortium advisory board,
policies regarding publications of research
findings, and compensation for University
participants in the Consortium.
October 13, 1972

A Presidential assistant during the mail session tells the
President that there are some problems of "passing the baton" from the
Provost's office to the Office of Metropolitan Affairs (OMA)
Commentary: It seems as if the Police and the
University coordinator thought the Provost was in
charge of the Consortium. They did not understand
where OMA which had no power over academic units
was getting the authority to call a meeting of just
the University component of the advisory board.
The Vice President of OMA did not want to meet the
Police Officer in charge of the project; he wanted
He called the Director of Public
to meet the Chief.
Safety, an ex-officio member of the board, and set
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up the meeting between the
Chief and himself.
esident himself was seen as
promising
om! the responsibility
OMA
of the Consortium yet
Pr0V °st
head the negotiations,
his had created certain
expectations on the
part of the police for the Office
of Metropolitan Affairs. During interviews
it was
clear to the researcher that the
police were
viewed as racists by many of the
University
members of the Consortium. It was
said that
the Mayor had threatened to block
the Foundation grant unless more minorities
were
selected and that police reluctance to
meet
with the OMA was more evidence of their
racism.

^

^

October 13

,

1972

Meeting of the University half of the advisory
board and OMA to
talk about priorities.
Commentary: Reconstruction of this meeting
through interviews reveals that members of
academic departments who were also members of
the Consortium heard the Vice President for
OMA say that the Consortia was his responsibility now. Academic departments saw him
taking people from academic areas with no
authority, expertise, or communication. The
OMA also raised the question of the right to
publish findings.
In their agreement with
the University the Police had inserted a
proviso which required their approval on all
research findings to be published. At this
meeting it was also decided that the whole
advisory board would have a University represenative as Chairman to be "elected" at the
first meeting.

October 17, 1972
Memo from the President to the Provost and the Vice President for
OMA advising the two men to decide on what must be done to facilitate the
"passing of the baton".
Commentary: Since the problem was not clear
from the President’s view he asked the two men
to keep him informed but to essentially iron out
the difficulties themselves.
The Vice President
for OMA was in the meantime trying to catch up
on the development of the consortia by reading
articles written by the Police Chief and by
getting briefings from the University program
coordinator
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October 19, 1972

r

members
chart
board

Commentary: One member raised the
question
as to whether the advisory board
would merely
approve proposals submitted by program
coordinators or try to generate their own to
augment whatever proposals were submitted.
This issue was not dealt with.
Also the
"statement of understanding" needed to be
discussed discussed further. The University
members felt some items needed to be changed.
In addition it was decided that the
chairmanof the Consortium was to be given over
to the Vice Chairman, a member of the Police
organization after six months.

October 26, 1972

OMA memo to the President saying that the baton had baen
passed
and things were under control.
Commentary:

The OMA had given the people involved

a chance to meet with him in order to hear an explana-

tion of his position. He felt that the Provost and
the Dean of the Business School finally understood
the shifting of University-wide responsibility for
the consortium to his office.

November 3, 1972

Memo to the President from an assistant who attended the Advisory
Board meeting on the 19th. The memo reported 1) that the OMA had decided
to stay in the background because a black man of the helm would be unacceptable to the Police, 2) that there seems to be a lack of trust between
the two groups, and 3) that a subtle struggle for control over the consortium
was beginning to rise.
Commentary:
Interviews and observations revealed
that the Police felt that 1) the University was only
interested in money to do research and teaching and
did not want to "dirty their hands" in real problems;
2) the University was not a cohesive unit with unity
of purpose, the university is not tight enough with
a true chain of command; 3) the University lacked a
true understanding of the Police and their problems;
and A) the consortium lacked any formal mechanism for
cooperation, communications, and coordination.
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It was also apparent that the
police did not like
the idea of advisory board business being
conducted
without them as evidenced by chairman, a
university
member, being "elected" before the meeting.
The
issue of control also surfaced around the
right to
publish.
The issue of trust surfaced with the
readiness of the Police to move ahead with specific
projects while the "eggheads" were slower to organize
and move ahead

November 9, 1972

—

Advisory Board meeting of the Consortium
the "statement of understanding" was discussed in an effort to clarify the terms of the
Consortium
agreement. The Police gave in on the issue of publication but would
not
allow the agreement to be changed to substitute OMA for the President
as
the chief negotiator
Also some discussion was held on a new program
proposal.
.

Commentary:
It was clear from interviews and
observation that the Police wanted "equal" lines
of authority:
The Chief and the President. The
Police attitude was that if the President thought
that this consortium was one of the most important
things he could do, he should take responsibility.

November 10, 1972

Memo to the President from an assistant. The memo reports that the
meeting on November 9th went reasonably well. The on-going program organized by the School of Business with the Police is going well because the
people "running it are not becoming embittered against the police." Also
it was reported that the rift between the OMA and the University coordinator seemed to be smoothing over.
Commentary: The University coordinator had been
understanding of the Police position. He had been
trying to mediate between the Police and the University. He had a great deal of credibility with
the police, but not with the, OMA. The coordinator
was seen as taking the Police side in most arguments
The one ongoing program highlighted
or discussions.
Instructhe different norms of the organizations.
tors told war stories of the policeman's conduct.
The fact that the policemen wore their guns while
in civilian clothes always made an impression on
One anecdote reveals the insensithe academician.
viewpoints when an instructor
others'
each
to
tivity
strike symbol painted on
power
black
a
came in with
briefcase with its
the
placed
his brief case and
of him at the
front
in
visible sign on the desk
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start of the class. He
immediately "lost"
his class of policemen as they
became quietly
infuriated with the instructor’s
values.

December 12, 1972

Presidential memo to Consortium advisory
board savine that- ho
he
nfuslon that m *y have occurred over
the change in respons"
H
ibility to
the OMA for the Consortium. The
memo offers th P s
ln conducting a seminar in
organizational develop!
the
Consortium if It will help "get the
process off the ground "

“

Commentary: The President’s expertise
was in
organizational development.
It seemed as if
his intent was to reduce the infighting
and
power plays that were apparent in the University’s relationships to the Police and to
"demonstrate dramatically the differences in
the ways that universities and police departments operate."

December 14, 1972

Consortium advisory board meeting. The President’s memo was
read
and it was decided to take him up on his offer of a
seminar.
The revised
statement of understanding" was approved with the flow chart (Diagram
#3)
to express lines of authority.
Also the OMA sent another representative,
a woman, in place of the Vice President and a new woman
assistant dean from
Education was placed on the board to replace a professor who had suddenly
died.
At the December 14th meeting the use of student interns was discussed
as well as a proposal project on women on the police force.
The role of the
board in terms of input to ongoing projects was also discussed.
Commentary: The turnover on the board may have upset
the pace of the board's activities.
Charges of sexism
as well as racism began to surface towards the police.
An anecdote which represents the difference between the
police and the University people occurred over lunch.
Someone asked the women to begin to eat because the
police wouldn't start until the women ate - consequently
lunch was being held up.

January 30, 1973

University advisory board meeting. Issues discussed are broadly
categorized as 1) board involvement in project development; 2) advisory
structure and reorganization; and 3) contractual arrangements for funding
to be done through OMA.
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Commentary

It „as evldent £he
poUce an<J
Were beCOmlng se P«ated
from each
oth«
other
TOe group was large and
The
the process was
not going well.
So far all the meetings
had
e en hew at the
University.
The police understood how the University
operated but the Uniem d t0
7
Very llttle about P°lice
Itvle
style and mode
! of
operations. The Police felt
that most meetings were
not productive.
No
WaS being a PP rov ed or
implemented.
This
meeting resulted in suggested
changes in ConsortUTe
d r ° le
ln P ro P ose d Plans for
the educational
r
development of Consortium board
members.
The structure changes would
assign
responsibility of overall policy
questions to
e total advisory board
with responsibility
or identification of projects
(and of those
who could serve those projects)
and for planning
and monitoring of implementation
to go to the
project coordinators. The educational
development suggestions were: a retreat,
a meeting at
police headquarters, consultation with
the University President, Police lectures
on their operations, and visits with Police on
their own turf.
:

r

^

r

^

^

February 6, 1973
C ° n =°“lum

advisory board meeting. The Police presented
five projects
art ’ °Utllnil>g needs f °r such programs
and
asking
for
5
r University
identification
of
resources to fill those needs. Most of the
University members vied for the right to fulfill
those needs.
It was also
suggested that some other more qualified resources
be brought in from other
universities.
Some discussion of the reorganization of the
advisory board
was discussed. The next meeting was to be held
at Police Headquarters.
It
was announced that the coordinators were to meet
with the President on the
15th of February.
S

Commentary: As the projects were submitted by the
Police the academic departments represented in the
advisory board began to compete for the right to head
the project, staff, and provide the service, which
resulted in nothing getting accomplished.

February 13, 1973
Memo to the President from an assistant describing the poor condition
The Police have sent a letter to the Foundation expressing
dissatisfaction with the University and threatening not to come to any more
meetings.
This memo told of the stereotyping done on the part of the University
that the police were basically rigid, authoritarian, hostile, and
racist and that it was the job of the Consortium to change those attitudes
of the Consortium.
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In addition some of the
University people
eeting the expressed needs of
the Police,
ave all the expertise to do some
of the

Commentary: This memo was designed
to brief
the President on the problems of
the consortium
before the February 15th meeting with the
program
coordinators.
Because of low police morale, the
vying between colleges to have the right
to control the projects, lack of sufficient
expertise
and refusal to admit it, and negative
attitudes
on the part of some of the University
people,
the assistant recommended giving most of
the’ power
to a steering committee.
The President in response
wondered why the Vice President of OMA had not been
included in the February 15th meeting.

February 14, 1973

Memo to the President from an assistant advising him to
call the
Police Chief after the meeting with Program Coordinators and
make the
required changes in the advisory board structure. The President
was
also advised to tell the Police Chief that he was deeply concerned with
recent developments in regards to the Consortium.
Commentary:
It was clear to the assistants, to the
program coordinators and to the police that something
had to be done to get the services the police needed.
Those program coordinators wanted the President's
commitment to change the structure and to give his
support and consultation skills to work with the
advisory board.

February 15, 1973

Presidential meeting with project coordinators and the advisory
board chairman.
In the meeting the President expressed his concern that
the vying for projects was hurting the effectiveness of the Consortium.
He also explored alternatives to the dilemma in an effort to be responsive
to Police needs.
Although he did not overtly give his approval to the
power shift from the advisory board to a steering committee he did promise
to call the Police Chief and make a decision.
It was almost assumed that
the power to review, plan, set up, and monitor projects would be given to
the program coordinators.
Commentary: During the course of the meeting,
the President asked why the Vice President of
OMA was not at the meeting. The University
coordinator said the Vice President knew the
meeting was being held. The researcher felt
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that while the Vice President did
know this
meeting was going on, he did not
know that
the coordinators were going to
lobby for a
power shift from an advisory board
structure
to the project coordinators.

March

6,

1973

Consortium Advisory Board meeting at Police
Headquarters. The
Ct C ° ordinat ors made a bri-ef report of
the meeting they had had with
lhl
the t
President.
It was decided that the University
people would meet to
iscuss the alternatives for a reorganization.
For most of the meeting
the Police briefed the University people
on their operation.
The Dean
rom the Business School gave a progress report
on a design for a training
3

-

Commentary: Not much seemed to be said concerning the proposed shift of power from an
advisory board structure to the steering committee composed of the project coordinators.

March 30, 1973

Memo to the President from the Vice President of OMA. He tells the
President that many people are pushing for a smaller group to be established that would respond to proposal ideas. OMA is therefore polling the
advisory board to reach consensus on how effective the Consortium has been
and what suggestion the members have on making it more effective. He suggests that the President and Police Chief might want to meet with a smaller
group "to endorse and implement whatever changes are suggested."
Commentary:
It would seem from this memo that OMA
still saw his role and the role of the board as chief
determiner of what changes were to occur in the consortium.

April 4, 1973

President’s meeting with the Police Chief, a Police Foundation
Representative, and the Safety Director. At this meeting the President
gave his word that he would restructure the advisory board and promised
to offer the new advisory board appropriate training in the area of
organizational behavior. In return the Police Foundation agreed to fund
the Consortium for a second year.
Commentary: This decision on the part of the
President was in the face of the above OMA memo.
It is not known by the researcher if the President
read the memo before the April 4th meeting.
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April 4. 1973

~S1‘

e Sat 0 " WaS that the
Presldent
stop the in-fighting
over the "loHr "
i
reward syste m "in
"herSo^rUnS^ritrpeopJrL^
lntereStS a8 the y now defl " e them to
the Interests of the
Consortia

^St^hiE'™

1

Commentary: This phone call plus the meeting
that
day with the Police Chief and Foundation
representative made it very clear that services would
have to
be forthcoming or the Consortium would
be dissolved.

April

6

,

1973

Memo, the President to the Vice President of OMA
in which the President says that he may have short-circuited OMA's
letter of March 30th by
promising to shift the power of the advisory board to
a small steering committee and to the program coordinators. The President
says that he did not
read the letter of March 30th until after the luncheon
with the Police
Chief.
The decision cannot be changed without some difficulty, he
reports.

Commentary: The President did mention in the letter
that he assumed that the Vice President of OMA had
been informed that this shift was coming and that
the program coordinators had consulted OMA on the
matter

April 12, 1973
Memo, the Vice President of OMA to the President. The Vice President outlines a history of events by saying that: 1) the Police and University at odds over the role of the advisory board - "Police officers
for the most part, preferring to concentrate on more narrowly focused
result-oriented projects, tended to be impatient with the questioning
and intellectual exploration of the University members."; 2) that just
the University group met on January 30th to suggest ways of improving
relationships; and 3) the University group met again on March 15th and
decided that they should be restructured. The Vice President expresses
displeasure that he has indeed been short-circuited and suggests that
the President consider other alternatives, namely to hold the April 4th
agreement in abeyance to allow the board to work it out.

Commentary: The Vice President of OMA denies that
he knew that the February 15th meeting was being
The minutes of the January 30th and
organized.
February 6th meeting would disconfirm this. OMA
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had been informed of the meeting.
The Vice
President and the University
coordinator were
notion the best of terms so perhaps the
purpose
ot the meeting was not clearly
communicated

however

April

iy73

President of OMA to
University members of advisory
board
*A ih S recedved the commentstheabout
the effectiveness of operaMo^e' off°^
p
tions
the Consortium
and has called a meeting to discuss the
comments
ana perceptions.

Commentary: Most of the perceptions are shared
by all. The Consortium is not effective. Most
members think that the size should be cut. No
one is in agreement on how to give responsibility
so as to guarantee interdisciplinary cooperation.
Some advocate putting responsibilities for program
development, initiation, and implementation in the
hands of the coordinators, while some say that
responsibility should be in the hands of one academic
department.

April 26, 1973
Memo, the Police Chief to the President. This memo by the Chief
is confirmation of the agreement reached on April 4th.
The Foundation will
refund contingent on the Consortium on the restructuring of advisory board
and some organizational development seminars to be conducted by the Univer-

sity President.

Commentary: The Chief does not see the abolishment
of the Board just using the program coordinators to
make the Consortium more product-oriented.
May 7, 1973
Memo, the President to the Chief of Police.
The President shares
his feeling that "we can work it out." He writes, "OMA is undertaking
discussions with University members that will result in a statement that
we can discuss." "I would like to but cannot give more time to the Consortium because budget and legislative problems are taking up most of my time
as my first priorities."

Commentary: This letter pledges little direct commitIt says that somement on the part of the President.
thing will be done but leaves that something broadly
There seems to be no firm commitment to the
defined.
seminars nor to giving the program coordinators direct
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‘
Tt could be said that this
letter has
a °^®f
holding action to give OMA room to
move.
(This action may have been taken

P

after Presidential communication with University
program
coordinators, it is not known.)

May 7, 1973
3 presldential assistant to the President.
The memo urges
President to abolish the board completely
in favor of a steering
66 and then do the organizational
development seminars with the
coZitJ;
committee
Those appointed to the steering committee
should be people
not completely wedded to a college so
that vending and in-fighting will
e

Commentary: The memo also describes the problem
OMA is having trying to control academic units.
The OMA cannot give students credit for internships.
One school in particular has challenged
the position of OMA.
What complicates matters
is that the University coordinator is from the
school that is challenging OMA. He is seen by
OMA as not working OMA purposes. Also, since
the University project coordinator did not make
clear his interests for the February 15th meeting
with the President, there is reason for OMA doubtfulness
.

May 8, 1973

Memo, the Vice President of OMA to the Police Chief (a carbon copy
to the President).
The memo says that the Vice President will appoint a
new member of his staff to assume primary responsibility for coordination
of the University side of the Consortium.
The present program coordinator
is expected to work in collaboration.

Commentary: Through interviews it was revealed
that the Vice President had contacted the coordinator and the Dean of the school the coordinator was appointed from and announced that he was
putting his own man as the coordinator of Consortium
activities. The purpose was to move the Consortium
closer to his own shop. All interaction with the
police was to be conducted by the Vice President’s
new appointee.
May 9, 1973

A letter of resignation from the project coordinator to the
Vice President of OMA.
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Commentary: This was a blow
to th P
k
project coordinator was seen
as the only University
° ”aS gettlng annhing
done. Most of the
oosalhl p JecCs " ere
done In small ad hoc eroucs
h eaded by him.
The project coordinator had
developed
a great deal of trust and
credibility with the Police
3
le t thS P ° Uce " lth n °
buffer b ®tween them
and OMA and
a competing
schools.

™

June 18. 1973
6
me "berS ° f the Consortlu '"- Both
Police and University
people at this “Lm*
thought
out organizational
arrangement. OMA ha^llf VthV
* T*’

e£

TT

ss: s
;

^pSx^r

fifteen projects and activities to be
implemented in the next academic year.
Commentary: The President at this meeting
tried to get
both groups to realize some of the basic
conflicts that
he had seen and to convince each group
that there was a
need to cooperate
What is included here is the speech the
President made to this group

after a year of problems expressing some of the
conflict he has seen and felt
It was, from the author's viewpoint, a skillful
speech.

It was recorded by

note taking so that some of the words and phrases are
paraphrased.
I want to reaffirm and provide my blessings to
this Consortium.
I want to also show my concern, commitment, and
respect for the City Police Department. They are the heroes
of society, the urban heroes.
Society does not understand
the police.
It is a tough thankless job.
Americans have
always had land to run away from their main societal problems.
Police cannot be ignored because now the middle class are
coming into contact with them because of drugs, riots, etc.
Before nobody cared why police were underpaid and underappreciated, but this is changing.
The University has much to learn about working together.
To be blunt, the University is not very good at working with
external groups. We get threatened by the prospect because
the knowledge we spent all of our lives getting may not be
useful.
Excuse them because they are insecure. We must fuse
action and theory. When I was teaching at M.I.T. businessmen
would come back and grill me.
'Have you ever met a payroll?
Nice idea but...' I got more defensive and more abstract,
then I got cynical.
It's hard not to be defensive and insecure.
All my knowledge would not be useful and they told me that.
The University is not geared for this work. We are close
The locus of decision-making is with the individual
to anarchy.
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How
University the feelino
at we are tbecoming more
specialized which shapes the
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way we see things? It
gives
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incapacity." „e
st se e things^ in
must coUabotate. „ e are not
?ogeth«
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lon - That ls "hat I want.
We’ve got
to help
heln° each
h other with out
problems.
a d6my is a lone ly Place
for individual professors
Al«n with money to be
Also,
gotten everybody is vending. This
at e
ay n0t be
in the PoUce
We’ve
r °n
hat
A team is an accomplishment not
a
gift.
j
It takes°M
trUSt
The lnltlal part of anything can
be
dJfff
i.
!
ficuit.
A centipede on skis best describes
group process.
ve got to try to understand norms,
respect differences.
6
to do something; something damn
imuortanf
mpor^nt
I have been low profile
but I would like to help
in the fall.
You ve got to face those questions.
If you want
an omelet you’ve got to break the
egg.
You can do it.
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Analysis

From the mini-case study just presented
it can be seen that three
types of role conflict could have been
experienced by the President:

intersender conflict, interrole conflict, and
person-role conflict.

namely
Examples

of these three types of conflict are discussed
in the section on analysis

that follows.

Person Role Conflict
The norms of the University and the police are different.

The

police are a para—military organization with top down, hierarchial decision-

making and are used to deliberations only at the top echelons, conservative
in values, and authoritarian in outlook.

In this circumstance they were

product-oriented with low tolerance for deliberation or debate.

They had

a need to solve problems familiar to the police such as community relations,

communications, etc.

177

On the other hand University
people are subject to norms of
abstract debate, deliberation of
the smallest details, and
democratic

decision-making.

Rather autonomous development of
expertise and

programs in narrow specialities is the
rule not cooperation across

interdisciplinary lines.
In the case of Police/University
Consortium, most of the know-

ledge the University people had was
organized in the specialized areas
of sociology, psychology and law.

Cooperation to solve social problems

was something that had to be learned.

To make matters worse the way

that rewards were to be distributed was unclear.
set by the first program.

A precedent had been

One individual school proposed and conducted

the first program and received the "soft" money in
return.

This prece-

dent may have set the competitive, vending tone that prevailed.
In general, the ethos of the University ran counter to the Presi-

dent

s

need to make the University a truly urban university.

Person-

role conflict is defined as the conflict between the focal person’s

needs and values and the demands of his role set.

In this case of

person-role conflict the University was, in a sense, working against
the President’s needs and values.

The conflict, though indirect,^

was none-the-less felt by the President.

^By indirect, the author means that the University people never
disagreed with the President’s goal of making the University a truly
urban university yet the results of their behavior worked against
the President’s goals.
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Intersender Conflict
It was clear from the chronology
of events that questions of

authority created other problems for the
President.

The academic

units did not want a non-academic unit,
(OMA) taking responsibility
for coordinating programs in the academic
area.

The police had a

preference for clear and direct lines of authority.

Because the

initial agreement for the consortium was set
up by the President
and Provost before the OMA was formed the precedent
was set.

The

precedent was set that was seen by the police as the lines
of

authority being direct from the President to the Provost and then
to the academic units.

A shift in authority to the OMA was

to an indirect staff unit.

a shift

This shift to OMA became less desirous

by the police when the academic units themselves began to challenge
the authority of OMA.

These problems set the stage for intersender conflict.

Inter-

se nder conflict is defined as one sent role that is in contradiction

with one or more sent roles.

There was intersender conflict for the

President from February through May.

On one hand the OMA was asking

for room to negotiate with the advisory board, to get it to produce

the services and projects needed to get the Consortium going; on the

other hand the assistants and the program coordinators were demanding
that the President abolish the advisory board and give the power of

program implementation to a small steering committee.
Even more intersender conflict can be seen on April 4th and 6th

when the Police and the Foundation met with the President and said that
either the advisory board must be restructured or there would be no
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refunding for £he next year.

At the name time DMA
was asking

f or

time

through the restructuring
of the advisory board by
taking steps
such as polling the University
members of the board, conducting
meetings,
and eventually reappointing
a new man to be project
coordinator.
The President was caught
between the external demands
for authoritative, top-down decision-making
and the academy's ethic of
autonomy and
democratic decision-making. He
was caught between Police demands
for the
services he had Initially traded
and negotiated for, and the
anarchistic,
specialized, insular characteristics
of the institution that had to
produce
those services.
Interrole Conflict
The third type of role conflict is
expressed clearly by the Presi-

dent’s statement concerning his priorities
of budget and legislative

relationships.

He was trying desparately to get a special
medical subsidy

and an increase in the general subsidy to
enable the University to balance

the budget for the coming year.

Also the President had asked units in the

University to cut their budgets by 3% for the academic
year to balance this
year's budget.

The University budget process was reaching its culmination

and key decisions had to be made at the same time that the
University-

Police Consortium was breaking down.
Interrole conflict is defined as pressures associated with membership in one organization being in conflict with pressures stemming from

membership in another group.

There were definite time and commitment pres-

sures associated with the budget and legislature that may have interrupted
the President’s participation in this case and ability to monitor the

developments in regards to the Consortium.
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Summary
The University and the police
were engaging in a difficult
process
of trying to blend two
distinct institutions with almost
opposite norms
into a collaborative effort
to solve pressing social problems.
The project
was still underway at the conclusion
of the study year.
Some conclusions
that might be drawn from this
example
are:

1)

External groups view the university as
a service institution.

2)

External groups view the president as having
control and

authority over the university.
3)

The university organization into subject
matter fields may not
be the most appropriate for solving society’s
problems.

4)

If the university is to compete for outside
funds to solve

societal problems, university people will have to learn
to

cooperate across departmental and interdisciplinary lines.
Long and Groskind have captured the lesson that can be learned
from
this case study:

Rousseau said of philosophers that they loved the whole
world in general in order not to have to love anyone in
particular
It might also be said of the university
that they have served the whole world in general in order
not to serve anyone in particular.
Small wonder if they
have ended up serving no one but themselves, and in doing
so, perpetuated a methodology that is radically incorrigible.
But only by recognizing a constituency other than the faculty
and by making their activities accountable and corrigible
through the enlightened service of that constituency can
the university escape the trap of prestigeful self-service
(Long and Groskind, 1972, p. 6).
.

Medical School Admissions

Medical school admissions was a tough issue for the President in
1972-73.

It was complicated by the fact that applications to the professional
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schools of law and medicine were swelling
to unprecedented numbers and
yet there was still a shortage of
doctors.
The demand for physicians
has resulted from more Americans today
being covered by health insurance,

Medicare, or Medicaid and from an awareness
of the progress being made
in treating diseases so that they
expect the best medical care as their

legal and moral right.

Background
Figures show that in 1973 there was an estimated
346,000 doctors
in the United States, or, in other words, one
physician for every 636

potential patients (U.S. News and World Report, 1973, p. 53).
ment goals are to bring that ratio to 500 to

Govern-

1 by the end of the decade.

The basis on which these doctors are spread throughout the country

depends more on the physician's speciality, but by-and-large
are needed in rural and inner-city areas.

,

doctors

Dispersal of doctors to urban

and rural areas that need medical care is a problem because of a lack of

good educational and cultural opportunities for the physician and his

family and partly because the isolation from colleagues and new sources
of professional information.

Students are applying to medical schools in record numbers because

medicine is where the desirable jobs are.

With the glut on the elementary

and secondary school teacher market and job opportunities for engineers
and professors fluctuating in a downward trend, students are understand-

ably turning to the medical and legal professions.

Students want the economic security, sense of craft, independence
and mobility that is associated with the practice of medicine (Cohen,
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1973, p. 20).

Also because the medical vocation
is so widely known and
promoted by a variety of role
models found on T.V. "everybody
feels
that they know what a doctor
is" (Cohen, 1973, p. 20).
There is a
sense of social concern or commitment
associated with medicine that
draws the young student of today as
never before.

Between 1961 and 1971 the number of people
applying to medical
schools in the United States had doubled,
while the number of places for

medical students has increased only 50%.

In 1971, 29,172 students

applied and only 12,361 were admitted (Cohen,
1973, p. 19).

in 1972,

more women and minorities were admitted to U.S.
medical schools than
ever before.

Women represented 16.8% of the 1972 entering classes in

all U.S. medical schools, an increase of 34.9% over 1971.

Minorities

showed a 24.3% increase over 1971 (Journal of Medical Education,
1973,
p.

293).

With more women and minorities applying and

a

general increase

in total applicants, colleges should "prepare for a horrible wailing

and gnashing of teeth from rejected applicants to medical schools as

undergraduates in unprecedented numbers declare themselves" (Cohen,
1973, p. 19).

The President was well aware of the problem of medical school

admissions because of mail and phone calls from all sectors of society
that contacted him in the fall of 1972 to lobby, push, cajole, and

otherwise influence him on behalf of a favorite son or prospective
candidate.

Because of the tremendous numbers applying to medical

school more students were being turned away.

Before the year was out

the President was to become thoroughly versed in what was once a faculty
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prerogative, namefy the process
and criteria of medical
school admissions.
University Budget Problems

During this same year the biennium
budget was passed by a new
State
legislature. The twelve State
universities worked for a 6.5%
increase in
State appropriations which was
tough given that the Democratic
Governor
had recommended only a 3% increase
and given that the new majority
in the

Republican legislature did not want to
be seen as the spenders in a finan-

daily tough, inflationary

year.

The universities and Regents had begun
to organize through an inter-

university council which had agreed to pool
resources and information to
lobby for the 6.5% appropriations increase.

The strength of numbers of

a large block would help to insure that the
increase was possible and

equitable.

There were, however, special needs for individual
institutions

with particular circumstances that mandated special
appropriations.
For example, the University studied by the author did have its
own

individual needs that mandated special appropriations.
both public and private.
taxes, and State taxes.

The University is

Supporting funds come from private giving, city
The University is in the unique position of being

one of the nation's only municipally-sponsored, state-affiliated universities.
The city's support for the University is guaranteed by the 1926 City Charter
and subsequent amendments.

The financial support from the city grows more

or less with the tax base.

In the decade of the 1960 's the city annual

tax grew from $3.1 million dollars to the current $3.85 million dollars.
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In 1967 the University became
a state affiliated institution.

Through state affiliation it receives
support for all lower division
(freshman and sophomores) students,
except for Nursing and Pharmacy

courses under the Community College Act.

The University has an affil-

iation agreement with the State Board of
Regents which provides subsidy at the same level as other state
universities for courses in

Pharmacy, Nursing, Law, Medicine, and Graduate
Programs.

subsidy for upper level undergraduates.

There is no

The state subsidy jumped from

under $1 million dollars in 1967 to almost $20 million
in 1972.
It had been said before but needs repeating, that
the University

was having difficulty balancing the budget because of enrollment
drops,

cutbacks in federal subsidies and grants, inflation, and the rise in
cost of books, fuel, and electricity.

prohibited tuition increases.

The present biennium budget had

The University anticipated a $4,500,000

deficit through inflationary costs alone in the next two years.

While

the average state supported university received 45% of its general funds

from state subsidy the University studied receives only 29% of its
general funds from the state.

In and of itself that discrepancy created

problems for the University even if additional state subsidy was awarded.
There was another problem for the President in that his medical
school needed expansion funds.

The University had constructed a new

medical science building that was financed by both federal ($34.6 million)
and state ($17 million) funds and by some University contributions ($2

million).

The building was scheduled for completion in the spring of

1974 and the University was expanding the freshmen enrollment the next
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fall 63% fro, 118 to 192
students.

Each year for a period of
four years

this expansion would continue
until by the Fall of 1978 the
total roster
will have risen from the present
number of 462 to 768 students.
The
University, to recruit new faculty
and operate the new building,
sought
a supplemental grant of
$1.2 million from the State for the
biennium

1973-75.
The issue of admissions arose because
most state schools had

restricted their enrollments to medical
school to 90% in-state students
and 10% out-of-state students.

In some states such as Illinois and

Indiana they had reduced out-of-state admissions
to below 5%.

(Since

the University was state affiliated and not
totally dependent on State

funding, it retained its

privateness" and its autonomous prerogative

to accept many more out-of-state students.)

in-state and 44% out-of-state students.

The University had 56%

Because the wailing and gnashing

of teeth could be heard all the way to the legislature this 56-44%
ratio

was destined to change sooner or later.

Chronology
There were many meetings, phone calls and letters concerning the

problem of getting a subsidy increase and for obtaining a special appropriation for the medical school during the academic year 1972-73.

The

two appropriations were different yet required a delicate balancing of

legislative strategy.

In the chronology most of the mail, phone calls

and meetings directly concerned with the subsidy increase will be left

out except when they have a direct bearing on the request for a supplemental

medical appropriation.

There were other external groups, besides the

legislature, pushing for change in medical school admissions policies
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and decisions:

their interactions with the
President will be lncluded
but no commentary will be
made in the chronology that
follows.

There was some discussion of a
supplemental medical appropriation before December, however,
the pressure began to really
build up
in February.

The President had written to the
Chancellor of the

Regents in the beginning of the academic
year to present a picture of
the University's financial problem.
It's at that point that the

chronology begins.
October 24, 1972

President to the Acting Chancellor. The President
in plain and painful terms explains the financial conditions
of the University and pleads
alS ° ex P lains that he ™*y not be able to open
the new Medical
Tl
bcftool building unless a special appropriation
is forthcoming.
Commentary: The University received federal
capitation grants for every medical student
that was admitted however the grants came
a f ter the school was in operation.
Once the
school was open and operating, federal money
would be forthcoming but the school had to be
opened first. The University had to have the
money to hire new faculty to open the school
to get the federal money.
January, 1973

There had been many reports by various vice presidents, assistants,
and others through the first four months of the year that the subsidy and
medical appropriation increases were going to be tough to get. The University had mounted a campaign to gain legislative support by having
breakfasts for legislators at the President’s house to explain the problems
the University was having. Also the Alumni Office had launched an information sharing effort with its alumni throughout the state by telling the
alumni about the University’s financial problems and asking the alumni to
contact their congressman for support for the University.
This alumni
campaign was effective as reports began to come in from the alumni office
that showed alumni were reaching legislators.
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February 21

,

1973

PraSidents
were raising^uestionf
The Regents
Ibout ‘ the'st ate unive rsities.
Those
had to do with cost ana]v<?1c
questions
i
'

VV

it was also announced that rh^

support of medical students
who come

,

ities.

At the meeting
0
flnanclal

from^t-of-sLte !

^

Commentary: The Regents were
responding to a
s tate consuitant report
that showed the high cost
students from out-of-state and
documfnted rh
mented
the fact that the State was
not retaining
these students once they finished
th^ir schooling,
he President realized then,
as he wrote to one
of his vice presidents; "there
is no question but
e
re going to have to make the
most incred•k? Y
ible
defense of our request for a subsidy
revision
and medical school expansion.
If W e are to move
rough the barage of questioning without
incurring
the wounds that were opened up
today we will have
to be very compelling."

/

February 23, 1973

Acting Ch ancellor
th„
e n
possibility of limiting the number
students in professional schools which
tor in state students.
The reason was

to the President.
The memo announced
of spaces available for out-of-state
would increase the number of spaces
a cost saving motive.
The Board of
Regents is exploring alternatives but the "Board
will want to consider
amendments limiting State subsidy to State residents
within the entering
classes in medicine with a view to sharply increasing
spaces available
or state applicants and hopefully to an increase
in the number of physicians eventually establishing permanent practices in
the state."

Commentary: After it was apparent that there were
going to be problems with the University Medical
School admissions of 56% in-state and 44% out-ofstate, the President wrote to the Medical School
Dean and Vice President asking for information.

March 5, 1973

Memo from the Medical School Dean to the President. The Dean tells
the President that the University’s access to the national pool of medical
applicants allows recruitment from the largest possible base. "Restriction,"
he writes, "will make more heterogeneous classes with regard to socialeconomic, racial and cultural background." Also studies show that geographic
restriction of admissions will not ensure an adequate supply of physicians
in the State.
"There is a high correlation between location of residency
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Commentary:
It is quite evident that the
Medical
School faculty was reluctant to
have State interference.
They were aware of the growing
national
tendency of public schools to limit
enrollment,
by legislatively limiting the
entering class size
or limiting State subsidy to
just in-state students.

March

6,

Meeting the Board of Directors
A board member raises the question of
further information on the admissions
to out-of-state students, comparisons
changes.

1973
of the University and the President.
Medical School admissions and wants
process. The ratio of in-state
to other colleges, and on proposed

Commentary: Board members were reacting to a
Regents press release concerning the efficacy
of medical school admissions and state subsidy
for the education of out-of-state students.
Also there was some question of how many minority
students were being admitted. The President asked
his Vice President for the Medical Center and the
Medical School Dean to prepare the information the
Board members wanted.

March

7

,

1973

Phone call to the President from the wife of an Alumnus industrial
executive in behalf of a young friend of hers. She wants to know the
status of her friend’s Medical School application. Her husband has been
a corporate fund supporter of the University for years.

March 13, 1973

Memo the President to the Medical School Dean. The President wants
meeting with the Dean, the Vice President and the Director of the hospital
to review and acquaint himself with admissions procedures.
The President
feels that unless the University's policy is intelligent and reasonable,
another policy might be developed by the Regents and the legislature.
a
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March 19, 1973
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Commentary: The Regents were
with both minority admissions
admissions.
The proposal for
schools, if pushed might mean
existing medical schools.

^

very concerned
and out-of-state
two new medical
no expansion of

March 20. 1973

Memo to the President from the Vice Mayor
of the City.
The Vice
yor wants an explanation of medical
admissions procedures in response
to letters he has received from citizens
and in order to present a report
o the city council.
The President responds by saying the University is
now reviewing the admissions procedures and the
Vice Mayor should contact
the Medical Center Vice President and Medical
School Dean for further information.
March 23, 1973
Memo to the President from State Representative //I saying that he
is receiving mail from throughout the State concerning
the University’s

medical admissions policies. Would the President provide him with information on procedures and percentages on in-state/out-of-state admissions?
March 23, 1973
Memo to the President from an assistant. The assistant has been
checking on various applications the President needed to know about.
The assistant advises the President to answer to all those personal
inquiries concerning applications and say that all applications have
been put through the proper process and to wait and see the outcome.
The assistant advises the President not to become involved in the
admission process more than is absolutely necessary.

March 27, 1973
Memo to the President from State Representative //2. The Senate
representative asks for more information on Medical School admissions the procedures, admissions ratio, number of minorities admitted, and
number of graduates of the Medical School. This representative also
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Commentary: This representative was black
and
naturally showed an interest in minorities.
He
was also on the Senate Education and Health
Appropriations Committee.

March 27, 1973
Memo to the President from State Representative
3.
The representative sends the President some figures that have
been sent to concerned citizens and legislators that compare University
admission ratios
to other state schools
The accompanying letter with the statistics
advise the recipient to write to his city councilman,
state representative or senator.
//

.

March 28, 1973

Memo to the Dean of the Medical College from the Vice President
of the Medical Center (cc:
President). The Vice President says that he
will be going to the Regents tomorrow to discuss the admissions issue.
He feels that the University has no alternative but to propose to increase
in— state student admissions to a 70—75% level. There may be a compromise
between 70% and the absolute maximum of 80%. The University’s trade-off
will be to obtain the special supplemental appropriations for the Medical
School expansion.

March 29, 1973
Meeting between the President and Medical School personnel regarding
the process of Medical School admissions.
The President was informed that
the criteria used for examining candidates were grade point average, extracurricular activities, college of origin, personal interview, AMCAS and a
counselors’ letter of recommendation. This year there had been 6,500
applicants for 120 positions. A minority goal was set at 24 (or 20%)
and women would make up 20% of the next year's class.
Commentary: The faculty and medical group were
reluctant to give up this traditional prerogative.
They argued that it would reduce the applicant pool
from 6,500 to 1,400, that geographic restriction
would not be an effective way to maintain physicians in the State, that the restriction would lower
the quality of minority applicants, that the state
budget only makes up 19% of the Medical College
budget, and that financial support should be correlated with control.
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March 29, 1973
Memo - Westwood Civic Association to
the Chairwoman of the Board
the President) - urging that the
out-of-state medical school admissions be limited to 10%.
(cc:

Aprll 2, 1973

Memo to the President from a United States Senator
(Legislator
He asks the President for more information
concerning alleged unfair
admission practices so he can reply to his constituents.

April

2,

//A).

1973

Memo to the President from the Dean of the Medical School. He pleads
with the President to do what he can to allow the admission standards
to stay
as they are for the sake of tradition, academic excellence, and
competition,
but says that if Nixon’s budget cutbacks which could cost the University
a
loss of $3.5 million in federal grants places the President in a position
where he must bargain then the President should ask for appropriate compensation from the legislature to change admissions ratios.
April 4, 1973

Phone call to the President from a physician alumnus representing
an ad hoc group of physicians from the southwestern part of the State.
He says that the State medical academy wants a change in the University’s
admissions procedures. He is a friend of the Regents and wants action.
April

5,

1973

Memo, the President to the Regents. He presents the University
rationale for the Medical School special supplemental appropriations.
The President asks for $1.2 million in the 1973-75 biennium budget.

April 6, 1973

Meeting, the vice presidents meet with the Acting Chancellor to
request a special appropriation of $1.2 million for the Medical School
expansion.
April 12, 1973

Memo to the Dean of Medical Admissions from a State Senator
(Legislator #5) recommending a student for admission.

April 13, 1973
Memo, the Vice President to the Medical Center to the Dean of the
Medical School. The Vice President describes a conference with the
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April 17, 1973
Memo to the President from the Vice President
for Public Relations.
a report ° n the House Bill #86 which Is
the biennium budget for
75 ‘
He phen reports on the inter-university council
meeting with the
,
c
ng Chancellor of the Regents and the University
presidents. The Acting
Chancellor stated his displeasure of special appropriations
for three state
institutions. The Chancellor spoke for unity in the
inter-university
council.
The council members were mad at those institutions that
went for
special appropriations and threatened to try to turn some
legislators against
the increase.
When the Acting Chancellor was asked whether he knew of those
special purpose items he said absolutely not.
Commentary: The Chancellor was denying knowledge
of documents that had been sent to him, i.e. an
April 5 memorandum requesting special appropriations.
The legislature had also by this time tacked on an
amendment to House Bill 86 requiring faculty in
undergraduate schools to teach a minimum of twelve
hours and those in graduate school, nine hours.
Also they were urging that sabbaticals not be supported by subsidy money.
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April 20. 1973
Press Release "Regents
Rap Special Aid for Poll
Denounce Special Aid" (Akron
***'' Regents
Beacon Journal
The Z
Re e en ts publicly
censored the University for nor o-t i
university request! SneM^ n ! P 7 8 ° ing along with the interth ® Re Rents may erode
the total amount of dollars
possibl^^The"!
m
that he had heard that
Said 3galn
those "special
Proposals were being kicked
around" but had had no chance ro at
discuss them in hearings with
sity representatives.
Univer-

al^ron^

Commentary. This charge of
log-rolling may have
been unfair in the sense that
the University had
been working with the Chancellor
to get the
appropriations. Also this attack
meant that the
niversity wouid have to work over
the opposition
of the Acting Chancellor and
the newly appointed
ancellor in getting the special
appropriations.
It was not clear whether this
public censure actually represented the feelings of
the newlyappointed Chancellor.

April 20. 1973
t
th Preside " t from a state Representative
# 6.
He says
he is continuing
?
!
to get mad about the University's
admission
policies.
The House has passed House Bill #86 with
the appropriations tor the
medical appropriations, yet the University has
done little to show that
it wants to serve the citizens of the
State through its Medical School
admissions policies. The representative said that
citizens of the state
would rather have an excellent university open
to them and their children
than a prestigious university that is closed to them.

™h

Commentary: The representative also said that
excellence comes less from a varied student body
and more from a varied faculty.

April 23, 1973
Press release in which State Representative //6 blasts the University
f° r -^s admissions policies - "University Medical School Admissions Policies
Criticized
(Cincinnati Enquirer, April 23, 1973). He also criticizes those
legislators who pushed the appropriations bill through the House. The
article contained some rebuttal remarks from the Medical School's Chairman
of Admissions.

April 23, 1973
Memo to the President from an executive of an industrial firm
threatening not to participate in the corporate fund drive unless the
Medical School admissions policies are changed.
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Commentary: This action
represents a big step
In that the faculty have
come to feel thl height
of external pressures.
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students elect to
h ° 01 °“ tslde the state if
the University
.
fvo?
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May 17, 1973
Memo to the Medical School Dean from the
President.
The President
asks the Dean to contact Representative
#6 and walk him through the admissions process.
The Dean should contact the representative
and discuss with
m the issues he has raised and explain the new
admissions policy. This
must be done before House Bill #86 goes to
the Conference Committee.

May 17, 1973

Memo to the Executive Vice President from the President. The
President advises the Vice President to get out a press
release stating the
resolution of the admissions question.
"People should know about the
increase of in-state student admissions to 70% in 1974 and 75% in 1975."
May 17, 1973
Memo, the President to an assistant.
The assistant had drafted a
letter to an executive of an industrial firm telling the executive that
a particular applicant to the Medical School had been rejected.
The
letter which did not contain any information about the applicant’s shortcomings, was caught by the President and ordered to be redrafted. The
President felt that it was important to indicate what the applicant’s
deficiencies were that resulted in his rejection.
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May 23, 1973
Press release:
the University will increase
in-state student
admissions to 70% in 1974 and 75%
in 1975.

May 24, 1973

M

Pr lden frOI“ the Vlce Resident
for Public Rela?he vire^p
Vlce Pre sident !:has set up the meeting
with the legislators
,
SSUe
Medlcal Sch ° o1 Emissions. Those
present wfu be rte
vTrl
Vice p
President for the Medical School, the
Dean, the President as well
as epresentatives #2, if 6 and two
other area legislators. The Regents
have approved a special subsidy request.

^

tions

L
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Commentary: The President seemes to want
to
clear the air, get the figures that had
been
circulating around the state straight, and
appease the legislators. He is willing to
go
to 85% in-state students if need be.
The
legislators expressed the desire for a no
nonsense meeting. There was a dry run the
day before with the rationale of admissions
increase to be based on the "clear wishes
of the citizens of the state, not because
of expanding Medical School costs."

May 26, 1973
The meeting - a press release termed the meeting "useful." A
joint
statement revealed that the University was to increase the number of state
and city students with an added emphasis on increasing the number of
minority students in each entering class.

Commentary: The meeting between the President
and the legislators resulted in the legislators
coming to understand that in some ways the faculty,
not the President, had control of the admissions
procedures. The medical people in some ways felt
the direct pressure of the legislators.
There
were no percentage figures given in the press
release but the legislators came away from the
meeting understanding that 90% in-state student
admissions was the University's goal.
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June

6.

1971

V1S6S the Presld ent
that while the legislators
came away with the
h
“ nderstandin
d
quota is an official university
* that a 90%
coal
tbp f
are thinking in terms of
lumnl and Regents
a 70-75% otota or kin n’
!
* ly ne ^ otiated
g
by the Vice
President for the Medical
hp
Center
8
letting
the Dean explore
the admissions policy with
his faculty^nlTth
7
report back the £° a ls
that are likely to be achieved.
’

^

Commentary: The President allows
the faculty
to seek the medium partly
for faculty autonomy
and partly to leave well enough
alone while the
Governor signs House Bill #86 that
had gotten
past the Conference Committee.

Analysis
The case just presented exemplifies
that managerial autonomy is

difficult to maintain in the face of
turbulent environments and organizational dependency on many outside
groups.
This example shows that outside
groups pressuring for change are more likely
to increase the chances of
internal change occurring.

In this case, private citizens, alumni,

industry, the Regents, and several legislators
intensely and specifically

made their demands known.

Since the University was in need of the subsidy

appropriations pressure was even more acute and choice on the
part of the
University.
The author’s view is that the University could not have remained

unresponsive to the public will even if the biennium budget had not been
in doubt.

Why is it important to maintain institutional autonomy if not

to allow the institution to be more able to serve the people that give the

institution its legitimate function?

External groups were operating on

the assumption that if they were legitimizing and subsidizing the Institu-

tion's function then it should cater to their needs.

It was quite apparent
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that the ill-will and
backlash engendered by the
refusal to adjust
the admissions ratio
was not worth the dubious
distinction of having
a pluralistic student
body.

Again, this case illustrates
two kinds of role conflict
on
the focal person, the
University President. Intersender
and intrasender role conflict will be
discussed in the next two
sections of
this chapter.

Intersender Conflict

Many groups stated what they
wanted the President to do.
The
overwhelming majority of external
groups wanted the admissions ratio
changed. Legislators wanted
them changed because they wanted the
school
to be responsive to the
constituents the University served who
were

going to shoulder the cost of the next
approved appropriations bill.
Alumni, industrial executives and
private citizens wanted the ratio

changed so that their sons and daughters
would have a better chance
to be admitted in the competitive
circumstances of the seventies.

Other state universities wanted the ratio
changed because it would give

more of their graduates a better chance to be
admitted.
The faculty, Dean, and Vice President judiciously
guarded the

time-honored tradition of guild expertise of the medical faculty
having
the prerogative of determining what was best for the art of
medicine.

This group felt that the wider the applicant pool, the tougher the

competition the better the applicant they would get to train and hence
join the ranks of the guild.

At the start of the year the faculty had
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the prerogatlve to

decUe the ratlo

Qf ln . state/ouc _ of _
state

gtudente
and the President
could only defer all
pleas for applicant
acceptance
to the faculty

admissions committee.

When the year ended the
prerogative lay in the hands
of the
legislature which had set it
at a fixed ratio.
The pressure from outside pleas directed at
the President especially
pleas on behalf of outof-state students, from now
on can only be deferred
to the legislature.
There may not be as many
in-state students however who
will be turned
away.
One interesting thing is
that the President has always
had very
little influence on the process
of admissions and although
this admissions
Issue is resolved, with influence
changing hands, the President
still has
very little power on the process
of medical admissions.
The intersender role conflict is
quite evident.

was expected to protect faculty
autonomy.

The President

With what, it is not known.

All the power to make academic
decisions lay in the hands of the indi-

vidual faculty member and specialized
departments.

What did the

President have to offer to those who subsidize
the institution?

Accountability?

The legislature had already passed the
amendmend

requiring faculty to teach so many hours a week.

Quality of service?

There were precious little measure of quality
beside a prestigeful job
and those were getting fewer.

Socialization of the young?

In loco

parentis has been substantially weakened during the past
decade?
Failure to protect faculty autonomy could result in loss of

administrative credibility.

Failure to meet the demands of external

groups would result in financial loss and institutional debt.
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Intrasender Conflict
There was not too much evidence
for intrasender conflict.
The
Chancellor's vascillation and
eventual reversal of sent
role is one of
the few striking examples
that could he found during
the year of this
study.

Most of the external and internal
groups remained fairly consistent with their demands even
though those demands resulted in
intersender conflict.

Summary
It is evident that some of the
problems associated with the

admissions ratio stem from the fact that
the University is in the

transition between being a city and state
institution.

The term

transition is used because the University will
have to become totally
public supported and state affiliated to remain
solvent in these times
of financial scarcity.

It is difficult to sit on the fence being both

private and public because it requires the defense of both
positions and

weaving both into a course of action.

Many times, trying to be both

private and public may result in irreconcilable differences.

Certainly

this point is exemplified by the medical admissions case.
It seemed evident that the Vice President for the Medical Center

was not communicating to the President or the legislature what the

Medical College was doing.

This lack of communication caused the legis-

lators to keep the pressure on even though some decisions had been

reached to change the ratios as early as March.

It seemed appropriate

at least to have let the legislators know earlier what they were to find

out in the May 26th meeting, that the faculty had independently decided to

change the ratios and the President could do little to order that change.
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was no question
that the
President was going to
have to change the
tatio if it was within
his
power since all of
these groups - alumni,
industrial executives,
the
Regents, legislators had placed co^on
de^nds on
the President.

allowed very little choice
in compliance if the
state subsidy
and special
appropriations were to be
passed.
also be said that external
groups view the University
as
existing to serve the
public and expect it to be
responsive to public
demands. Furthermore the
President is viewed as having
the cbntrol
and authority over the
institution to direct the
University to he
responsive to those demands.

Ouasi-Legal and Moral Issues
There were some small issues
that surfaced during the year
that
centered around issues of legality
and morality.
For example, a gay

liberation group pushed for official
recognition as a student group by
applying through the proper student
and administrative channels for a
student organizational charter.

Another issue that required immediate

attention arose when the Dean of the
School of Education began to bring
his four month old baby to the office
with him.

A third example involved

the city building inspector declaring
one the University's dormitories a

fire trap.
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In each Instance there
were no tell-tale
antecedents to the Issue
that showed up in the
process of "scanning" for
information. Each one
of these issues resulted
from actions taken by others
that resulted in
a small crisis or
"brushfire." The President had
to react and deal
With each issue in an ad hoc
fashion. Most of these types
of issues

engendered outcries from the
public, from independent citizens,
and
groups, and were induced by
media exposure. Each of the
three examples

mentioned also involved ambiguous
legal decisions and hinged on
legal
technicalities for solution.
The "Dean’s baby" issue and
dormitory safety will be discussed

just briefly to show some of the
characteristic ambiguities associated

with the issues.

Some of the other quasi-legal and
moral issues that

cropped up during the year were:

the decision to disclose faculty

salaries, student in-state residency
requirements, mandatory regulations
that required students to live in the University
dormitories, and the

request to make students stand for the national
anthem at public events.

Dormitory Safety
On February 14th a group of city officials from the City
Building

Division inspected a twenty-six story dormitory operated by the
University.
This inspection was different in that it was done by some of the
top officials of the City Building Division, it was unannounced, and did not leave

any report of findings with the University Physical Plant officials.

On

February 22nd the City Official returned to conduct a tour with university
officials and members of the press which revealed the violations found on

February 14th.
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The City Press and
University Press carried
headlines saying
University Dormitory: The
State’s
State s c,f
oof or Fire
Safest,
Trap?" (Cincinnati
Post, February 22
1973, p.
24) and
F
Building Inspectors Point
Out
ral Violations of Sander
Hall" (The News Record,
February 23, 1973
p. 1).
The publicity caused student
and parent concern, reflected
In
a barrage of phone
calls and mall In the President's
office.
,

,

The President was quoted
as saying, "I really don’t
think there
is anything more than a
human error here, but I Intend
to put out a
letter to parents because

I

am quite concerned about them"
(The News

Record, February 23, 1973,
p. 1 ).

After some Interviews with University
officials and the press,
it was revealed that the City
Building Division was having Internal

troubles, squabbling over jurisdictions,
which resulted In sanctions

from the State Board of Building Standards.

The State Board had given

the City Building Division 120 days to
"get its house in order and

properly enforce the city-state building codes
or go out of business"
(Cincinnati Post, February 22, 1973, p. 24).
The violations found in the dormitory were vaguely
specified
and had resulted from wear and occupancy and were
not a result of

architecture, wiring, or inadequate fire protection.

The City Fire

Chief said, "the University can’t be bigger than anyone else, most
of
the things that we are talking about are people violations, but a

violation is a violation" (News Record, February 23, 1973).

The

architecture and physical plant people said the city people were nitpicking.

Violations were cited such as a severe draft which came from an open door
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in the trash chut e,
several outlet receptacle
boxes which had not been

installed within one-fourth
Inch of the finished wall
as required, and
a lack of firestopping
material around pipe casings
in two toilet rooms,
The fire officials were
not able to find the access
panel in the toilet
rooms to demonstrate this
last charge.
The role ambiguity and conflict
demonstrated by this example Is
evident in the need for the
University to maintain a credible
Image.

Ambiguity arises from the fact
that there Is very little the
President
could do to gain the proper
information to prevent this incident
from
happening.

If indeed there was a "head-hunting"
expedition being con-

ducted by the City Building Division,
there seemed little that could
be done to prevent the controversy.

The faculty and Board, parents and
students. Regents and legis-

lature hold the President responsible for
the organization's image and
behavior.

Conflict comes when the President strives to meet
role senders'

expectations, yet through no fault of his own or with
little control over
image factors, as exemplified by the above example,
role expectations

are not met.

The above example is an isolated one, but the image of

the institution is formed by several of these "brushf ires"
or small

issues occurring frequently over a period of time.

The above example demonstrates how the President can become the

victim of intrasender conflict.

The City Building Division had been

operating in a standard way for many years yet because of its internal
struggles it changed its style of operation.

The University therefore
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suffer the consequences
of a relaxed then
rigid Inspection procedure with no warning
that there has been
a change in inspectors’
attitudes.
In the long run, the
President and the University
officials
are seen as not doing
their job in meeting
public expectations.
The "Dean’s Baby" Issue
On October 12th the President's
secretary received a phone
call
from an anonymous mother of
a secretary who worked
for the University.
The woman complained that
the School of Education Dean
had brought his
baby into work and was thereby
neglecting other important things
that
had to be done.

The woman was angry saying
something should be done

about it and that other people
were going to complain.

The President

sent a note to the Dean to inform
him of the phone call, accompanied

with a box of "Pampers.”
On the 17th of October the Dean wrote
a memo to his secretarial
and clerical staff taking a stand on
the issue by explaining his reasons

for taking his son to work.

The Dean felt that "somehow the way in which

work is defined in our society needs to shift to
incorporate far more of
the human, the humane and the family."

In present society, work is most

often separated from play with the result being the separation
of values,
needs and activities which reward people emotionally and
aesthetically.
Also, because he was working at night, many times the child was not

awake during the hours his father was at home.

The issue of sex roles

socially defined proscriptions prevent a man and

various aspects of their lives."

a

woman from enjoying

The Dean did not want to thrust on his

wife "the role of full-time and unrelieved day care specialist" just because
he "had chosen to accept a heavy, time consuming, and emotionally demanding
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professional responbility.

»

By bringing his son to
work a couple of

mornings a week, the Dean would
get to "participate in the
magic of
my son's growth and my wife
would have brief opportunities
to do her
own thing."
The Dean closed the letter by
saying that the child's world

ought to extend beyond his home,
and that the chances were that
more

work would be the result because he
did not want to run the risk of
anyone raising complaints like the

one that had been phone into the

President’s office.
On the 24th of October a city newspaper
called the President

seeking a statement concerning the President's
view on the "Dean's
baby" issue.

The newspaper had done a human interest story and

wanted the President's rejoinder. The story was covered
by the UP
and API and received national and international coverage.

The Dean

was also on CBS national T.V. news.
On October 24th the President's office began getting phone calls

and letters from enthusiastic and outraged citizens and the controversy
was on.

In the President's office the mail and calls were running 2:1

against the Dean’s actions while in the Dean's office the mail and phone
calls were 16:1 in favor of his actions.

Before the story broke presidential assistants advised the President
to be cautious.

It would look bad that a Dean was babysitting at the tax-

payers' expense and this could set a precedent for other University person-

nel to follow.
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The President

initial reaction was to
consider treating the

matter with humor and
to put a plug in tor
da y -care. However it
was
evident that the issue
could result in a no-win
situation.
Even though
the President disliked
anonymous callers and felt
that this was a
local

Issue that needed to be
worked out between the
Dean and the complainers,
the President was quoted
by the press as saying
that as long as the Dean
was giving the taxpayer
his money’s worth, and
as long as the baby was
ot interfering with
institutional work or competency,
bully for the Dean.’

President

s

office for the next two weeks
had to deal with

the letters and phone calls
that came in blasting the
University and
the President for not doing
something about the Dean. Most
of the

Phone calls and letters to both the
Dean and the President that were
not in favor of the Dean’s actions
were from men who had sons or
grandsons in college.
The majority of contacts showing
approval and encouragement for the Dean were from women
and mothers.
None of the contacts to
the President were from organizations
but rather from independent citizens.

The conflict in this small example is
evident.

Intersender conflict

is present in that some people saw the
Dean’s behavior as refreshing,

endearing, and valuable while others saw it as a
dangerous precedent,

threatening men's roles and a waste of taxpayers' money.

The press saw

it as newsworthy and did "slant" the story in favor
of the Dean.

Ambi-

guity was present in that there was very little information
available as
to how the "public" would respond, and because the Dean did not
consult

anyone before acting, the dilemma was in the President's Ian before in-

formation or policy could be formulated.

207

There also may have
been sene possible
person-role conflict In
that If the President
wanted to back the Dean
wholeheartedly, If the
President’s values were
congruent with the Dean's
on this particular
issue. It seemed as If
there was very little
choice for the President
to voice that approval.
In a way, it was expected
that the President
would provide a sobering
statement about taxpayers’
money and accountability.

Chapter Summary
The academic year was filled
with many more issues and problems

similar to the ones described in
this chapter.

There were many more

examples of conflict and ambiguity
piled upon each other, some related,
some not, all requiring information,
all resulting in demands for the

President's time and energy and thoughtful
analysis in order for resolution to be reached.
In Chapter III the reader can easily
see the amount of activity

and the type of activity that is required
of the President in the process
of trying to solve the problems and
resolve issues that directly influence

the institution's course of action.

In Chapter IV expectations, in general

form, were described that characterize certain
pressures experienced through

interactions with external groups.
This chapter described through particular examples,
how general

pressures are manifested in specified, sequential, contextual
interactions.
The role of the boundary person is unique.

acting with internal constituents.

It is different than just inter-

The central elements or themes that
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were reflected In these
examples were power and the
President's lack of
it, misunderstanding,
and non-communication.

U

can he suggested that

many outsider groups may not
know or understand the true
"conditions of
authority" in the University.
Authority Is diffused.

It Is decentralized, lying
somewhere be-

tween the plethora of ad hoc
committees of the University and
Faculty

Senates and the individual faculty
member and his department.

The

administrator has very little leverage
to force faculty members or
departments to make certain decisions or
to cooperate in certain projects.

The President is now left with
cajoling, persuading, negotiating,

and pleading for support.

Also, because the President lacks formal
power over role senders

outside the University, his ability to guarantee
that the external groups
will provide the resources for which internal
units hold him responsible
is reduced.

To compensate for this lack of formal authority in
a linking

pin role, the boundary person must rely heavily on
bonds of trust, respect,
and caring that he develops with outsiders.

These bonds are difficult to maintain as examples have shown:

outsiders too easily associate the failings of the University with the
failures of the President.

Also the failures of outside units to provide

internal units with resources are often blamed upon the boundary person,

namely the President.

In both instances trust, affection, and caring

that oil the wheels of administrative decision-making, become scarce and

usually make the process of directing a large complex organization difficult and painful for the administrator.
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The ability to disengage
personal faults fro™
organizational
responsibilities and to distinguish
both fro™ events in
which the
boundary person is an
innocent and powerless
spectator are the results
of the role senders'
inadequate understanding of
boundary conditions.
The President in a boundary
position is faced with a
sizable
number of role senders whose
demands are hard to oredict
and even more
difficult to control, shifts
in role expectations result
from dynamics
idiosyncratic to the external
groups themselves, which makes
it doubly
hard for the boundary person
to diagnose.
Perhaps what makes the
situation even more tragic is that
the boundary person has only
limited
power or authority with which to
deal with external expectations.

CHAPTER

VI

COPING MECHANISMS

An underlying premise of role theory is that an organization
is made up of a variety of overlapping roles and role sets
each con-

sisting of the individual focal person and those other people with whom
the focal person must interact in the organization's input— transforma-

tion— output process.

Chapters III, IV, and V described the roles and

role set of a University President, in other words the activities and

behaviors of the President and those people and organizations he would
generally interact with in the course of performing those activities.
Also described were the five thematic problems that seemed to characterize
the academic year of 1972-73 and the resultant four types of role conflict

that could be seen through those problems for the President's role.

The emphasis of this study has been confined to variables of

role conflict such as sent role expectations, organizational position

and constraints on the focal person, the organizational contexts of the
role senders, the behavior of the focal person, and feedback to the role
senders.

Influential factors such as past interaction or history between

the focal person and his role senders, attributes of the persons involved

such as motives, values, fears, defense mechanisms, and style were not

considered in great length except when these factors had a direct bearing
on the issues discussed.
The influential factors listed above were described only when

absolutely necessary because the purpose of this study was to explain
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observed patterns o£ behavior in

terras of

existing social conditions.

Holding in abeyance "personality" or
"social background",

the method of

this study asks what features of the
observed social setting or organi-

zational context would lead almost anyone
occupying the role of president to behave in the particular ways being
observed.
In some ways, however, coping mechanisms
are more personal, more

contingent on past behavior, values, and personality,
than on the conditions of role conflict and ambiguity.

The focal person can have little

effect on "objective" role forces, but his personality influences

received role

and consequently the coping mechanisms he uses.

No

coping mechanisms can be fully understood without considering both the
factors this research studies such as sent role, role senders, organiza-

tional context, and the behavior of the focal person, and the factors

which this study did not directly consider such as the focal person's
style, personality, and past interpersonal relations with role senders.

An in-depth study of coping mechanisms in stressful conditions is
not a study of neat, self-contained role episodes and one-to-one relationships.

In the previous chapters, however, the author has considered role

episodes and relationships in this way, in full realization that the

emphasis taken oversimplified a dynamic and complex problem.
The stresses of role conflict and ambiguity are not equally

damaging to all who experience them because the extent to which the role
conflict produces stress is mediated by the focal person's individuality
and his relations with his role senders

(Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p.

If the coping mechanisms are successful for the focal person,

337).

the strain
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and stress is reduced; if the
coping behaviors are not
successful, the
conflict and stress can be
intensified.
The general emphasis and style
of this dissertation has been
to
focus on one President and his
problems; in keeping with that
approach
the author will discuss a sample
of coping mechanisms observed
by

watching one President work through his
problems.

There will be no attempt

to describe the personality
characteristics of the President that mandated

certain coping mechanisms over others or
to explain the motives for certain
choices over others.
It is the author's belief that people,
because of certain person-

ality characteristics, are limited in their
choices of appropriate coping

mechanisms.

It is not the purpose of this study to do an
in-depth study

of coping mechanisms which would necessitate
a study of personality and

style.

Rather, this study intends to describe what was observed,
to

depict the varient forms without trying to link cause and effect and
without making judgements as to the appropriateness of the behavior in terms
of the President's personality or style vis-a-vis the system's needs.

An in-depth study of coping mechanisms would not necessarily be
confined to a study of rational solutions of transient issues.

Ultimately,

coping must be depicted within a context which includes the problems or
issue, the personality of the solver, and the cost of the solution to
the intra-psychic, interpersonal, and organizational systems of the

solver (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964,

p.

340).

Also an in-depth study would not

be confined to successful coping behavior, because not all coping

mechanisms result in reduced conflict.
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The criteria for what
Is a "successful" coping
mechanist, Is
defined In terms of a reduction
In tension, stress, conflict,
or

ambiguity for the Individual
focal person rather than
in a reduction
of tension for the system.
It is possible to argue
that if system

needs
are met and at the same
time stress and tension are
reduced for the
focal person then the coping
mechanism is effective as well as
successful.

For the purposes of this study
effective coping mechanisms are
defined as behaviors which result
in a reduction of both individual
and

system stress and will not be
discussed.
The purpose of this study is to
delineate some of the coping

mechanisms observed that seemed to reduce
conflict and ambiguity for
the focal person.

Whether or not the focal person's coping
mechanisms

are, in the long run, effective In
reducing systemic conflict and ambi-

guity will not be treated in this work.

Coping Mechanisms
The major organizational determinants of conflict and
ambiguity
that have been depicted in the examples in Cahpters III,
IV, and V were
the requirements of overseeing and crossing the organization's
boundaries,

the requirement of producing innovative solutions to non-routine
problems,

and the requirement of being responsible for the work of others.

All

three of these factors or determinants resulted in constraints on the

President's

actions and almost always resulted in role conflict.

There seemed to be three basic ways of dealing with the conflicting
role pressures:

persuade

1)

the President could comply with the demands or try to

the role senders to modify their expectations; 2) he could
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avoid stressful situations; or

3)

he could use defense mechanisms

that would put reality In a
personal frame of reference and
lessen
anxiety. All three options were
observed during the year of this
study.

There were examples, such as the
safety issue concerning dormitories or the "dean's baby" issue,
about which little could be done.
In many small issues that leave
little reaction time or that arise because
the President has little power to change
the role senders’ actions there
is not much he can do but "bite the
bullet" or "grin and bear it".

When

role senders could not distinguish between
the President’s actions and
the institution's characteristics, or when
the role senders held the

President responsible in those cases in which he had not
control, the

President could only acknowledge that he was a casualty of his
role.
It did not good to protest or explain.

This chapter will contain two sections.

The first portion of

this chapter will describe the coping mechanisms that were found to come

under the three options mentioned above.

The second portion of this

chapter will contain suggestions of possible, generalizable coping mechanisms for university presidents.

Defense Mechanisms that Put Reality in a Personal Frame of Reference
This group of mechanisms seemed the widest in repetoire not

because they were preferred but because the opportunities for the other
two, persuading role senders to change and avoiding stressful situations,

were less likely possibilities.

The types of coping mechanisms observed

in this regard were behaviors such as 1) humor, 2) writing, 3) a focus

on change and innovation, and 4) keeping some psychological distance from
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Interactors
1)

Humor

Humor was a key ingredient in the
President's administration.
was cyclic.

It

There were periods when it would be
dormant yet always

return to the surf act in memoranda and in
meetings.

The humor was subtly

expressed, for example, by sending a box of
"Pampers" to the Dean who

brought his baby to work or by sending a memo
to the Long Range Planning
Task Force that described in satriical terms
how Moses might prepare his
long range plan for leading the Jewish people out
of Egypt.

was most prevalent just before or after long vacations.

The humor

And it seemed to

be less prevalent during periods of sustained crisis.
The humor did serve to put things in perspective and cause
Deople
to release a little of their anxiety.

There were times, however, when the

President would use humor to show displeasure.

A remark would carry a

double edge to show that he had noticed some deficiency, yet was willing
to poke fun of it.

The recipient was left to determine which was more

important to respond to first.
2)

Writing and Publishing

The emotional cost or stress of role conflict for the President

resulted in job dissatisfaction, low-confidence in the present structure
and style of the organization, and in a high degree of job-related
tension.

These three manifestations of stress could be seen in a number

of ways, the most prominent being in the President's published writings.
In 1972 he wrote of the frustration he felt, how he needed more time to
do the things he felt a president should do, how the university must

adapt if it is to survive in the seventies because the great flow of
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resources of the sixties had stopped, and he
wrote of the high degree
of energy the job demanded that resulted
in soul-tiring hours at his

desk trying to keep up with his work (Bennis

,

1972, p. A3).

A major coping mechanism observed by the researcher
was that of
the President using his writing as a form of catharsis
and analysis to

mitigate role conflict.

It is the author’s opinion that writing was a

self-initiated, self-rewarding process that enabled the President to
think out, to analyze and to externalize something that otherwise would

remain inside.

Writing would reduce the ambiguity by allowing for self-

definition and analysis.

It would reduce some of the President's role

conflict by placing phenomena in his own frame of reference.

Through

writing he could rationalize his own perspective and through analysis
explore possible alternatives which might result in some future solutions.

Because of the high rate of incremental information that "scanning”
produces and because of the need for informed decision-making the President
spent a lot of time attempting to clarify an ambiguous environment.

Part

of the clarifying process was done by writing about the insitution, its

contexts, and the problems the President’s office was concerned with

because of the institution and its environmental contexts.
3)

Focus on change and innovation

There was a tremendous amount of administrative change and emphasis
on change during the year this study was conducted.

The President spon-

sored a series of administrative seminars directed toward changing

attitudes, increasing skills, and providing ways that the top echelon
of administrators could cope more fully with their problems.

There was a
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great deal of turnover of Vice
Presidential and Presidential
assistants
during the year this study was conducted.
The emphasis on change and the eventual
personnel turnover at
the end of the year may have created
a sense of rising expectations
and

optimism that conflicts could be resolved and
that change was possible.
On the other hand, a sense of hopelessness
or powerlessness on the part
of the President in relation to internal
groups makes role conlict and

ambiguity even more difficult to bear, increases tension
and anxiety, and
decreases the President’s ability to influence interaction
with external
groups
4)

Keeping Some Psychological Distance from Interactors

It was established in Chapter III that the President chose the

unrelenting pace of meetings, phone calls, and mail.

why did he tolerate this pace?

The question is

Why did he continually cause the expan-

sion of his sphere of activities?

In Chapter III one reason given for

this expansion was not to discourage the flow of information needed to
do his job in that the President is sensitive to the opportunity cost of

his own time.

It can be said that this expansion also allows for breathing

room on pressing issues and spreads out the time between interactions that
are particularly tense and touchy.
The President at times did not get a chance to interact with

external groups because of other pressing priorities.

The long time

between interactions, either by mail, phone, or face-to-face meetings,
served to put "psychological distance" between the President and his role
senders.

The long interaction time gave both the President and the role

senders a chance to think out and weigh alternative actions and their
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consequences

A result of psychological distance and
unrelenting pace was that
the feedback the President gets about his
errors is greatly delayed and

he can never really call anything finished.

He seldom gets direct

positive feedback; in fact, he is likely to get
feedback only when something goes wrong.

The lack of feedback results in very limited
guidelines

to assess which of his actions are effective, and
therefore

there is

always the urge to do more.

Psychological distance and unrelenting pace are compatible in that
they allow for a rapid information flow and time to pass that may allow
the tension and anxiety around a specific issue to ease.

become defeating when the unrelenting pace is used as

a

They can

rationalization

for not coping with a problem that without immediate and sustained

attention will result in a full-scale crisis.

Avoiding Stressful Situations
There are times when it was more profitable to avoid confrontations.
It was better not to voice any opinion and to let conflicting units deal

with the problem and work out the solution themselves.

This could only

be done in cases which appeared to be inconsequential.

Issues and people

were often assessed in terms of their volatility and importance to

organizational purposes and handled according to that assessment.

In order

to avoid a stressful situation, the President would 1) give a subunit

responsibility to see that the problem was resolved or

2)

have his staff

of assistants filter, coordinate, and prioritize problems letting only

those that could have important consequences for the University get to
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the President's attention.

One coping mechanism,
that needs little

explanation yet served to
release tension, was the
practice of going on
vacations of a week or more.
Needless to say, the vacations
were welcomed, almost mandatory,
respite to his incessant role
overload.
Subunit Responsibility

There were times during the
year when the President would
forward
a letter of complaint
or praise to the subunit that
was resoonsible for
the written contact.

Record foul-ups were a common
example.

A student

or citizen would write wanting
some satisfaction and the President
would

request the subunit, in this case the
Registrar's Office, to look into
the matter while keeping the
President's office informed.

There were

numerous incidents of the President's
office forwarding letters, and to
a lesser extent phone calls,
to appropriate responsible subunits
for

action and resolution.
A slight variation on this theme would be
to have the subunit
that was responsible for the acrimony being
directed at the President

draft the letter of response that would go out
under the President's

signature.

This forwarding of contacts served two purposes.

It served

to make environmental demands more visible to internal
units and nut

the responsibility of resolution on the subunit.

This procedure gave

the President a way to monitor a subunit's performance.

Some times the

contacts that came from external groups and people, especially with requests
for survey information, resulted because the individual was not able to

discern which University subunit could solve his problem.

In those

cases it was very appropriate for the President's office to forward the

contact to the subunit that could answer the request.
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Staff of Assistants

The President had an executive
constellation comprised of

Vice Presidents and Presidential
assistants.

Many times these people

were responsible for a particular policy
or issue being handled in

a

particular way because they knew more about
that policy or issue than
anyone else.

The President was kept informed of how
projects or problems

were progressing but the assistants did much of
the day-to-day work.
In this way the assistants and secretaries
acted as a buffer or

screen for the President.

They would direct phone calls and letters

from people that could be answered by a routine
explanation away from
his attention.

An excellent example was when the "dean’s baby' episode

broke, one of the office secretaries recorded all of the in-coming
calls
and did a lot of the explaining to private citizens.

When a person

would come in to see the President unannounced, the President’s appointments
secretary usually would give some excuse for the President’s not being
able to see the visitor.

There were times when the secretary would say the President would
be out-of-town when an appointment was requested or that the President's

calendar was not firmed up yet.

In the case of anonymous phone calls by

irate private citizens, the President ordered no phone call to be

recorded and forwarded to him if the caller did not leave his name.
If the President could not do something about the call, or in some way

respond to it, he did not want to know about it.
The constellation of assistants, of course, served a dual purpose.

They helped lessen the incredible work load by drafting letters.
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receiving visitors, forming
preliminary policy statements,
and
monitoring specific projects
while at the same time fielding
ptessures,
putting out brushf ires, quieting
irate citizens, and running
interference for the President by
helping him to avoid stressful
situations.
C ompliance or Persuading
the Role Sender t o Change

There were many times during the
year when there was little that
could be done except comply
to the external demands.
Examples already
discussed, such as the Police
Consortium or the Medical School
admissions
cases, demonstrate how little leeway
the President had for negotiation.
In the case of the Police Consortium,
once the initial agreement was set,
the University had little choice but
to provide the service or suffer

the resultant embarassment of not being
able to live up to its promises.
In the case of the Medical School
admissions, there was little that

could be done to assuage the public attitude
that the University was not

serving those who were paying the bills, except to
increase in-state
admissions

Persuading the role senders to change expectations was not
easy.
There

were cases in which role senders did change their expectations
but

these were usually when the role sender was speaking for himself and
not
as a delegate representing some group or formal organization.

The

strategy most often used was cooptation, which is the process of absorbing

new elements into the leadership or policy defining structure of the

organization as a means of averting threats to the organization’s
stability or existence.
There was ample evidence of the use of this strategy with
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internal units but there seemed
to be very few attempts
at cooptation with
external organizations. There were
however plans to get prominent
public citizens to serve on"visiting
committees" for various colleges and
there was, by the end of the year,
an Affirmative Action Commission
that
was comprised of prominent citizens
and University people.
The Commission's

task was to recommend policy considerations
for review and action, working

closely with the President in developing
affirmative action programs

designed to eliminate the friction generated by
the existence of such
areas of concern.

Cooptation results in a sense of comity or "a basic
willingness to
see the ’other side' as human - if wrong-headed - and
without a basic need
to destroy them for your own survival"

(Bennis, 1973, p. 391).

Most

of the attempts to get role senders to change their
positions were

basically attempts at establishing comity.

The President always tried

to explain the constraints that he was operating under, with the hopes

that the role senders would help look for solutions that would allow the

needs of all who were involved to be somewhat met by the actions taken.
It should be restated that the chances for changing role senders'

expectations are not good.

If expectations were easily changed,

there

would not be much conflict between the University and its environment.
However, the University can easily be seen as

a

political

with decisions made in the midst of competing demands.

organization

Most of the

time, decisions resulted in someone or in some group being displeased.

The political nature of the University necessitated that the chief

executive make certain final administrative decisions, thus making the
Office of the President a "hot seat".

Any man who considers occupying
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that hot seat had to expect that
he will never please everyone,
and
at times, no one.

Suggestions for Coping Mechanisms
Most of the job activities, problems, and
job constraints

described in this dissertation are commonly
experienced by presidents
of large universities.

The literature in administration and higher

education will substantiate that.

There have been various coping

mechanisms described and prescribed in that literature.

Some of those

mechanisms are worth mentioning.
One way of mitigating the exhausting work load is to create
a dual system of administration, on the grounds that a
great deal of

power is lost in a unitary administrative system which places an

excessive burden on one person.
a

One form of dual system is to designate

president and a chancellor: the president handles external affairs, the

chancellor, internal affairs.

Another form divides administrative

responsibility between a president and a provost with very substantial
authority.

Team Management
The concept of the lone chief atop a pyramidal structure should be

questioned.

When a man is alone at the top, he is in the position of

viewing abnormal and corrupting communication patterns.

The "pyramidal

structure weakens informal links, dries up channels of honest reaction

1

This idea is taken from a memo from a Presidential assistant,

William Meyers, to the President, May 26, 1972.
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and feedback, and creates limiting
chief-subordinate relationships which
can seriously penalize the whole
organization" (Greenleaf, 1972, p. 73).

A self-protective image of omniscience can
evolve from these
filtered

communications.

This distorts the leader's .judgment which
is

often best sharpened through interaction with
others who are freer to
challence and criticize.

Filtered communications make honest criticism

difficult to come by and there is often a sense of real
loneliness

because the leader "cannot be sure of the motives of those with
whom he
must deal.
him.

Most of what he knows is what other people choose to tell

He often doesn't know what everybody elso knows informally"

(Greenleaf, 1972, p. 14).

Because the President is at the top, problems tend to centralize

around his office.

If he is the only one who can make crucial decisions

he often becomes grossly over-burdened.

Not only is there the strain of

creatively making appropriate decisions but the overload can often
result in indecisiveness which is subtle, hard to detect, and sometimes

injurious to the institution.

The incapacity to make decisions because

of too much responsibility, too much to do, and too many factors to

consider, becomes more costly to the institution than a few wrong

decisions made decisively.
Also, because of the work load the chief executive has to rely

on concentrated briefings and the support of ghost-writing which makes

him an actor, having to mouth other peoples' words.

The overload does

not allow the man to draw on and use his own creative powers.

The structure of a pyramidal or hierarchical organization with one
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man at the top only allows
a few men to emerge
as leaders, causes
a major Interruption
when the
leader leaves, and gives
'control-

priority over leadership and
cooperation (Greenleaf, 1972,
p. 15 ).
Corporate management or team
management may be a solution for
universities to consider. With a
team management concept the
principal
leader Is a £rimus Inter £ares the first among equals"
(Greenlead,
1972, p. 12).

There Is still a leader, a "first"
but he Is not seen

as the chief.

The £_rlmus constantly tests and
proves his leadership

among a group of peers.

There Is, however, mutual problem-solving;
there

is trust and mutual sharing of
responsibilities in the decision-making

process
The man who has the greatest team-building
ability should be

£rimus.

He is the strong person

of p rimus inter pares

.

who is able to facilitate the process

The key to this concept is that the role set

(or senders) of the group would see the "first"
as a leader only to

facilitate the functioning of the group as a team and not
because it is

leader-dominated
This alternative model has within it its own inherent friction

points or problems as does the "one man at the top" model.

The primus

inter pares model is suggested to cut down on the tremendous individual
role conflict that centers on the President from external and interanl
groups.

With group management some other problems arise but the number

of psychologically "shell-shocked" chief executives could be lessened

with the primus inter pares model.

Visibility as a Coping Mechanism
There seems to be a norm in the leadership and management
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literature which says that
a successful leader
is one who can serve
as
a buffer for his
subordinates.
This may not be the
realistic or
feasible leader behavior for
the circumstances of
the university
president.
Part of the problem, as
described in the examples of
the
Police Consortium and the Medirai
a
Medical School admissions
cases, was that
•

the internal units were
not aware of the pressure
put on the President
by the intensity of the
dissatisfaction of the external role
senders

until the situation had reached
crisis proportions.
In both cases, it is the
author's opinion, that it would
have

been appropriate for the President
to act as a mirror rather
than
buffer.
It would have been appropriate
for the President to reflect the
true conditions of inside units
to external role senders and to
reflect
the true implications of external
dissatisfactions to internal role senders.
By making visible to external and
internal constituents all that is

transpiring, there would be a greater chance
for comity.

External

groups must begin to understand the true nature
of the strengths and

weaknesses of the university.

Internal units on the other hand must come

to understand that there is an external world
to which the university

must hold itself accountable.
By the inside and outside role senders seeing things as they

really are and not through a buffer, the role senders can come to

understand the role pressures on the boundary person.
to see that he is not omnipotent nor a "flunky."

They could come

He is not someone

who is always to be blamed for the behavior of the people who work for
the university

,

nor is he to be thought of by those who work for the
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university as an adversary
who is plotting for more
authority or
trying to consciously or
unconsciously reduce the
facultv's academic
freedom.
The boundary person is
someone who can aid in the
solution of
issues by the nature of the
unique position he is in.
Because he is
in the position of receiving
up-to-date and comprehensive
information

he is often able to synthesize
and suggest alternative
methods of
operation.
He can operate more as an
arbitrator and third party
consultant rather than as the leader
who is seen as a shrewd, slippery
politician with an axe to grind or
interests to be served.
Third party consultants or
arbitrators do have interests to be

served but those interests are in
favor of justice and fairness, in

mutual benefit and mutual problem-solving,
and in the conceptualization
of a better functional relationship
for the parties involved.

would be the president’s interest, too.

If

This

visibility of the university

is increased, perhaps understanding
of the president's function will be

understood in light of the present constraints on
his role.
Summary

Coping mechanisms are essentially individual in nature and
limited by personality characteristics.

The basic cooing mechanisms

observed in the course of this study were concerned with changing role
senders

expectations, compliance, avoidance behavior, or placing the

problem in the President's own personal frame of reference.

Others

that were mentioned by the author concerned the possibility of team

management and of making interactions between external groups and the
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President more visible.
Much of the role stress and ambiguity
contained in the office of
university president is the result of
spanning the university boundary
to interact with outside groups.

The president often times has very
little

leverage to influence outside groups nor do
outside groups understand the
internal constraints on the president’s actions.

The president, in the

boundary position, has in reality little power
to influence external groups
and is constrained by a number of internal role
expectations.

Together

these expectations and constraints result in high role
conflict.
It is the author's opinion that there seemed to be
very little

that could be done to mitigate most role conflict that was
observed.

The university president can do little to change the role conflict

experienced unless the office can regain some of the stature and authority
it once had.

Perhaps external pressures will create the clear cut reasons

for why the chief executive must have the authority and control to make

more key decisions that shape the direction and fate of the university.

CHAPTER

VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
The reasons the university
president as a boundary
person was
chosen as the focus for
this study were: 1) this
roie has not been
Studied in-depth; 2) the
external environments of
universities are
placing increasing demands
upon the university to adapt
and respond
in ways that are different
from the past; 3) a boundary
position is
important because it represents
a break point in
organizational purpose and may constitute a major
arena for intergroup conflict;
and

administrators need to know about how
boundary people handle the
conflict inherent in the role
in order to become and train
more effective
administrators
4)

The purpose of this study was
1) to describe and analyze the

functions that the university president
carries out;

2)

to construct a

profile of the major agencies and interest
groups outside the university

with which he must interact in the course
of performing his duties;
3)

to describe and analyze the demands
or expectations of the people with

whom he interacts; and

4)

to describe and examine the coping mechanisms

of the president in mediating between conflicting
expectations and demands.

The case study method employed in this research used
the non-

participant observation technique, interviews, analysis of documents
and
records, and reflective analysis to provide contextual information
in

portraying the role of the university president.
a

The intent was to gain

qualitative, realistic assessment of a complex, dynamic process.
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At times the study
made use of the critical
device known as the
representative anecdote
that as Bennis defines
it is that "singular
event with antecedents
and conse q ue„ces capable
of consolidating
illuminations that hold true
not only for the
described event hut for
entire class of cases for
which the anecdote stands"
(Bennis, 1973,
9).

The "representative anecdote"
is quite necessary
given the
great amounts of phenomena
to be processed and
conveyed.
P-

Summary of Chapter III

Boundary Actvities

Chapter III presented an analysis
of presidential interaction
by form, frequency, flow,
and function - for the purpose
of showing
the process level pressures
contained in the university
president's job

Other managerial studies were used
to place the statistical analysis
of
this study in perspective.
The president's roles of monitor,
disseminator, spokesman, negotiator, disturbance handler, liaison, and
figurehead became evident

through analysis as did the quantity and
pace of his work flow, the

patterns in the activities and his use of different
media, the relationships between action and reflection in his work,
his relationships to
a variety of contacts and the interplay between
his rights and duties.

Pace
This study examined 293 calendar days of which Saturdays were

counted as work days for a total of 229 work days.

There were 37

Sundays, 24 of which had meetings, 12 Sundays having two or more work-

related meetings.

There were 27 holidays and/or vacation days.

Work
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days averaged
between 16 and 117 u
hours per day of
meetings or travel
time to some
work-related meetine
TMc
8*
his study shows
that the mall
averaged between 30
and 33 pieces per
day>
«.

,,

^_

per day.

.......

.. ....

».

„„

individuals Inside and
outside the University
diversity.

This would
,a mean
that

one out of every five
or six letters would
be from an Individual
or
organization with which no
previous correspondence
had occurred. The
content of the correspondence
was, of course, varied;
and although not
meticulously counted, it is
estimated that over a hundred
major issues
were pending and had to
be
06 keDt
u-i
Rept trark
track of
of wh
ile waiting for the
latest

developments
It cannot be stressed
enough that the work day of
a university

president Is a demanding one.

The communication and work
flow are endless.

When the day Is "over" In
the formal sense the residue
of the responsibilities are ever present. From
interaction with this President
over
the year it became apparent that
he could not escape the atmosphere

that was cognizant of his status
and power nor could he retreat
from his

own mind, which repeatedly searched
for new information that might
have
some bearing on the day’s problems.
Patte rns in Presidential Boundary Activities

There is no question that the studies already
done bear out the
data revealed In this study.

Guest (1955), Ponder (1957), and Mintzberg
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(1971) all indicated that
for managers, activity
is characterised

^

^Station,

and

BrevU*.

The data „ f

suggest that this Is certainly
the case for

a

tM ,

study

^

university president.

these three elements can
be documented by the
phone calls, calendar,
and correspondence.
The variety is most clearly
seen in the correspondence
(see

Chart II - Analysis of
Correspondence).

The University President

interacted with 20 separate
categories of external groups and
21
separate categories of internal
groups.
These categories can then
be broken into individuals,
constituent organizations, and
individuals who
represent the organizations. For
example, within the category of
"industry" the office of the University
President corresponded with 76
separate organizations and sometimes
interacted with more than one or
two individuals within that one
category.

The fragmentation of the university
president's work day is also

easily seen.

It is evident in the charts contained
in Chapter III that

no one group, with the exception of his
staff and administrative assis-

tants had an overwhelming proportion of
contact (in regards to the percent
of meetings held).

Fragmentation naturally follows when a limited amount

of time is divided into small amounts of contact
with a large number of

interacting groups.

Along with variety and fragmentation, brevity was the third
characteristic of the University President's work day.

There were days

when there were as many as fourteen different formal meetings scheduled
at thirty to thirty-five minute intervals.

These meetings were punctua-

ted by phone calls either placed by or received by the President which
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asted on the average
of elght mlnutes
(Mlntzberg>
a

.»

minute ave rage ) and by
short Kork sesslons

^

^^

p

_

^

^

^

were days when the brevity
of hls act ivit was
not as acute, yet the
y
rule was "many meetings
with many people over a
myriad of issues."
Use of Different Media
It is the position of
this writer that while
the university

president does cement relations,
mediate conflicts, and carry
on
operations, it is the character
of the issue and the
groups involved
that determine the medium
used.
To illustrate this point
the author
compared certain groups' use
of different
media.

A further conclusion that the
author reached was that the
urgency
and salience of a particular
issue or problem determined the
type of
medium used.

The study described how certain
groups push for more verbal

face-to-face contact as the issue
requiring contact comes to a "boiling
point." Such was the case with the
legislators around the ensuing
problems of budget appropriations and
medical school admissions discussed
in Chapter V.

Relat ionship between Reflection and Action
As other managerial studies have found,
this author found that

there was a strong preference for action on
the part of the President.

Reflection takes a "back seat" because of the
oppressive time constraints
brought on by work overload.

31.7% of the correspondence was in-depth

reports concerning various issues and units.

In other words careful

analysis was already done; what remained was that it be digested and
decisions made according to priorities and constraints.

In addition,
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27% of Che formal meetings
held were with staff,
administrative

assistants, and vice presidents,
slncly or collectively.

From

observation It was established
that over 60% of the time
was spent
in briefing, strategltlng,
or formulating positions to
be taken.
Because of the President's need
to avoid wasting time, to
participate only when the value of
participation was tangible and to
avoid too great an Involvement
with any one Issue, there was a
tendency
toward "having to mouth other people's
words." Often there was no
time to reflect or analyze every
detail of a prenared speech or presenta
tion.

The result was that the particulars
and Internal logic of a

given argument may have indeed felt "foreign"
to the President.

Superficiality is, no doubt, an occupational
hazard of managerial work.
In order to become effective the
University President must, in a sense,

become proficient at superficiality" (Mintzberg,
1971,
Relationships to

s.

p.

35 ).

Vcnristy of ContHctis

The President needs to develop relationshios with
three main sets
of people: supervisors

(subordinates).

(the trustees or board), outsiders, and insiders

The chief executive links these groups in a variety of

ways in order to guide the institution.

In this study it was found that

over a period of approximately nine months that 50% of the University

President

s

contacts through the mail, phone calls, and face-to— face

meetings were with external people, 43% with subordinates, 4% with
superiors, with 3% personal or undetermined.
the highest number of contacts with outsiders.

The phone calls showed

Face-to-face contacts

seemed to be preferred in the President’s relationships with the Board.
What is perhaps more important than the proportions is the variety of
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contacts with external
people or gruops.

The President's
office

corresponded with over
,08 different Individual
organisations and with
over 700 Individuals
(Chart II).
111
T„
To gam access to
outside informatic.
Lon
‘

“

•

° £ " SenS ° rS " ln

““

environment had to he
developed.

It has been stated
In this paper that
the university is much
more

decentralized and "flat" -in
ln ltS or 8 anlza tional
hierarchy compared to most
other organizations. The
phone calls show an
extraordinary number of
interactions with individual
faculty members! 39.5%
followed by 23.4% with
staff assistants and 13.7%
with the deans. The meeting
frequencies show
30.3% with administrative
staff and assistants, 17.5%
with faculty, 16 7 %
with the vice presidents and
10.2% with the deans. The
mall shows
31.4/ with the vice presidents
17 fi 7 Tt-ii-v.
bxaents l/.OZ
P
with faculty members, 11.3%
with the
deans, and 8.7% with the
assistants.
It can be suggested from
these
.

,

figures that the university is
indeed a flat organiztion because
the "top"
Of the organization interacts
more with the "bottom" (faculty)
of the

organization than it does with the middle
(the deans) of the organization.
Balance between Fights and Duties
It is the position of this study
that the University President's

role is long on duties and very short
on rights.

Many studies confirm

that the executive's role is characterized
by reactive behavior rather

than proactive activity.

It was observed during this study that
the

University President could make certain types of
decisions such as
initial commitments to his own long-term projects,
choosing to join

external boards of directors or certain committees; or
yet, still more
ironically, he could set up his own networks for information;
but once
these choices were made, activities were more or less planned for him.
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making demands on his
time and energy

rw 0

v

e
is information
networks
•

-

were set up he lost
control over the kinds
UnH ofc information
he received
and more often than not
those
ose ext-er-n.i
*
external information
networks in times
of crisis become
"nets" of accountability.
•

•

Summary of Chapter TV
The Environment

This chapter

examined the scanning
behavior that made the

President cognizant of what
was going on outside the
University. The
chapter also discussed what
the environment looked
like as a result of
scanning; what groups leveled
what specific pressures at
the President's
office around which specific
issues, and the conclusions
that could be

drawn from the President's
interaction with the environment.
Scanning

Compounding the problems of scanning
with "sensors" is the fact that
the sources of potential data
are voluminous; therefore, the
appropriate
choice is crucial.
The information
that could and should be used for

strategy and action is almost limitless.

Scanning requires the tapping of

many sources of information often
without order and completeness and is

many times constrained by the time it
takes to obtain and process the
information.

Add to this list of difficulties the rapid
rate in which the

information changes and the fact that some information
cannot be obtained

because it is strategic to the "opponents'" positions
and it becomes easy
to understand the complex problems the President
faced in the scanning

process
The President received two types of information from people
internal
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to the organlzaclon.

He recelved lnformation
about the organtzation

such as cost reports
and

inflation

about operations and
policy and

also received Information
from his subordinates
about the environs
and changes in the
environment.
Because units were
specialised into
functions like public
relations, academic affairs,
metropolitan affairs
and business and finance
both solicited and
unsolicited information
was narrowly grouped
into areas. The information
was specific, unitoriented in terms of the unit's
speciality, and often times
concerned
with an immediate issue of
operation.
In each case, whether
from an internal or external
source, the

information that was received,
was specific, issue-oriented
and emphasized the reporting unit's
point of view.
Because information that the
President received was specific
and issue-oriented, it was
incremental.
By that it is meant that a
wholistic picture of the environment
had to be

pieced together; data had to by
synthesized and interpreted in a time

span that was appropriate to allow
for effective action.
In sum the scanning behavior of
the University President might

be described at times as both deliberate
and random, specific and
general, formal and informal, although, for
the most part, his scanning

seemed to be connected with specific issues around
several common themes

There seemed to be five major problems or concerns
at the heart of most
of the President's contacts, through the mail,
phone calls, and meetings

Specific Issues
The five problem areas that were found to be most significant in
the year during wich this study was conducted were:
1) problems related
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to cost and budgets;
2) problems related to
affirmative action;
3)

problems related to public
service;

m ent

“d

4)

problems re l ated t0 enroll .

admiSSi ° n t0 Professional
schools; and

moral or quasi-legal
concerns.

5)

problems related to

The five major problem
areas were mani-

fested in the communications
the University President
had with external
environmental groups. Each
external groun that he
interacted with had
their own idiosyncratic
viewpoint, with their own
subtle trade-offs
as the President chose
one course of action over
another.

These problems or issues were
on-going.

were never reached.

Lasting resolutions

Whenever the President made
speeches, attended

luncheons and banquets, or went
to meetings, he was faced
with discussion
and explanation of these problem
areas.
Kis phone calls and mail

reflected external groups' concerns
with these problems.

There also was

demands from internal groups and
indiviuals concerning these issues.

How the President dealt with these
problems determined the support he

received from both internal and external
groups and ultimately the course
of action the University would take.
In order to fully describe the complexity
and conflicting demands

that converged on the President's of f ice
, an explanation
of which specific

groups actually made their demands known and what
the implications of
those demands were for the President and for the
institution

was also

presented in Chapter IV.
External Groups
Since the mail contained the greatest amount of contacts, 5,770
total contacts, in contrast to 1,231 total phone calls and 1,177 total
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meetings, and since the content
of phone calls and
meetings was not
always known, written documents
are more easily used to
obtain a general
sense of what groups and what
demands the President was
being exposed to.
A general thumbnail sketch
of each group's demands was
presented as well
as the range of organizations
or individuals contained
within each
group, in cases where a group's
demands were articulated by several

organizations and individuals
Twenty external groups (See Chapter
III, Chart II) used the mail
to convey demands and share
information:

action on the part of the President.

their demands required appropriate

The mail (supplemented at times with

interview and observation notes) since it
reflected the greatest range
of external pressures on the President
and the University, was used to

explain the substance and nature of external
demands.
The twenty categories of groups were other
universities and colleges,

students, independents, industry, legislative and
state agencies, the

Board of Regents, non-profit organizations, the federal
government and

federal departments, educational associations, consultants and
speakers,

religious groups, education panels and study groups, foundations, and

public schools

Conclusions
There were many conclusions that could be drawn from
the President’s interaction with the environment.

a study of

From the description

of his interactions in this chapter it is difficult to understand how

internal constituents can maintain the image of the university as an

autonomous cloister.

The evolution of the university and its environment
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can no longer tolerate internal
myopia to external forces that
has
fed the myth of the Ivory Tower
in the past. The abundant
resources are
gone; growth has slowed down to
next to nothing, and from what
has

been seen in this chapter faculty/university
isolation and function are
being questioned for cost, efficiency,
accountability and service.
It
can also be seen that the questions are
not coming from just one or two
groups.

Numerous groups vie for the President’s
attention to express

these demands.

There are many small constituents that each
have their own

intricate interests that must be balanced and
coordinated if the total

organization is to maintain some semblance of autonomy and
self-direction.
In sum, the implications that could be drawn from
a description of the

President

s

interactions with the University's environment centered around

two themes, namely that the "condition" of the environment will
continue

influence the University in more direct ways consequently lessening

institutional autonomy and that environmental influence will lead to
centralization.

Reduction of Autonomy
A reduction in institutional autonomy results from the insti-

tution’s reactions to three conditions in the environment:

stance because of change;

2)

1)

a

reactive

possible ineffectiveness because of scarcity

and accountability; and 3) further politicization because of many funding

constituencies
1)

It was clear that the intensity and nature of scanning is

influenced by the environment and by environmental changes.

If the

environment is turbulent and rapidly changing as in the case of enroll-
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Lack of information and
uncertainty in
decision-making lead the
University to he more
reactive than proactive
and result in less
autonomy and self-direction.

^

2)

A review of the five
major problem areas and
external

constituencies in this chapter
revealed a tenor to the
environment
characterized by a concern for
finances and accountability.
This climate

m

turn influenced the
University's exchanges with
outside groups.
causal texture of the higher
educational environment in the
1970's
IS one of change,

The

scarcity, and accountability.

It was found that the
scarcity/accountability syndrome can
have a

spiral effect.

Scarcity and change bring on
greater reflection on

available information and alternatives
which increases inertia.

Inertia

can lead to a lack of satisfactory
responses from the service organization (in this case, the University)
which causes the client to increase
his monitoring activities and his
frequency of interaction with the

organization in efforts to direct the service.

The net result is more

anxiety, more time lost in providing the
service, more accountability,
and a reduction in the effectiveness of
the service organization.
3)

levels.

The contact the President had with external
groups was on many

Pressures and demands were articulated around many
issues and areas.

Economic, political, technological, and social concerns
permeated the
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President's reiations with
outside groups.

These ideas and demands

resulted in value
ludgemenfs and interests so
numerous that reconciliation was impossible and
displeasure an almost certain
result.
In times
of scarce resources clear
reasons for extablishing
priorities among
competing demands must be
provided to those outside
units that grant
the University its resources.

Politicization of the University
results

from the competition for
limited resources with externa!
groups who have
special interests to be served
in granting the University
those resources
Centralization

Centralization is encouraged by
environmental conditions not onlv
internally but externally to the
University as well. External centralization results because the problems
of information and alternatives,
scarcity and accountability, and
politicization are better handled if
universities cooperate with each other rather
than compete.

External

centralization is born out by the fact that more
and more college con-

sortia are being formed.

Consortia result in a wider variety of combined

services at lower costs and fewer environmental
variables with reduced

uncertainty in shared decision-making.
Internal centralization results from

1)

an increased amount of

information converging on the President's office from a number
of sources
both internal and external to the University, and from

2)

the need for

increased responsiveness to consumer demand.
1)

The President received information because he was perceived by

external units as having the power to direct the University and to change
internal dynamics to be responsive to outside needs.

It is evident from

an analysis of external groups' demands that their needs must be met if
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resources are to be forthcoming to the
University.

Because those

needs are focused on the President and
because internal information

concerning the feasibility of those needs
focus on the President it would
seem that he must have the power to direct,
to make decisions that will
result

m

the acquisition of vital resources whether
he has that power

in reality or not.
2)

External groups were more concerned with the product
of

teaching rather than with the core function of teaching.

For example,

they were concerned with education as a means of social
mobility for

everyone.

They were concerned with whether or not education provided

the training for professional, technical, and social roles in
society

and with education as a means to solve social problems that might lead
to a better society.

External groups were concerned with education as

a

consumer good.

They were concerned with teaching before research and with applied

research before pure research.

External groups held the President

accountable for the University’s capacity to provide the services they
needed and saw as relevant to their view of the University’s function.
Because resources were forthcoming to the University only if the

University was responsive to external needs and because external groups
recognized the President as the "authority" that could direct the

University to be responsive, centralization toward the President's
office occurred.
Summary of Chapter V

Role Pressures
This study focussed on sent roles from outside the focal person's
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organization.

It was suggested by the author that there
were con-

straints implied in the interactions between the
President and various

external groups. It was also shown how these
relationships may have

conflicting objectives and entail different standards of
rewards and
performance.

These two conditions can result in lengthy, tension-filled

relationships requiring considerable negotiating and communication
skills.
In the boundary transactions discussed in this chapter only the

role senders

expectations, sent role, and organizational position were

described along with some of the organizational constraints influencing
the President's role performance.

These five factors were used to depict

role conflict and ambiguity.

Role Conflict and Ambiguity
Role conflict is defined as two or more sent roles occurring

simultaneously such that compliance with one makes compliance with others
difficult or impossible.
tion.

Many times sent roles are in direct contradic-

There are four difference types of role conflict: intrasender

conflict, intersender conflict, interrole conflict, and person-role

conflict (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,

p.

19).

Role ambiguity is related to the amount of role-related information

needed to perform the role adequately (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,

p.

22).

The

focal person must know what kinds of behavior will be rewarded or

punished, what kinds of behaviors will be satisfying or frustrating for
the role sender, what alternatives and opportunities there are to the

present situation, and what the consequences of these alternatives are
if acted upon.

Ambiguity may be a condition of existing information

cannot be
that is inadequately communicated or result when information
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gained or is non-existent.

Mini-Case Studies
Three mini-studies concerning a University-external group
consortium, budget appropriations, and cases concerned with moral
or

quasi-legal matters were chosen as the best representative anecdotes.
These mini-studies contained elements and examples of conflict and ambiguity
found in all the other issues and areas that could have been chosen.
The University-external group consortium was chosen because it was

ongoing through the year and at the finish of this study was unresolved.
The appropriations/admissions issue was resolved by the time this study
ended.

Quasi-legal concerns were chosen because of the unexpected

nature of the problems that often times required
a

a

reactive stance and

high tolerance for ambiguity.

University-Police Consortium

From this mini-case study it can be seen that three types of
role conflict could have been experienced by the President: namely,

intersender conflict, interrole conflict, and person-role conflict.

Person-Role Conflict

Pressures on the University ran counter

:

to the President’s need to make the University a truly urban university.

Person-role conflict is defined as the conflict between the focal person's
needs and values and the demands on his role set.

In this case of

person-role conflict pressures on the University were in a sense

working against the President's needs and values.

The conflict, though

indirect, was none-the-less felt by the President.

Inter-sender Conflict

:

The President was caught between external

the academy
demands for authoritative, top-down decision-making and

s
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ethic of autonomy and democratic
decision-making.

He was caught

between demands for services for which
he had initially traded and
negotiated
and the anarchistic, specialized,
insular characteristic of the
institution that had to produce those services.
I nter-role

Conflict

:

A third type of role conflict was

expressed clearly by the President's statement
concerning his priorities
of budget and legislaive relations: he was at
the time trying desparately
to get a special medical subsidy and an increase
in general subsidy to

enable the University to balance the budget for the coming vear.

Also

the President had asked units within the University to cut
their

budgets by 3% for the academic year to balance this year's budget.

The

University budget process was reaching its culmination and key decisions
had to be made.

Inter-role conflict is defined as pressures associated with membership in one organizatoin being in conflict with pressures stemming from

membership in another group.

There were definite time and commitment

pressures associated with the budget and legislature that may have

interrupted the President's participation in and ability to monitor
the developments of the consortium.

The University and the Police were engaging in a difficult process
of trying to blend two distinct insitutions with almost opposite norms

into a collaborative effort to solve some of the pressing social problems.

The project was still underway at the conclusion of the study year. Some

parting conclusions that might be drawn from this example are:
1)

External groups view the University as a service institution.

2)

External groups view the President as having control and
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authority over the University.
3)

The University organization of
subject matter fields may
not be conducive to the solving of
society’s problems.

A)

If the University is to compete
for outside funds to solve

societal problems. University people will
have to learn to

cooperate across departmental and interdisciplinary
lines.

Medical School Admissions
This case exemplifies the fact that managerial
autonomy is

difficult to maintain in the face of turbulent environments
and organizational dependency on many outside groups.

This example shows that

change is more likely to occur if there are a large number of
external
groups pressuring for change.

In this case private citizens, alumni

industry, the Regents, and several legislators intensely and specifically

made their demands known.

Since the University was in dire need of the

special supplemental appropriations, the President was almost forced
to comply with their demands.

Intersender Conflict

wanted the President to do.

:

There were many groups stating what they
The overwhelming majority of external groups

wanted the admissions ratio changed.

Legislators wanted them changed

because they wanted the school to be responsive to the constituents the

University served who were going to shoulder the cost of the next approved
appropriations bill.

Alumni, industry, and private citizens wanted

the ratio changed because their sons and daughters then would have a

better chance of being admitted in the competitive circumstances of the
seventies.

Other state universities wanted the ratio changed because

it would enable more of their graduates to be admitted.
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The faculty. Dean, and
Vice

Present

of the Medical
College
judiciously guarded the
time honored tradition
of guild expertlse
of
the medical faculty
having the prerogative of
determining what was hast
for the art of medicine.
This group felt that the
wider the applicant
pool, the tougher the
competition, the better the
applicant they will
get to train and hence
Join the ranks of the guild.
At the start of the
year the faulty had the
prerogative to decide the ratio
and the President
could only defer all pleas
for applicant acceptance
to the faculty

admissions committee.
As events unfolded the intersender
role conflict the President
experienced was quite evident. The
President was expected to protect
faculty autonomy. With what it
is not known.
All the power to make

academic decisions lay in the hands
of the individual faculty member.
What did the President have to offer
those that subsidize the institution?

Accountability?

The legislature had already passed an
amendment

requiring faculty to teach so many hours

a week.

Quality of service?

There were precious little measures of
quality besids a prestigeful
job and those were getting fewer.

Socialization of the young?

In loco

parentis has been substantially weakened during the
past decade. Failure
to protect faculty autonomy could result in loss
of administrative

credibility.

Failure to meet the demands of external groups would

result in financial loss and institutional debt.

Intra-sender Conflict

intra-sender conflict.

:

There was not too much evidence of

The Chancellor's insulation and eventual

reversal of sent role is one of the few striking examples that could

249

be found during the
year of this study.
7

Most
° St °
off the external
and internal
Stoups remained fairiy
oonsistent in their demands
on the President
and

the University even
though those demands
resulted in inter-sender

conflict.

Quasi-Legal and Moral

l RS „p g

There were a number of small
issues that surfaced during
the
year that centered around
issues of legality and morality.
One example that required
the immediate attention
of the
President was when the Dean of
the School of Education
began to bring
his four month old baby to
the office with him.
A second example
involved the city building inspector
declaring one of the University's
dormitories a fire trap.
In each instance there were no
tell-tale antecedents to the issue

that showed up in the process of
"scanning" for information.

Each one

of these issues resulted from
actions taken by others that resulted
in
a small crisis or "brushfire."

each issue in an ad hoc

The President had to react and deal with

fashion.

Most of these types of issues

engendered outcries from the public, from independent
citizens and
groups, and were induced by media exposure.

Each of the three mentioned

examples also involved ambiguous legal decisions and
hinged on legal

technicalities for solution.

Dormitory Safety

:

The role ambiguity and conflict demonstrated

by the dormitory safety example is evident in the need for the
University
to maintain a credible image.

Ambiguity arises from the fact that there

is very little the President could do to gain the proper information
to

prevent this incident from happening.

If indeed there was a head-hunting
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expedition being conducted b
y the City Building Division,
there seeded
little that could be done
to prevent the
controversy.

The faculty and Board,
parents and students. Regents
and legislature hold the President
responsible for the organization's
image and
behavior.
Conflict comes when the President
strives to meet role
senders' expectations yet
through no fault of his own or
with little
control over image factors, as
exemplified by the above example,

expectations are not met.

The above example is an isolated
one, but

the image of the institution
is formed by several of these
"brushfires"
or small issues occurring
frequently over a period of time.

The dormitory safety example also
demonstrates how the

President can become the victim of intra-sender
conflict.
Building Division had been operating in

a

The City

standard way for many years

yet because of its own internal struggles it
changed its style of

operation.

The University therefore must suffer the
consequences of

a relaxed then rigid

inspection procedure with no warning that there has

been a change in inspectors’ attitudes.

In the long run the President

and other University officials are seen as not doing
their job in

meeting public expectations.
The Dean's Baby Issue

:

Intersender conflict was present in this

mini study in that some people saw the Dean's behavior as refreshing,

endearing, and valuable while others saw it as a dangerous precedent,

threatening to men's roles and a waste of taxpayers' money.

The press

saw it as newsworthy and did slant the story in favor of the Dean.

Ambiguity was present in that there was very little information available

251

as to how the
-public” would respond
Pond, and K
because the Dean did
not

consult anyone before
acting8 the
he d-n
dUe ""',a ” as i"
President 's lap
6 ° re lnformati
°n or Policy could
be formulated.
There may also have
been some possible
person-role conflict
if the President
wanted to back the Dean
wholeheartedly, if the

President's values were
congruent with the Dean's
on this particular
Issue, there was very
little choice for the
President to voice that
approval.
In a way, it was
expected that the President
would provide
a sobering statement
about taxpayers' money
and accountability.
In sum,

this chapter described
through particular examples,
how
general pressures are
manifested in specified,
sequential, contextual

interactions.

The role of the boundary
person is unique. It is

different than just interacting
with internal constituents.
The central
elements or themes that were
relected in these examples
were power and
the President's lack of it,
misunderstanding, and non-communication.
It can be suggested that
many outside groups may not
know or understand
the true "conditions of
authority" in the University.
The President's authority was
diffused.

It was decentralized,

lying somewhere between the
plethora of ad hoc committees of the
University and Faculty Senates and
the individual faculty member and
his

department.

He had very little leverage to force
faculty members or

departments to make certain decisions or
to cooperate in certain projects
The President was left with cajoling,
persuading, negotiating, and

pleading for support.
Also, because the President lacked formal
power over role senders
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outside the University,
his abiHty to guarantee
that the external
groups will provide the
resources for which internal
units hold
hi. responsible was reduced.
To compensate for
this lack of

authority in a linking pln
role> the boundary

^

formal

on bonds of trust, respect,
and caring that he develops
with outsiders.
These bonds are difficult
to maintain as examples
have shown:
outsiders too easily associate
the failings of the University
with the
failures of the President.
The failures of outside
units to provide
internal units with resources
was often blamed upon the
boundary person,
namely the President.
In both instances trust,
affection, and caring
that oil the wheels of administrative
decision-making, became scarce

and usually made the process of
directing a large complex organization

difficult and painful for the President.
The ability to disengage personal faults
from organizational

responsibilities and to distinguish both from
events in which the

boundary person is an innocent and powerless
spectator are the results
of the role senders' inadequate understanding
of boundary conditions,
it was found.

The President in a boundary position was faced
with a

sizable number of role senders whose demands were hard
to predict and
even more difficult to control.

Shifts in role expectations resulted

from dynamics idiosyncratic to the external groups themselves,
which

made it double hard for the boundary person to diagnose.

What made

the situation even more tragic was that the boundary person had only

limited power or authority with which to deal with external pressures and

expectations

253

Summar y of Chapter VI
Coping Mechanisms

^

general emphasis and
style of thls dlssertatlon
has
to focus on one
Present and hl . problems;
ln keeplng
approach the author dls
cusse d a sample of coping
mechanisms observe,
by watching one
President work through his
problems.
There was no
attempt made to describe
the personality
characteristics of the
President that mandated
certain coping mechanisms
over others or to
explain the motives for
certain choices over others.

^^

The major organizational
determinants of conflict and
ambiguity
that have been depicted
in the examples in Chapters
III, IV, and v
were the requirements of
overseeing and crossing the
organization's
boundary, the requirement of
producing innovative solutions
to nonroutine problems, and the requirement
of being responsible for
the work
of others. All three of these
factos or determinants resulted
in

constraints on the President's actions
and almost always resulted in
role conflict.
There seemed to be three basic ways of
dealing with the conflicting
role pressures: 1) the President could
comply with the demands or try
to persuade the role senders to modify
their expectations; 2) he could

avoid stressful situations; or

3)

he could use defense mechanisms that

would put reality in a personal frame of reference
and lessen anxiety.
All three options were observed during the year
of this study.

Defense Mechanisms that Put Reality in a Personal Frame of
Reference
This group of mechanisms seemed the widest in repetoire not
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because they were
preferred bur because
rhe opportunity
for rbe
other two: persuadin
g robe senders ro cba„ e
and avoiding stressful
g
situations were less likely
possibilities. The types
of copi„ g
mechanisms observed were
behaviors such as 1) humor,
2) writing and
publishing, 3) a focus on
change and innovation,
and 4) keeping some
psychological distance from
interactors.
,

Avoiding

S tressful

Situations

There were times when it was
more profitable to avoid confrontations.
It was better not to
voice any opinion and to let

conflicting units deal with the
problem and work out the solution
themselves.
This could only be done in
cases which appeared to be
inconsequential.

Issues and people were often
assessed in terms of

their volatility and importance
to organisational purposes
and handled
according to that assessment.
In order to avoid a stressful
situation
the President would 1) give a
subunit responsibility to see that the

problem was resolved or

2)

have his staff of assistants filter,
coordinate,

and prioritize problems letting only
those that could have important

consequences for the University get to the
President's attention. One
coping mechanism, that needs little explanation
yet served to release
tension, was the practice of going on vacations
of a week or more.

Needless to say the vacations were welcomed, almost
mandatory respite
to his incessant role overload.

Compl iance or Persuading the Role Sender to Change Expectations
There were many times during the year when there was little that
could be done except to comply to the external demands.

Examples already
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discussed, such as the Police
Consortium or the Medical
School admissions
cases, demonstrate how
little leeway the President
had for negotiation.
In the case of the
Police Consortium, once
the initial agreement
was
set, the University had
little choice but to provide
the service or
suffer the resultant embarassment
of not being able to live
up to its
promises.
In the case of the Medical
School admissions, there was

little that could be done to
assuage the public attitude
that the
University was not serving those
who were paying the bills,
except to
increase in— state admissions.

Persuading the role senders to change
expectations was not easy.
There were cases in which role senders
did change their expectations but
these were usually when the role sender
was speaking for himself and
not as a delegate representing some
group or formal organization.

The strategy most often used was cooptation
which is the process of

absorbing new elements into the leadership or
policy defining structure
of the organization as a means of averting
threats to the organization’s

stability or existence.

Suggestions for Coping Mechanisms

Team Management
Corporate management or team management may be a solution for

universities to consider.

With a team management concept the principal

leader is a primus inter pares - the first among equals (Greenleaf, 1972,
p.

12).

chief.

There is still a leader, a "first," but he is not seen as the
The primus constantly tests and proves his leadership among a

group of peers.

There is, however, mutual problem-solving:

there is

trust and mutual sharing of responsibilities in the decision-making
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process
The man who has the
greatest team-bufiding
ability should be
He is the strong person
who is able to facilitate
the team

working together toward
common purposes and
objectives. The literature
on organizational development
is full of strategies
that could be used
to facilitate the
process of

£^1^3 inter ^ares.

^

key to

tMs

concept is that the role set
(or senders) of the group
would see
the "first" as a leader
only to facilitate the
functioning of the group
as a team and not because
it was leader-dominated.

Visibility a s a Coping Mechanism
There seems to be a norm in the
leadership and management literature
which says that a successful leader
is one who can serve as a
buffer for
hxs subordinates.

This may not be the realistic or
feasible leader

behavior for the circumstances of the
university president.

Part of the

problem, as described in the examples of
the Police Consortium and the

Medical School admissions cases, was that the
internal units were not
aware of the pressure put on the President bv
the intensity of the

dissatisfaction of the external role senders until the
situation
reached crisis proportions.
In both cases, it is the author’s opinion, it would have
been

appropriate for the President to reflect the true conditions of inside
units to external role senders and to reflect the true implications of

external dissatisfactions to internal role senders.

By making visible

to external and internal constituents all that is transpiring,

would be a greater chance for comity.

there

External groups must begin to

understand the true nature of the strengths and weaknesses of the
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university,

Internal units on the
other hand

Tnust

c on>e to understand
that there is an
external world to which
the university
must hold itself
accountable.

Implications
This study has theoretical
’

annliori
pplied anda research
implications

'

Because the literature
on Boundary roles
!s sparse and
practically
non-existent in the context
of higher education
organizations, rau ch
research remains to be done
in order to help
administrators in
universities and colleges
handle the conflict
generated across the
organizational-environmental interface.
All that this particular
study can do is raise some
general questions that will
indicate areas
for further research.

Research Implications
This study is of one public
University and one President.

If

this study were to be done
again, the size, age, and type
of university
investigated might be varied. Would
there be significan differences
in the role senders and the
expectations held for the president and
the

institution he leads?

What differences might be found in
the

expectations held for the president by
external groups if the
institution studies were small, private,
and recently established,
as compared to the results found in
this work?
be found if a parochial school was
chosen?

What differences might

Would the categories of role

senders and the amount of interaction they had
with the president be

difference than what was found in this study?

Would the information

gathering process be as complex or uncertain if the
institution were
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smaller?
This study suggested team
management as an alternative
to the
"one man at the top"
organisational structure.
Research study could
be designed to test
whether team management
lessens perceived role
conflict and provides for
more adequate coping
mechanisms.

Increased visibility of the
university's subunits and their
responsibilities was also suggested
as a coping mechanism.
An experimental

design could be created to test
whether or not increased visibility
of
university subunits, norms, and
responsibilities eases presidential
role conflict.
In addition, an effort could be
made to study some of the

external-internal transactions that do not
go through the president's
office yet impinge on the president's
job and create role conflicts.
What are the other boundary transactions
occuring at lower levels of
the organization that influence the climate
of the institution and the

ways in which internal units function and
therefore the president's
roles?

Research could be done on university presidents'
Dersonalities
to find out whether there are common personality
traits or attitudes

that make them more capable of withstanding high levels of
role

ambiguity and conflict.

In line with the above suggestion, further

research might also be done to examine cultural norms or social
attitudes which lead people to aspire to high-conflict, high-stress
positions.

In turn, what are the social norms or attitudes that make

it difficult for the occupant of the office of university president

to quit or step down?

If research were done in these areas some of

259

the answers would of course have
practical implications.

Applied Implications
It is the author's opinion that
there is not enough information

available to aid in the process of developing
more effective higher

education administrators.

There must be further research done in the

above mentioned areas before more intelligent
decisions can be made

concerning screening, training, career planning,
and job redesign for
administrators in the field of higher education.
It is clear from this study however that it may
not be appropriate
to pick individuals for the job of university
president solely on

the basis of the candidate's academic training or discipline.

This

study implies that presidential screening and selection procedures

must take into account factors beside academic credentials,

recommendations, style and appearance.

Search committees must somehow

try to assess the candidate's ability to deal with ambiguity and

conflict, information and role overload, and fatigue.
This study also implies that the training of university and

college administrators must include the development of

a

high level

of skill in the areas of conflict resolution, negotiation, and

interpersonal communication.

Training should also provide the future

administrator with experience in coping with role conflict, perhaps
by placing him in stressful situations that allow him to test himself,
his values, his needs, and his stamina and to develop coping mechanisms

before he is given the actual responsibility of an office.

Career

planning and training must provide future administrators with the
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above-mentioned skills if the
casualtv
casualty and *turnover
rate of top level
university and coilege
administrators is to he reduced.
Theor etical Implications
It is the author's
opinion that there may be
some doubt as to the

appropriateness of applying business
and organizational
literature
terminology to institutions of
higher education. An understanding
of university and college
organizations may be subtlv lost
in the use
of terms such as input, output,
and trading behaviors, among
others.

Without alternative analytical terms
the author was forced to use
terms borrowed from the fields of
business administration and
systems analysis.

Organizational behavior literature in the
future

must be more finely tailored to higher
education if any kind of

precise analysis is to take place.

Within the field of organizational behavior
testable hypotheses
must be developed concerning issues of
organizational autonomv, role
conflict, and coping mechanisms.

For example, are any organizational

variables directly related to role conflict?

If so, what are they and

can coping mechanisms be developed to reduce conflict
and stress?

Are

there ways to measure imput and output in educational institutions
and,
if so, how might those measures be used to reduce conflict
and

ambiguity for the boundary person?

Further research to determine in what ways and how much

personality influences an individual’s range of coping mechanisms in
an organizational setting might also be undertaken.

One general question that could sum up the implications of
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this study would he; is
it

possible to shape the office
of president

to make it more attractive
and more sustaining to
the talented people

who are now its casualties?

APPENDIX

A

the university as an
institution and as an
organization
The purpose of this
appendix is to examine some of
the characteristics
of the system in which the
focal nerson worts, interacts,
constructs, and
defines his job function. The
environment is discussed historically
in
order to give perspective to
present system problems and future
dilemmas
and choices.
Some discussion of the system’s
qualities, flows of communication, and norms, that differentiate
it from other organizations
will
follow.

The first half of this appendix
discusses the university as an

institution.

It is set forth in three sections;

the first focuses on the

university of the past from 1860 to
1970, the second on the present from
1970 to 1973, and the third on possible future
trends.

will be emphasized in this description:

1)

the historical development

of the internal components of the university;
of the goals of this system; and 3)

Three main aspects

2)

the historical evolution

the historical relationship between

the university and the emergence of external constituents
to which it is

now accountable.
In the second half of this appendix the university as an organiza-

tion will be discussed.
id iosyncracies of

There will be an analysis of the organizational

the university.

A discussion of why the university

is different from other organizations and some description of the diffi-

culty of administering such an organization will be presented.

emphasis will be placed on the office of the president.

Special
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Of necessity this appendix
will be general,

Its nurnose, to

adumbrate the character of the
university on which to base
the hypotheses
developed In Chapters III and V,
will therefore exclude finite
detail,
The aim Is to hit the median
between detail and generalization,
accuracy
and strawman.

University as Institution

An institution is
are implemented.

a

mechanism by which goals important to
society

This is accomplished by persuading
those who control

financial resources in the community that
what the organization is doing
is important enough to merit financial
support.

always held education as a "sacred cow",

Because Americans have

their hope for the future,

educational institutions have always been subject
to external "intervention"
as well as financial encouragement.

It is the firm conviction of this author

that the concept of the "ivory tower" is at best
wishful thinking and at

worst myopia that comes with preoccuation with institutional
self.

view of the autonomous cloister was
concepts of the
*-

universitas

.

"

This

a product of ancient and medieval

Major changes in university life have been

n -*-tiated from external forces such as Napoleon in France, ministers of

education in Germnav’s royal commissions and University Grants Committee
in Great Britain; the Communist Part in Russia’s university governing

boards, the Federal Congress
1963, p. 105).

and foundations in the United States (Kerr,

There are, as Kerr puts it, two views of the university

One pictures it as a radical institution
when, in fact, it is most conservative.
The other pictures it as autonomous, a
cloister, when historical fact shows that
it has always responded to demands of
external groups. The external view is
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that the university is
radical: the
internal view is that it is
conservative.
The internal illusion is
that it is a
law unto itself:
the external reality
hat
governed b y history" (Kerr,
}o^ p. 94 %).
iyoj,

What, indeed, is interesting
is that this duaiistic view
has nersisted
so long, yet under close
analysis this view has some
historical antecedents
worthy of discussion. The discussion
of those historical antecedents
wall be divided into three phases:
1)
before 1860; 2 ) 1860-1930;
and 3)

1930-1970.

Each phase represents a critical turning
point for

higher education.
Past

Before 1860
The function of colleges in America between
the time of 1620 and

1860 was neither totally religious nor totally
professional.

Although

schools rose from religious sects, schools like William
and Mary, Yale,
and Harvard were concerned not only in turning out
clergymen but also

with adjusting the individual to the society in which he would
play a
part (Handlin, 1970, p. 83).

This process of socialization depended

not only on the college but also upon the changing society and the concep-

tion the individual held for himself (Handlin, 1970,

p.

3).

Quite naturally, the evolutionary roots of the colleges were European,

where the seeds for a duaiistic function to higher education had already
been sown.

Cardinal Newman was fighting the ghost of Bacon who 250

years before had held that knowledge should be for the benefit of man
and not for "variety and conceits" (Kerr, 1963

,

p.

8 ).

Bacon did not

like the snobbish superiority that came with a non-functional elitist

ucation.

What Newman espoused
went t0
to the other
nt-h
extreme by holding
that inquiry,
speculatlon and dlscov0ry

^

the

territory of the intellect
(Kerr, 1,63. p.
2).
Ne^an favored
knowledge and said that
practical knowledge "was
a great

dea! of trash"

(Kerr, 1963, p. 2).

A university training,
according to

..

raise the intellectual
tone of society, cultivate
the public mind
refine the intercourse
of private life" (Kerr,
1963, p.

should
...

2).

In America, where
aristocracy became sublimated,
families of wealth
and power tried to gain
social recognition of their
superiority

through

the possession of
culture.

could

Where else but in the few
budding colleges,

this culture be acquired.

At the onset the earlv
colleges

trained ministers, but later
they aquired the additional
tasks of preparing men for law, medicine, and
for a variety of other callings
which
acquired professional status in
the New World (Handlin,
1970, p. 2).

This training was considered
"useful" and the frequency with which
this
argument was set forth showed the
disdain held for purelv intellectual

activities in the new land.

Colleges were frail and underprivileged,

lacking financial or social support,
hence utility was the rationale used
and the merit of scholarshop rarely had
to be more specifically denoted
(Handlin, 1970, p. 2).

The external constituencies of this period
were defined mostly by
the layboards.

It was to these layboards that the argument
of utility

appealed and they who granted the limited financial
support to nurture
these small schools.

The layboard has been a distinctively American

device for "public" authority although it was used in Holland in the
late
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16th Century (Kerr,
1963, p. 25}

“ ith dSm0Cra “ C WealS
aS

rh*

i

™

u
ayboards
were very compatible

the lmmedlately

and practical promise
of education.

„

Appeals for aid from the
public
purse rested upon the
justification of utility
(Handlin. 1970, o. 57)
The European tradition
did not sit well in
this country, hence the
collages dedication to their
own definition of culture
ran counter to the
ethos of this new "public"
and pragmatically oriented
America.
Even though there were
layboards which controlled
the colleges of
America , the president was
always a clergyman (Rudolph,
1962, p. 419)
He was the man who knew
the rudiments of a liberal
and Christian education and who ruled his
institution almost like a monarch
(Kerr, 1963,
.

p.

32).

The president had almost
total control of faculty
appointments

and very seldom left his
appointed post except upon death.
In 1859,

the American scene changed,
although

the purpose of

higher education still vascillated
between aristocratic values and
pragmatism, in that 1859 marked a major
turning point in an American

culture and economy that had been building
and gathering momentum in the

laissez-faire economics of a new country.
1860-1930
Many factors came together in this period
to cause rapid change
and adjustment for American colleges.

Those factors were:

Darwinism

and the dawn of the scientific era, the industrial
revolution, wider

separation of the church from education, the ever present problems of
finance, and rapid growth through immigration.
The function of a college education prior to 1860's and 70’s was
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to develop and strengthen
Intellectual powers, to
cultivate taste and
sensibility for fine art and
literature, and to Impart
a strong sci-

entific acquaintance with
all the branches of
learning. The result
was socialization or useful
preparation for the battle of
life (Handlln,
1970, p. 150).

Culture replaced religion as
the guide to thought,

behavior and emotion.

Not that the college became
antl-religlous or

unchristian, but schools, though
required by public opinion to have
religion in a general way, were
forbidden to have it in any particular way. The democratic spirit
of the times called for a
"cultured

citizen in command of scientific
methods" (Handlln, 1970.

p.

50).

After 1870 traditional morality no
longer provided an adequate
sanction for either social experience
or for academic disciplines

within colleges (Handlin, 1970, p. 44).

Because of discoveries, headed

by Darwin, science became a rival to
religion and culture.

Knowledge

derived from scholarship gained in influence as
the development of

physical and natural sciences spurred the development
of social and

personal sciences.

Sociology, economics, law, politics, and phychology

seeking new forms of validity often clashed with ethical
norms derived
from religious norms as people encountered the novelty
of science and

technology (Handlin, 1970, p. 44).
In this period of industrialization, the economv shifted from
an agricultural rural base to an urban, factory-oriented one which

gave rise to large complex organizations.

This shift depended upon the

labor of a foreign-born industrial proletariat (Handlin, 1970, p. 43).

Because of this great immigration, because of industrialization and
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enterprise, and becuase
of . g eneral

faUh

^

and universities
functioned not oni as the
y
incuicator of traditionai
moralrty in the form of
a surrogate parent
for the rich, but science
also added new vigor to
the old cry for usefulness
in American education.
The usefulness, or
vocational aspect of American
education,
blossomed in an historic act
that would, in one fell
swoop, give rise
to the American university,
make room for the masses
seeking social

mobility, and forever bifurcate
higher education into two
purposes:
namely teaching and community
service.
The land grant movement brought
schools of agriculture and
engineering, home economics and
business

administration.

It opened

doors of higher education to the
offspring

of farmers and workers as well
as to the middle and upper classes
with

the introduction of agricultural
experiment satation (Kerr, 1963,
p. 15).
At the heart of the Morrill act of
1862 is the assumption that publicly

supported universities are bound, morally
and politically, in some way
to serve those who pay the bills

(Long and Groskind, 1972, p. 6).

The

democratic, even egalitarian and populist trend,
manifested in the land
grant act held the doors of opportunity open to
all through education,
and this put a strain on the universities to adapt
and absorb the shock
of massive growth.

The growing importance of science added

a third

dimension to

universities’ goals already bifurcated into teaching, socialization and

community service.

Science and the demands of the society led schools

to develop in certain ways not yet anticipated by the schools themselves

or by society.
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science with Its emphasis on
specialization as well as
growing
complexity, began to have
consecmences for the once lowly
faculty.
Bathe demand for trained
professors, young men returning
by the

hundreds from German universities
with Ph.D.'s, were "eager to
apply to
the American university
the continental form of university
governance,
a form, which,
unencumbered by a president
or a layboard of trustees,

concentrated power in educational
matters in a small faculty oligarchy
composed of those who had achieved
professional rank" (Dodds, 1961. p.iO).
Knowledge, because of Its complexity and
specialization, reduced the

possibility that all members of the faculty
would have the competence to
understand or judge each other's work.

Science became Institutionalized

in the sense that it developed an
organization by discipline, Internal

standards for the accredition of practitioners
and for the validation
of results, and a claim for recognition of
its competence by society at

large (Handlin, 1970, p. 54).
The university function as custodian of culture and of service
to
its benefactors was affected by its receptivity to science.

The con-

viction that knowledge was attainable by use of apdied objective
reason gained through research and experimentation allowed research to
take its place beside teaching and service as purposes of the university.

Developing factions within the university began to readjust,
especially

with the newly gained autonomy for the faculty resulting

from the authority of expertise and the high demand for its qualified
services.

This evolution brought departments into the university,

created reserach libraries, took medicine out of the hands of the

270

scientists.

Instead of the Newman eternal
truths in the nature! order,

there was the discovery of
the new:

instead of the generalist,
there

was the specialist (Kerr,
1963, p. 4).

With all this expansion,
institutions had to comnete and
did so
by raising their standards,
therby enhancing their value
among discriminating consumers.

These institutions worked at
improving the quality

of instruction and
stiffening admissions requirements.

There was, of

course, as a result of the new
research, more knowledge which lead to

course offerings to enhance an
institutions, attractiveness.

"The

freedom for the student to choose became
freedom for the professor to
invent and the professor’s love of
specialization has become the student’s

hate of fragmentation:

until a kind of bizarre version of academic

laissez-faire has emerged”

(JCerr

,

1963, p. 14).

being increasingly defined by the professionals.
involved education.

Social mobility was

Access to

a

profession

For example, entry into the practice of law,

medicine, engineering, and the corporate enterprise no longer
occurred
through inheritance or apprenticeship but rather by passage through

a

defined course of training in an institution of higher education
(Handlin, 1970, p. 46).

The reocurring issue of academic freedom was fanned during this

period because of the development of two new external constituencies to
the universities.

Along with accrediting boards, state farm bureaus

and state regulating agencies came the restructuring of the layboard

through a shift in those most likely to be appointed as trustees.
the real newcomers to higher education were the fast growing alumni

But
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and their brainchild,
the foundations.
As might logically
follow,

f

lnanclal status and
?roblemg that

accompanied growth were
challenging.

The administrator also
changed in

character.

The clergyman president
was descarded because
he lacked the
ways of the rapidly
expanding economic world,
because his committment
to
the classical curriculum
had to give way to the
more practical, popular
emphasis which commended
itself to the trustees, and
because the
direction in which the university
now moved was more secular
and less
Subject to religious influence
(Rudolph, 1962, p. 419).
The whole
concept of administration
changed with a resultant increase
in the median
number of administrators per
school.
In 1860 the median was
four, by
1933, it was 30.5 (Rudolph,
1962, p. 434).
Because of the Problems of
growth, organisation and
standardization the apparatus known
as "the
,

administration" came into being.

Proliferation of goals, demands for

new services by an increasing enrollment,
and the need to relieve
research-minded scholars from the details
of management gave rise to
an administrative layer "on top"
or juxtaposed to the special disciplines.

Finances was one problem that kept many
presidents overworked.
This was the age of the big giver, the
age of the alumnus and

philanthropic foundations and if the president did
nothing else he
could

—"work

at incorporating these agencies of financial support
into

the structure of his organization

—

often becoming both the svmobolic

and actual focus of the new foundation of university
finance" (Rudolph,
1962

,

p.

424).

This need for finances led to the shakey union of the

businessman and the academician.

Business united with the academic
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three ways, namely
through board membership,
by being
!ar ge donors and later
by forming locations
to aid higher
educational
institutions

More businessmen, bankers,
and lawyers became board
members
because they had the expertise
to handle the Increase
In Income and
endowment which brought
problems of budgets, property
investment and
management , and of the husbanding
and parcelling of resources
(Metzger,
1955 p. 142 ).
,

Businessmen also began to give
large maounts of money.

Inevitably,
the increase in the site of
gifts changed the relations of
donorrecipient. Businessmen became
almost entrepreneurs in the field
of

higher education by providing
funds and deciding general
purposes
(Metzger, 1955

,

p.

141 ).

The large contributors, the
philanthropies

cush as Andrew Carnegie, romanticized
the life of the intellectual by

upholding the "higher satisfactions of
the mind and indifference to

material possessions" (Metzger, 1955

,

p.

144).

The patron of the university received
from the academic world
the ornate courtesies of gratitude.

Donors did not enter academia as

intruders but as welcomed do-gooders (Metzger,
1955, p. 145).

it

rapidly became the norm to cultivate the goodwill of
these possible donors.
To do otherwise was defined as disloyalty and
treachery.

This business-

man-academic relationship was tenuous at best, because as the
cutting
edge of academic theory ran ahead of present social and economic
practice, inevitable clashes occurred.

Academic freedom became

a

major issue as benefactors sought the
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dismissal of professors
who began to decry
and criticize the
degrading
and corrupt practices
of the benevolent
donor.
Kconomic exploitive
Practices and social
injustices lav at the base
of the academic’s
critiques and resulted in
many faculty dismissals
j-smissais
Because of this clash
between business,™ and
faculty.a "professional
status" buttressed
.

by

the principles of
tenure and academic freedom
grew due mostly to the
work of the AAUP.

Expertise and knowledge in
the university that could
be
industrializing nation, led
government and industry to consult
faculties. Foundations sponsored
by government but especially
began to relieve scholars of
total dependence upon college
and

used in an

with
businessmen,

university

budgets.

Foundations became a means by which
businessmen could encourage
the development of certain
fields without financing the
total school.
The usefulness and mobility
needs the university served were
still

very much alive after World War

I.

From the turn of the centruy until

1930 there were a great variety of
institutions, that were striving
to produce a single product, the
college man (Handlin, 1970, p. 46).

Universities were to endow the student with
clutural sensitivities
and knowledge to distinguish them in the
future through participation
in a way of life in the academic community.

By the end of World War

I

the university was in full bloom,

with three divergent competing purpose of research, teaching,
and

community service, a well established and autonomous faculty, and
restless student body.

a

The people of America’s demoractic pluralistic

culture, in sense, saw the the university meeting all their needs and
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-re

therefore tolerant of all
the ways In which the
university was
growing.

1930-1970
This period was more or
less a refinement of
the trends of growth,
egalitarianism, complex
organisational life, faculty
specialization, and’
outside financing that
marked the turn of the
e century.
century
Two
Iwo new wrinkles
were the lack of common
assumptions concerning values
and the age of
student power and assertion.
After the great depression
of the 1930's
the growing emphasis on
egalitarianism made it clear that
universities
were no longer to be merely
the instrument for producing
an intellectual
elite.
The impersonal corporation
was replacing the family firm,
and
as inheritance was no longer
the major precondition for
success, every

youth was to be able to carry his
formal education to the extent
of
his native capacities (Handlin,
1970, p. 73).
During the 1930's and
1940’S the emphasis was not so much
independent entrepreneurship but

rather access to strategic places on the
steps upwards within a large
organization.

Because mechanization reduced the need for
unskilled labor,

more of the nation's youth poured into the
colleges and universities
(Handlin

,

1970, p.72).

Growth, led upon growth.

As modern technology

required a more highly educated population, higher
educational institutions
would have the responsibility to provide the trained
intelligence that
would create, master, and find the terms on which man
could live with

technology (Rudolph, 1962, p. 463).
After 1930 signs of the changing moral tenor of American became
clear.

The conception of an established genteel culture broke down and,

because the university was no longer

a

Diace of exclusiveness, the
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“zr rastes,
.

“•
beliefs, and

tuitions

hls task of
transmitter wasS dlfflculi
t

these

•<

-

became diff Icult to
achleve

.

not only because
outside

common values were break-i™ a
breaking down but also
because inside the
faculty character had
changed.

^

^

faculty, „ho has been
the dlssemlnators of
e, became guardians
of particular
segments of knowledge
that they
expected to develop and
spread (Handlin, 1970.
p.76).
The
factions Within the
university which were already
divided along departmental lines, further
separated by largeness,
became even more
autonomous as a result of
reserach opportunities that
increased enormously with the awarding
of government defense
contracts during the
late 40’s and 50's and
60's.
Faculty members gained a new
sense of
ependence because large
research grants gave them
materials, research
assistants, and freedom from
undergraduate teaching. Faculty
autonomy
from the dominance of the
administration and from colleagues
and the
great mobility that renowned
expertise gave also had the effect
of

weakening the feeling of community
among members of the same academic
discipline.
Faculty autonomy had also effectively
decentralized authority to
the level of the individual
professor
(Kerr, 1963, p. 44).

This

decentralization of authority required a new
kind of executive office
with new areas of administration because
unless there was to be chaos,
there needed to be coordination of grants,
responsibilities for teaching,

funding for graduates and so forth.

The process of administering the
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university changed;

it became bigger
and
88
d m° re con>Plex,
more tense with

.
checks
and balances of
interests
Interests , aa polite tug
of war, a blending
of
emphases . The "presidency
an
,

_

^

shot through with
so many ambiguities,

things to many men"
(Kerr, 1963, p. 34
).

^^^^

it was an office
that was maly

The university was so
many things to so many
men because its
goals were proliferated
during this period. It
was as British as
Possible for the sake of
the undergraduate, as
German as possible for
the graduate student
and for research personnel,
as American as
possible for the sake of the
public at large and as
confused as
possible for the sake of the
preservation of the whole uneasy
balance (Kerr, 1963, p.
18).

Student life changed during this
period, too, because after
1930 the expectation that
college would be able to control
behavior
or draw young people back
to the old code had to be
reconciled with
autonomy for students within
certain broad limits (Handlin,
1970,
P.

69).

Since the university was a mechanism
for advancement, the

willingness to accept the discipline
of scholarship, for the time
being, was easier.

Also because of the re-emphasis on student
life

during this period, residence halls,
student unions, intramural
playf ields , undergraduate libraries, and
counseling centers sprang
Up In many places (Kerr, 1963,
p. 17).

Egalitarian leanings caused other adjustments.

The junior

college was born in an effort to make a differentiation
among students

with the expectation that they would divert the less
prepared or less
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ted students away
from senior institutions
(Handlin, p. 77 ).
emergence of the Junior
college the curriculum
became split
between general and
special course offerings
which resulted in a

widening distance between
most of the scholars
and most of the
students. Associated
with the opening of
college to all was the
assurance of public funds
as usual and an
expectation that the
university would provide
the answers to some of
society's

problem

To be this "service
station" the university
needed scholars with
a passionate concern
for human betterment and
for the improvement of

social conditions and
relationships (Handlin, 1970,
p. 73 ).
The emergence of the federal
government grant after World
War
II caused another drastic
change in the modern university.
The G.I.
Bill, the Sputnik and technology
explosion, the baby-boom, the
weak
position of youth in the labor
market, and the federal grant
caused
higher education enrollments to
double during the 60’s. Enrollment

went from 3.5 million students
to over

7

million from 1960 to 1969

.

Student aid grants, medical development
grants, and research

grants began to influence the university
in numerous ways.

Federal

grants resulted in the scientist becoming
affluent and the humanist

becoming militantly poor in comparison, and
in the concentration of
money in just a few universities.

Research became a priority over

teaching and graduate teaching became a priority
over undergraduate
teaching.

Over time, federal grants led to the commitment
of

university funds and to a reordering of university priorities
more
subject to federal control and influence (Kerr,
1963, p. 46-84).
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is sfrange char
the land grant was
repeated a hundred

^^

e form ot the
research grant and that
the university shouid
respond
agaxn, with eagerness,
to national needs,
it i s stranRe .. that
i

in

higher education
institutions which had
their historical origins
the training of
gentlemen should have
committed themselves so
fully to the service
of brute technology"
(Kerr, 1963,
p.

48).

The sixties were turbulent
especially for universities
because
tudents began to reflect
back to the society the
conflicting and
unclear values that are
a byproduct of change.
Most parents became
deeply disturbed when
college students questioned
accepted moral
values and rejected the values
and practices of an
acquisitive society
manifested by the Viet Nam War
and the military-industrial
complex
(McConnell, 1972, p. 6).
The public expected the
educational institutions
to confirm, not criticize,
the values which family and
society had
inculcated.

After all, the university was not
designed to inculcate

beliefs and values (McConnel,
1972, p. 6).
to be a training ground for
occupation

It had given up that task

and social mobility.

Above all, the changing composition of
the student body eased the

problem of dealing with values because
it was drawn from a wider
segment of the society than ever before.

The student body lacked the

common assumptions basic to earlier college life
which made students more

susceptible to the influence of external events such
as wars and
employment trends (Handlin, 1970, p. 81).

The students ended up being a

counter-influence to excessive comroerciality
selfishness of demagogism.

,

to chicanery, and to the
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At best the "true"
university spirit migbf
have accounted for
students' rejection of
current shallow values
because of its emphasis
on examination and
reflection, and its norms
of despising all
sorts of

intellectual and moral shams.

At worst, the university
has by its

emphasis on research, on
academic disciplines and
specialization, left
the student body well
enough alone, to see what
other members of the
university community have
yet to see
that by accentuating means
we
have failed as a society
to develop ends;
that technology, in and of
itself, is not enough; and
that we must work to develop
shared
xperiences that result in the
sense of community and common
goals.

-

present, the country
ln

s

commitment to education is reflected

the stati stics of university
and college enrollments.

While

m

1870 1.7% of the 18-21 year olds
went to college, in 1970 over 50%
enrolled.
This means there are over seven
million students in our more
than 2,000 institutions of higher
education (Rudolph, 1962, n. 486).
The country’s commitment to education
is being challenged.

In many

ways the violent crisis of the 1960 ’s
topped off the already growing

relization that educational attainment had
little to do with competence
on the job (Berg, 1971).

Historically the purpose of universities and

colleges has been to deal with concerns of religion,
professional
training, upward mobility, and socialization.

It seems that higher

education is at the point where it cannot deal with religion
because
of constitutional restriction and the lack of public
support; professional

training, because of closed job markets and a glut on the present
market:
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“
T"
7

cut

Df a

‘

„

. «...
.....
goods" and with a
structure that
cnat isn't
,o
isn t Hdesigned
P
to change values 2
The baby boom and
subsequent

enroUments focused

“ entl0n ^

has waned

win

o*

education.

those institutions he
forsaken?

crisis of the 60's has
given way to

a

a iQt

But now that the boom

The violenr,

quiet, invisihie struggie
for

survival and meaning for
the university in the
70's.
The Present
This quiet struggle revolves
around financial stability
In a

period where growth has stopped
and proliferated purposes
which are not
Clear to the public that
is rapidly becoming the
University's sole visible
means of support. As enrollments
are declining, institutions
are hard
put to show the relation between
education and the job needs of
society.
While the labor intensive
character of universities is causing
rising
costs because of tenure systems.
Money on the federal level is being
cut back and, because of other
interests, foundations are nutting
their

money elsewhere.

Philanthropy has declined as inflation has
increased.

Wl ile ever
y one has access to some form of higher education
?
there are significant
qualitative differences between access through
community colleges or fairly low-level colleges
as contrasted to access
through Ivy League, high-powered private schools
and top state universities

2

For further reading on the question of values change
in higher
education see Sanford and Katz, When Parents Fail,
the Law's Re sponse
to Family Breakdown
Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971.
.
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The expansive 60

's

for the universities has resulted
In a need to retract

in the 70' s.

The internal development of faculty,
students, and administrators
has also been affected by change in the
national picture toward frugality,

declining enrollemnts, and a disenchanted
public.

Kerr wrote in 1963

that the ’’multiversity was not one community
but several, a community of

undergrads; and a community of graduate students;
a community of social scientists;

a

a community of humanitists

community of professional schools; a

community of non-academic personnel; and a community of administrators
(Kerr, 1963, p.

8).

The student community has focused on the subjective concern of how
can an individual maintain his integrity in a shifting turbulent society
(Bennis, 1972, p. 11).

Toffler (1970), Reich (1970), and Roszak (1969)

all clearly delineate this change that is occurring among vouth.

new morality is person-centered.

"Their

It values technology only if the tech-

nology serves personal growth and social goals.

To the extent that

institutions fail in fulfilling these goals they will fail to attract the

brightest young people to work in them.

This new culture treasures

smallness, human scale, and cultural pluralism" (Bennis, 1972, p. 38).
The administrative community of this era is looked on a
evil by faculty and students and by external publics as someone
to be held "accountable" for "managing" the university.

a

necessary
who is

Administrators

are viewed by some faculty members as having no esoteric specialty, no

systematic competence akin to an academic discioline, and no expertise
or power in governance (Lunsford, 1968, p. 90).

"Every campus has heard
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faculty members comment
that the only academics
who turn to administratlon are those who are
not fully 'competent
in their scholar ly
work or those who are
motivated by desires for
personal power and prestige"
(Lunsford, 1972, p. 90 ).
The faculty world seems
to have lost a sense of
unity, both
intellectual and communal unity
(Lunsford, 1968, p. 88 Baldridge
1971, p. 14; Bennis 1972
?/z, p.
d
44 ^).
This can be accounted for
by many
factors not the least of which
Is what R. Oppenheimer
called the
,

,

"thinning of common knowledge."

Knowledge Is so fragmented and
the

administration so distant because of
Institutional size, that faculty
members are Increasingly alone
Intellectually and Institutionally
(Mortimer and McConnell, 1968,

mentality

p.

111 ).

There is a kind of "guild

in the academic profession as in many
others.

The guild

tends to be isolationist toward society,
devoted to producer against

consumer sovereignity

.

.

.

full of senatorial courtesy and selective

of its own members (Kerr, 1963,
p. 97 ).

Today the university is afflicted with a three-fold
sense of loss
loss of community, loss of purpose, and loss
of power (Bennis, 1972,
p.

44).

The location of power has generally moved from inside
to

outside the original community of masters and students (Kerr,
1963,
p.

26).

The nature of the multiversity makes it inevitable that this

historical transfer will not be reversed in any significant fashion
.

Kerr, 1963, p. 26).

university survive?

.

The question seems to be in what form will the

.
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future C hanges and Trends
Generaliy there seem
t0 be £w0 points
of
literature today which
suggesi dlrectlons

^

^^^^

^^

one View is to cut
back where if is rhe
leasr painful,
mainfaining
as much balance as
possible (non-academic
appointmenf s
athletlCS> etC °’ try t0
“ eather the -tor-, try
to woo the scholarSMP winner, try harder to et
the foundation or
g
federa! g rant, and push
more funds from alumni,
donors, and legislators
egisiators by
hv showing
h
the severity
of the circumstances
and relinquishing what
autonomy there is left.
her view is that given
the scarce resources
available under
heavy competition, the
university needs to make some
choices among human
needs and make the basis of
the choices explicit.
Those choices are
among the experimental college,
the service of social nroblems,
the

emphasis on one goal, the uncoupling
of education from research,
and
other status-quo shattering
behaviors. The reluctance of the
university
to change substantially in
form has been well-documented
by Rudolph,
1962; Kerr, 1963; Hodgkinson,
1970; and Bennis, 1973.

The problem

of small incremental change
forced by external constraints is
that

change Is never well-planned.

Incremental change has been how univer-

sities have changed in the past.
The fact that universities do not change
rapidly has its strong

points yet if change has its roots in force
rather than understanding and

planning, it would seem that choice and autonomy
may be threatened.
Some suggestions for the future have been pointed
to by the

Newman report, by Hodgkinson* s 1971 study, as well as
by governmental
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agencies such as the National
Science Foundation

,

but it still remains

for the individual organization
to assess these suggestions
in ligth
of their own idiosyncratic
conditions.

The University as an
Oreanization
In the foregoing historical
account, a discussion of events,

characters, causes and consequences
has given the reader a sense
of the
development of the university over time.
Another way of understanding
the university is by examination
through a systems approach. Systems
theory is basically concerned with
problems of relationships, of structure, and of interdependence in secular
form (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 18).
It is concerned with the patterned
activities of a number of associated

units or people that are complimentary with
respect to some common
purpose or outcome bounded in a short space and
time.

As has been

stated, the general qualities of a system or
organization are that it has

common purpose, division of labor, and coordinated
effort.
A general approach to understanding an organization is
to examing
its goals as stated in bylaws or as seen by its leaders,
but this

method may idealize, distort, rationalize, or omit essential aspects
of the functioning of the organization.

The error may be in equating

purposes and goals of the organization with the purposes and goals of
individual members.
What is needed is a theoretical construct for understanding basic

organizational operation, function, or activity.

Patterned activity or

reoccurring activity can be examined in relation to energy input into the
system, the transformation of energies within the system, and the resulting
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product or e„er
gy output (Kate and Kahn,
1966>
17) .
The traclns
Pattern of e„er gy exchange
or activity of peopie
as it resuits in see
output, consequentl
y coming to know how the
output is translated
into
energy that reactivates
the pattern, is the
focus of this section of
this appendix.

,

^

The task of this section
is to explain a conceptual
model of a
functioning institutional
system, examine some of the
friction points
that in reality occur, and
to place in perspective
the function of the
ffice of university president
in the university system.
The theoretical framework
that will be used to explain
relation-

ships and functions will be
taken from Talcott Parsons.

A characterization

of the input-transformation-output
cycle the university engages in
and

of various subunits in that
cycle as well as the president's
position in
the cycle should provide excellent
background and context for the

examination of the presidential boundary
activities in Chapter III.
Parsons

'

Model^

The hierarchical aspects of a system can
be broken down into

three main functions.

They are the technical function, the managerial

function, and the institutional function.^
The technical function is composed of those behaviors
that lead

Parsons' model to which the major roles of the university
have been added is graphically depicted on the next page.
This illustration comes partly from Baldridge, 1971.
4

This model will be synopsized from an article by T. Parsons,
"Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organization",
in J»A.
Litterer s Organizations: Systems, Co ntrol, and Adaptation, New York:
Wiley, 1963.
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irectly to organfzaUonal
purpose such as the
process Qf
educational setting. The
technical function must
consider those things
that impose limitations
on the ptocess such
as matetials, what
must he
processed, and what
cooperation is needed to
get the Job

^

done.

1„

^

the

division of labor, both the
resources necessary for
performing
technical functions and the
relatione
a.
elations to
to the
population elements on whose
behalf the functions are
performed have become
problematical. Resources
must be made available
by.special arrangements: they
are not
P

iust given.

When the division of labor
has progressed beyond

certain point,
decisions that pertain to this
division must take precedence
over those on
the "technical" level.
Thus it does not make sense
to set up classrooms
without having decided what students
should be taught, what things
by
a

what kinds of teachers without
knowing whether specific teachers
and
specific physical facilities can be
made available. One may say that
the
more complex technical functions are
performed by sub-organizations controlled and serviced in various ways
and at a variety of levels by higher

organizations called administration or management.
The relations between the managerial
level and the technical level

can be divided into two categories: mediation
between the organization and
the external situation and the "administration"
of the organiztion

'

internal affairs.
The function of an external perspective and responsibility
at the

managerial level is

1)

to mediate between the technical organization and

those who use its "products" - the customers, pupils or whoever, and

2)

to procure the resources necessary for carrying on the technical
functions
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(i.e.

financial, personnel
resources, and physical
facilities).
Decisions tnade at the
managerial level control
the operations of
Che technical level.
This Is certainly true
for such matters as the
broad technical task which
is to be performed in
the system, the scale
of operations, emplyment
policies, purchasing policies,
etc.
Control
is not simply unilateral.
lures siona Is iin
Professionals
n the technical,
systems who are
closest to the problem are
always placing demands on the
managerial level.
Those "demands" are based on
professional competence at the
technical
level, a competence not often
shared by the administrative
personnel who
in a line sense are the
organizational superiors of the
technicians.
In its external relations the
managerial level is oriented to

its "markets" for the disposal
of the "product," and for the
"procure-

ment" of the resources required by
the organization to perform its
fundtion.

But those "lateral" external relations
do not exhaust the

external" problem foci of a managerial level.

The organization which

consists of both technical and managerial
suborganizations never operates
subject only to the exigencies of "disposal
to" and "procurement from"
the agencies which stand on an approximately
equal level as customers or
as sources of supply.

There is always some organized superior agency with

which the organization articulates.
A formal organization is a way by which ends important to a
given

society are implemented.

The wider social system is the source of "meaning,"

legitimization, or higher— level support which makes the implementation of

organizational goals possible.

This means that just as the technical

level is controlled and serviced by a managerial level, so, in turn, is the
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managerial level controlled
by the institutional
level through the
structure and agencies
of the society.

No organization is
ever wholly independent.

I„ terms of

f

„»,

controls it may be relatively
so, but in terms of
the 'Waning" of
Che functions performed
by the organization,
hence its "right" to
command
resources and to subject its
"customs' to disciplines, it
is never
wholly independent. Trustees,
boards, etc. are the
mediating structures
1)
between a particular managerial
level and hence the technical
level it
controls and the high-order
community interest which the
organization
is supposed to serve.
The focal point of these
higher level controls which
stand "over"
the managerial level are of
three types, often in combination.
2)

Control is universal.

The operation of the organization
is subject

to generalized norms, valid
throughout the wider community ranging
from

formally
3) codified laws to
standards of good practice informally
accepted.
No organized agency supervises;
intervention is likely only when deviant

practice is suspected.

Such control is exerted through
litigation or

by key enforcement agencies, trade and
professional associations, and

relevant public opinion.
The second type of control mechanism is some
formal organization

which is interstitial between the managerial
structure and a more
diffuse basis of "public" interest, such as fiduciary
boards or nonprofit organizations.
The third type is that which brings the managerial level

directly into

a

structure of "public authority", usually some political
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or regulative authority.

Points of articulation
between the three system
levels
represent a break in line
authority. Persons on one
level do not
ply tell the people in the
next level down what to do
1) because
of the non-delegated
expertise and responsibilities
of people at
another organisational level,
and 2) because functions at
each level
are qualitatively different.

Because the technical functions
of an

organization often require high levels
of competence, professionals
are developed.
A manager will never have the
last word on planning
and evaluating operations because
managers are seldom, if at all,
equally competent in the technical
field.

A manager has the veto power

not the capacity to implement.

The qualitative break between the managerial
system and the

institutional level in line authority can be of
two types.

One type

is exemplified by the top man who
is not responsible to anyone,

board being a 'rubber stamp."

the

The second type can be issustrated

by the executive who is under the firm guidance of
a political structure
of which the executive is considered the subordinate.

The board, whatever structural form it takes, is a mediating

structure between the affairs of the organization at the managerial level
and its publics.

It can become absorbed in the managerial structure

only at the expense of its primary function yet it can not just

management to operate unchecked.

permit

On the other hand, the manager in this

situation cannot merely be implementing other people's decisions.
must be in a position to present his problems to "his" board and to

He
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negotiate with it
fro* a position
of relative
strength
nRtn
be a
rri
,
-way interchange
of inputs at the
instituti
and technical
levels.
i~

The
There
must
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t

These levels also
have "lateral"
on thPf
heir activities
in relation
•

•

t-

°

r

^
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S

^

’
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“ a,!erlal

S ° Ciety

•

and carr V

lnterac tion with
the environIntake of resourr'oo
resources adepends upon
the •object"
produced. The
organization could be
involved in the output
put of a commodity,
a physical
,.
object or product,
while another class
r
,
,
of m
materials
on which technical
operations must be
performed are human
individuals or collectivities
In add tl0n> the
dlSP ° Sal a " d P rocur einent
functions will be different
;
depending on whether the
oreani^at-inn
ganization must secure the
"cooperation"
of the raw materials
or the partly finished
products, at any stage.
An organization serving
a collectivity must
establish a longcontinuing relation with
its perspective clients
by which its effects
-St be shown to be of interest
to recipients.
There is a need to
establish a prior and special
link between the organization
and the
recipients and this imposes
important constraints on the
managerial
system.
Cooperation must be motivated,
the service-performer
must offer
something to bring about
adequate cooperation and readiness
by which
the relationship is set up
in the first place.

M

„
ment.

The output of commodities
or production of collectivities
is

primarily the work of the technical
level.
power is the work of the managerial
level.

But the output of purchasing
I„ education the technical

output is change in the character,
knowledge, and skills of individual
pupils.

But the school system may be treated
as responsible for
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another category of output:
Its contribution to
the general level
of performance capacity
in the community.
This relationship focuses
not on the community as
a whole, hut rather on
those particular families
and interest groups,
those members who are deemed
clients of the
educational systems. The input
of students from the
community may be
said to consist of the
community's support for education
as a function, in
its commitments to the
maintenance or improvement of the
capacity level
°f its population

The function

of management is the mediation
of the organization's

relations with the environment by
disposal and procurement of collectivities, i.e., the contribution of
support and educational services to

interested groups and the procurement
of resources, personnel, materials,
etc. for the process of producing
a "product."
It has been noted how the community
provides legitimation and sunnort

to the managerial level.

Management cannot secure support solely through

its relationships with the recipients of
its product, whether commodity
or service, or through it s relationships with
its sources of procure-

ment.

This is because it requires tapping into the general
political

structure to influence the community as a whole, not just
the customers.
The importance of their legitimation and support increases
when the

service rendered requires a strategic, long-term relation of solidarity

between the performer and the recipient.
The functions of the institutional level are disposal and procure-

ment of support.

When financial resources must be "raised" in order to

finance the function of the organization, the responsibility rests at the

institutional level.

In this respect the administrative head of a non-
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profit organization often
has a key role in mo„eyra l slng . A university
president oecupies an interstitial
position. He is both the
top executive
Of the managerial
level and a member and
representative of the trustees.
As a money-raiser he
acts on behalf of the
trustees.
The institutional level
has not only vertical relations
to the
managerial level but lateral
relations as veil, it has a
product to
"sell" and has procurement problems.
The product is a contribution
to
the functional needs of the
community. The salience of this
responsibility
for the institutional level is
a function of the failure of
"automatic"

market mechanisms to provide for
adequate financial solvency, or
proceeds
On the one hand, when the financial
question becomes too difficult,
there is a tendency to shunt it to the
next higher level or organization,
as in the case of financing public education
through taxation.

On the

other hand typical of private non-profit
organizations, the proceeds, if
any, are clearly inadequate to finance the
essential services, and hence

the responsibility for meeting the deficit rests
squarely at the insti-

tutional level. The function here is basically

that of persuading those

who control financial resources in the community that what the
organi-

zation is doing is important enough to merit their financial support.
The primary "disposal" function of the institutional level is to

contribute to the integration of the higher-order system with the

managerial level.

Its role is to mediate between the claims of the

institution on the community's resources and legitimation and the
exigencies of effective performance of functions at the lower "levels."
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«diffuse coarnmnity.
Th e professional
cannot judge
ge his own case
J
in a pluralistic
society
The ma„a g erial
level function in the
university is to
contribute
o t e generalized
capacity of the society
to partake of the
educational
Process, both in character,
knowledge, and skills
of individuals and
the
Performance capacity of
the society as a whole.
However, the production
of even the generalized
capacity to perform the
relevant function
effectively, does not
settle the position of
that function in the
society,
does not in itself determine
the "public" evaluation
of it, not the
proportions of resources which
are to be devoted to it
in comparison
with and hence in competition
with other functions. To
determine

that

position is an institutional
function.
The most important factor
for the institutional
level, besides
money, is that of power in
a technical, political
sense.
The essential
point is the "subscription" of
organizational goals under the more

generalized goal -structure of the
still higher-level social structure
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and therefore the
explicit "authorizationto embark on the
organizational activities in
q uestion and to "take the,
seriously.- This ls
sometimes called the struggle
for power in a society
and consists of
competition for support and
authorization among the many
different

organized interests of the
society.

Organizations have interests in
their power positions in
the larger
society and these organizations
with common interests have
organized
to promote their interests.
The point is that there is
a problem of
allocating power to all significant
organizations in the society
Whatever their primary functional
significance. The assertion and
mediation of claims of this interest
necessarily focuses at the institutional
level.
In summary, organizations at all
three levels are subject not

only to technical exigencies but also
to exigencies of disposal and

procurement.

These exigencies even at the same level,
are sources

of profound differences in
organizational type.

Furthermore, there

is an independence between levels which
qualifies the continuous line-

authority picture usually drawn of formal organizations.

This relative

independence among the three levels means there is at each
linkage
point, a range of possible different types of articulation.

Parsons’ model is a fine theoretical base but it is only a

starting point for understanding the "nature of the beast."
there are "friction points"

In reality

and stress points where the system functions

less than optimally and becomes difficult to administer- The beard, as
a rule, does not

function as Parsons’ description nor does the president.

The president gets involved in disposal and procurement functions at the
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institutional level every time he
testifies in front of the legislature.
He does try to establish the
"position" of education in competition
to
other functions. Our next step
is to examine some of those
friction
points of the system that make it
less than ideal and more difficult
to lead.

(It should be said that friction
point are not so much in

the system as of the system.)
F riction Point

(1)

- Non-Profit Public Nature

of the University

One major friction point is the non-profit
public nature of the

university.

Universities, as organiztions

and, in most cases, highly dependent on,

,

"a

are greatly influenced by,

public view or vision

"

that

will lead to support (from state legislatures,
federal agencies,
foundations, parents, alumni, and community groups).

Tax-supported higher

education can be considered a public service and is, therefore,
subject to public "ownership." (It is interesting to note that all of
these groups in a pluralistic democracy such as ours feel
a claim
of ownership in the public university.)

When the university's interactions

with the groups listed above are stable and predictable, then the university
enjoys a degree of autonomy.

In the 70's, however, when universities are

beset with budget problems and declining enrollment these interactions

become very changeble and unpredictable.
The non-profit nature of the university as an economic entity

makes it very hard for the university to rationalize its case to the
5

general public.

Profit-making institutions price their "product"

5

Ideas on this topic are drawn from a speech made by Herbert
Hollomon at the University of Cincinnati, April 2, 1973.

297

at the margin, seek to reduce
delivery costs of the product
to the market,
and to produce a return to
investors in order to ultimately
increase market
size.
(Universities on the other hand increase
costs to match increased

income by hiring new faculty members
and support for faculty, by
constructing
new buildings, and by instituting new
programs, etc.). The modus operand!
is
to grow, to change through growth.

Growth is seen as the solution to

problems, never the creator of problems by
most administrators (Hodgkinson,
1971, p. 25).

There is no internal incentive to reduce
costs or increase

effectiveness
The university has made investments in its
employees during

periods of rapid growth, but because of a tenure and
security system, it
is difficult to retract during periods of recession.

Over 50% of

university faculties are tenured and between 1973 and 1980 only
retirements are anticipated in total faculty positions.
the system cannot accommodate a fluctuating market.

5

- 10%

In other words,

Added to this is

the fact that many faculty were hired on "soft money" which is quickly

disappearing.

In this day of declining enrollments, shifting foundation

emphasis and dwindling federal grant money as well as higher costs of fuel,
paper goods, and building materials, indeed universities are in fluctuating

markets and feel the pinch severely.

The universities' almost "non-

retractable" nature makes the procurement of resources at the

institutional level to the next higher level tantamount to survival yet
difficult to rationalize in the face of other pressing social priorities.
In brief, 1)

the capital provided for the institution is largely

supplied by outside sources rather than determined by the generation of
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capital from within or by
self-investment of capital;
2) the professionals who are involved in
the institution's
processes largely
determine the character of the
service rendered and therefore
in many
ways the cost of the service
as well;
and 3) while costs increase,
only
in a limited sense is there
feedback between what the
insitution does,
the services produced, and
the market the institution
serves.
For
example, students have little
choice and don't really affect the
offerings
of the institution as they
would in a true economy.
The public does see education as
a consumer good.

The relative

value of a university education is
perceived by the incoming student
or family

m

contrast to going to work immediately after
high school

as possible income for the rest of life,
wheras, in actuality, the relative

importance of a certified bachelors degree of a
general character
is of less value than vocational training
for certain kinds of jobs.

The perceived possible income determines
the "character" of

applicants in a given year.
drop.

In 1967 the salaries of engineer began to

From 1968 up until 1971 applications declined from 23% to 10%.

A 25 year analysis of engineering applicants shows a fluctuation
between
9

and 26% depending on the salary that engineers can get once they
have

completed a program.

The same kind of analysis can be done with lawyers

with the equivalent consequences.

How does the institutional level of the university compete for
support and power while its structure prevents sensitivity to market

demands?

Satisfying market demands is not the sole purpose of the

university, yet in the years of accountability and cost effectiveness
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justification to "the public"
and their representative
nerve endings,
the legislators, becomes
sticky. Within a relatively
short span of tine,
universities, as they have
expanded have added a number
of diverse
functions to traitional
research and teaching:
service,

_lty

co^unity

problem-solving, vocational training,
contracted research and development,
adult and continuing education,
and others, with the result
that

university systems are large,
unwleldly, and complex.

The "purposiveness of the university is not
easily established from within
or recognized
from without. The university
thereby becomes easy to add to, but

difficult to change (if change means to
re-allocate or more effectively
utilize resources in an organizational
development sense.)
Friction Poin t

(2)

- Diffuse and Proliferated
Goals

Continuing in this same vein, systems theory also
assumes that in
a ny
b_e

organization, go als can be specified and consensus
about goals can
obtained

systems.

.

This is easier to accomplish, of course, in smaller,
closed

In reality university goals are diverse, ambiguous,
and divisive.

There is in a university an incredible number of linkages to
the

external environment at many different levels: to local, state, and
federal governments; to parents, alumni, and donors; to deteriorating

neighborhoods and local planning councils; to accrediting and professional
associations; to future local employees of graduates; to other universities with whom consortia agreements have been made, to clients (such
as hospital patients); and to unions of non-salaried and staff employees.

This leads to tremendous 1) permeability (boundary transactions at more
than just the points of resource procurement and disposal),

2)

to
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accountability an,

consent lability

pressures, an, 3) to

politician.

to ali aotta o f
commuufly

The university, because
it is

dependent on outside sources
tor income (donors,
alumni, partents,
ations, federal, state,
and local governments,
etc.), is sus-

ptible to scrutiny by these
outside groups and to
pressures they
can bring to bear on
shaping the goals and
direction of the university.

This is especially true in
times like the present, of
severe budgetary constraints
and in the face of a plan
for revenue
Sharing which will mandate
closer inter-institutional
cooperation.
Given the relevance and salience
of these groups to the
university's

survival, it is easy to see how
difficult it is to achieve, much
less maintain, a consensus about
university goals or priorities.
Goals, of course, are achieved and
maintained inside the

organization by those who carry on the
organization’s purposes.

The

fact that research, teaching, and
some community service is being done

all under one roof is evidence that
either there is no consensus or
the consensus is that all three are
goals of some equal importance.
In either case support hinges on what
outside groups perceive the goals

of the university to be.

Historically, the university has had two orientations and
not

without tension between them:

the elitist function of scholasticism,

research, and dispassionate inquiry vs. the populist functions
of

training and service.

Lunsford writes that:

Only the broadest abstractions will reconcile
the diversity of orientations among scientists
and humanists, ’applied’ and ’basic’ researchers
those oriented to research and those oriented
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eValUatl ° n; We al5 °
lack instruments and
methods of evaluation.
This compounds the
dilemma of relatively
relativelv little
m-n *feedback between
the
university and the market
it serves.
Fr iction Point

(3)

-

Accoun t ability and mu-.

Accountability is predicated on
the idea that data can be
fathered
about effectiveness.
The managerial level functions
and the institutional
level functions "retire"
in some way, information
about organizational
effectiveness and impact on the
environment.

There are strong norms in a
university supporting autonomy and
prohibiting interference.
Intellectual and academic freedom are
most

often interpreted to mean
independence from institutional constraints
and institutional policy, hence
institutional scrutiny. Tenure, as it
IS operationalized in universities,
adds to this protectionism and the
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difficulty in generating
valid data

There tls als
THere
,
° the problem
that
f
„
the
performance of teachinp
,
^8 is rarely subiprtsuDject to adirect
monitoring or
“Pervasion.
Faculty members design,
conduct, and evaluate
their own
eachmg without consultation
with colleagues.
Further, given academic specialization
it
1CU 1 , ° r 0ne facult
V member to evaluate
.

•

fiarCh ° UtSlde

^ «*

-“Cture

is congruent with
the role

of the university
which segregates
administrators from faculty
and Wlth the reWard
SySt
Mgher

™^

™

6dUCatl
Professional
Performance is evaluated by
discipline and not by
institutional contribution. As Blau
points out the role
between staff and line
are
reversed in the university
ity.
Thp
Qt-aff
The staff
expects to carry out the
university's main "productionfunction - teaching and
research - while line
authority is vested in the
university's administrators
(Blau, 1966
P.

92).

A second reasons that
it is diff-fnn^
difficult *to generate valid
informa-

tion about a university
is that it is difficult
to measure output.
Since goals for universities
are multiple, vague, and
conflicting,
systematic evaluation of outcomes
or individual role
performance is

problematic; furthermore,
than qualitative aspects.

it is easier to measure
quantitative, rather

Consequently, there is no way in
most cases

to evaluate what constitutes
significant of even worthwhile
service

effect upon the client.

This lack of measures for goal
achievement

makes it very difficult to generate
valid information about what is going
on in the organization.
The problems associated with the
generation of valid data are some
of the same problems associated
with the assumption that systems are
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basically interdepended
and facilitate goal

accomplish
Technical

Earlier there van a
discussion of the reasons
why it was difficult
CO specify and
agree upon goals for the
university
ersity, there are many
other
reasons why goals, once
set, are not reached.
reached
re,
One
reason is that authority
and power are diffuse
in the university.

Universities tend to isolate
individual faculty members
from
each other and from
administrators during the working
day and reinforce
a condition of low task
interdependence in which one
person's role
performance is not crucially
linked with that of another.
It

is important

to note that change within
a system of low task
interdependence can be

difficult since there is a lack
of communication and
meaningful
linkages between parts of the
system.

At the same time the university
is highly differentiated
(into

departments, colleges, institutes,
divisions, etc.).

These parts, however,

because they are not concerned with
the same issues, are highly

—dependent

and insulated from direct contact
and conflict.

(This

insularity breaks down when one group tries
to encroach on another's
traditional area of responsibility and hence
two grouns do become concerned

with the same issues.)
The result of these conditions is a very flat,
decentralized

organization structure.
It is flat in that most professors (and
students) pursue
their own person-professional goals rather than those of
the institution.
The university is centralized in that
only the very top administrative
officers tend to have
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any perspective about
and leverage over
entire
academic community and
" d yet
vpf they
rho have
v.
tremendous
dif f irnl t-v iJ
at 18 g ° ln
8
S on w ith other
levfls
eve Is of the
rJ
,
organization"
(Simonides, 1971).

^

Besides formal, bureaucratic,
and legitimate sources
of power,
there is also the power of
mass movements and the tower
of expertise.
Consequently, the "legitimate"
authority of administrators is
weakened.
In addition there are
multiple governance structures
in the university
and a "labyrinthian cat’s
cradle" of standing and ad hoc
committees.
Three paradigms have traditionally
been used to understand and
describe university authority
structures: the bureaucratic model,
the

collegial model, and a political model. 6
Certainly, in many ways the

university resembles other bureaucratic
organisations and has, at least
in rudimentary form, some basic
characteristics of a bureaucracy:
a functional division of labor;

offices;

3)

2)

1)

the definition of staff roles as

a hierarchic ordering of offices, providing
an authority

structure; and 4)

operation according to rules and procedures.

However,

much of what has been written in this appendix
so far reveals the
looseness and in some cases

the.

breakdown of this structure.

A

bureaucratic model of university governance deals with only
one kind of
power and not with the illegitimate or non-formal uses of power
mentioned
above.

It does not deal with processes, change, or tactics of
policy

formulation/negotiation.

The bureaucratic model is oriented to business

and formal relationships in the university and not to the academic core
of the organization.

6

Ideas for these three models are drawn from Baldridge (1971).
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A second model of
unlerdf,,
„„
uniersity governance,
the collegium,
which
oes deal with the
academic core. Is more
normal Ive^toplan than
lptlve
pr
ts
-

:;;;;

^

™

-

—

-

—

tta Pr0 f C8Slonal
t0 make hlS 0Kn
declsl °"= a nd his need
for freedom from

organisational constraints.
is democratic,
participatory,

Bee

leaking

,

In the collegial model

the result of the
deliberation of a

community of scholars and
equals.

Unfortunately, this model
when

applied to a university does
not takp
*
take -fm-n
lnto account factors
such as
diverse goals, environmental
constraints, or conflict.
The third organizational
model Is a political,
power/confllct
model.
Its basic components are
interest groups, interest
articulation,
and the
legislation/arbitration/negotiation of demands.

While It Is

descriptive of certain parts of
goal implementation In a university
it
is lacking to the extent
that it denies elements of the
other two models.
What is clear is that the
organizational structure of universities
IS complex and that there
are many areas of overlapping
authority, unclear

jurisdiction, and conflict between
professional and administrative expertise.
Hence, goals once set are often left
unimplemented.
Office of the President
Before this chapter is brought to a close
something must be said
about the office of university president in the
midst of the organizational
structure.

This position is intricately yet finely balanced
between

organizational structure and purpose, and the public and
its
representatives -- the legislature and board.

Most of the constraints

of the office have been mentioned in a
general form to preoare the

reader for the analysis of one university president's activity
over an
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academic year, contained
in Chapter IV.

AH
c

n ges

.

o rganlzatlons

undergQ change

Positions within the
organization.

"

^

as a resuu
Those lnternal changes
shape th0 character
Md conttr>int>

the ° r8anl2ati °"

^

~

^

age , f

^

^

^^

^

of the industry result
ln stages

of evolution and
revo lution in the
organisation's form and
purpose (Creiner
W72). Those st ag es of
evolution end revolution
raise problems for
management . Part of the
function of this appendix
has been to show how
the university has
changed and what kind of
constraints have

been

leveled against mana^ent
because of those changes.

What kind of a person

is Picked to cope with
those changes and on what
basis is the selection

made?

Over the years, the pace of
academic administration has
quickened.
The average presidential
tenure in 1960 was eleven years,
in 1969 it was
seven (Metzler, 1972, p.
162); and, as previously stated, in
1971 it was
four years (Hodgkinson,
1971, p. 268). Why is there so much
turnover in
this position in recent years?
Is it that the search procedures
are so

faulty as to select unstable and/or
unreliable men for the job?
it

Could

be that there are not enough
qualified people in the nation to fill the

positions.

Or could it be that the job is so
demanding and so full of

conflict that there quickly comes a point
where the person must "bail out”
or run the high risk of losing effectiveness
and health?

It is probably

a combination of all three.

There is some evidence to support the case that search
procedures
are conducted so as not to match the perfect
qualifications of any one
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" *“

......... ....

...

„

administrative succession
may lead to organizational
Instability and
conflict, instititutions
of higher education
tend to select as
presidents
Individuals who have been
socialized In institutions
with similar
characteristics (Blrnhaum. 1971
p. 135 ).
,
In buslness organlzatlons
there is a reduction of
possible conflict caused by
succession because
chief executive officers
are likely to be chosen
from within the company
after going through a lengthy
promotion and transfer routine
(Levinson,
1961, p. 362).

On the other hand, most chief
executives In higher

educational Institutions
Lions havp
uh-i„ previous
vpvv little
nave very
experience with the
institution they are selected to
lead.
Hodgkinson states that 60% of
1,222 presidents polled held no
previous positions on the campus where
they were president (Hodgkinson,
1971, p. 286). This type of approach
to the succession question often
results in the selection of someone who
step on toes

.

While this approach may minimize conflict,
it also

decreases opportunities for innovation
and change (Blrnbaum, 1961 p. 145).
,
The succession processes in business
and in higher education are

therefore different.

While business firms utilize anticipatory
recruitment,

in-service socialization, and internal promotions,
higher education

institutions generally select presidents from other
academic institutions
us ing informal and ad hoc processes.

Riesman makes the point that the criteria of the university
search

committee are often too high and inappropriate for the institution.

There

are no career ladders to develop people for the job hence amateurism and
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intellectual aversion to bureaucracy
leaves the™ understaffed
(Riesman,
1969, p. 73 ).

The median age of the university
president Is 60 (Hodgklnson,
1971,
P. 262).
Over 60% have terminal degrees
In the primary areas of:
the
humanltles-25%, educatlon-18%, social
science-17%, and the natural

sciences-14% (Metzler, 1972, p.
162).

They come from business or

professional families and usually are
products of rural or small town
America.
Fifty per cent were born In communities
of less than 2,500
(Metzler, 1972, p. 162).

Boards also tend to pick people who agree
with

their values If not their politics.

In a study of 110 state colleges,

88% had the same political affiliation as did
the governors of their
states (Bennis, 1973, p. 22).
The satisfaction the executive used to derive from
clear lines of

authority, deciding what to do and seeing it done;

now, the clear

rules and uncluttered divisions of responsibility and
labor are gone
(Sayles

,

1964, p. 45).

Those days of presidential monarchs, what brief

they had, has given way to another type.

The presidential position

has declined in academic status (Dodds, 1961, p. 1).

It would seem that

most presidents more than acknowledge the type of role they must play.

They seem to perceive themselves as working hard at supporting the ideas
of others, mediating across factions, and working to implement their own

ideas (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 272).
The purpose of this study is to examine what a university president

did and under what constraints he had to operate.

university president play?

What role does a

In 1973 a faculty member of a major
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university wrote;

ln
tl0nal
the t :™er

“ ™PmSi ° n
4

s
f diverse
^uhL :l nzti tM
radit
d itf
? academic
onal
framework,

publics-

the ratter
latter iniM
^
^
initiates
and
sponsors
degree program and
majors which are somewhat outside traditional
boundaries. In the
absence of traditional
structures the col
e
or university may come
to reflect market
demands to a rather significant
degree; and
this would pose a real
threat to faculty
autonomy and freedom, this
threat becomes
even more real when It Is
recognized that the
aptain of erudition may
Increasingly by the
most common style of
administration
(Boland, 1973, p. 3).
noTT
ew

How accurate Is this indictment?

Is the administrator

deliberately trying to pose a threat
to academic freedom?

What are
some of the behaviors and
constraints that would lead an
administrator
to be perceived as a captain of
erudition In the times of financial

austerity?
study.

These questions are explored In the
main text of this

appendix

b

criteria for classification
of the correspondence
This appendix is designed
to give the reader
a clear sense
of the basis for the
categories In which the
nail, phone calls, and
meetings were organised.
In the main text
categories In Tables
I - IV such as
acknowledgements, status requests,
reference data, etc
were described without any
clear cut criteria.
In this appendix
those criteria are spelled
out and examples given
to highlight the
criteria.

Mail

Most of the mail was classified
into fifteen categories.

Those categories were partly
taken from Mintzberg's writings
on

managerial work (Mintzberg, 1973,

p.

246).

The total number of

pieces of mail logged was 5770, of
which 2,467 pieces were external
(Chart II) and 3,303 pieces were
internal (Chart II).

A piece of

mail not figured in the total count was
any letter considered personal
not system-relevant

.

Examples of this would be letters from
personal

friends of the President concerning vacations
or arrangements for

dinners, etc.

Also not considered were correspondence between
the

President and his publishers, personal financial and
tax statements,
and communication with relatives.

All categories contained mail

either received or sent by the President.
The fifteen categories and criteria are as follows:
)

Acknowledgements

:

Letters that formally acknowledged a visit, a
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favor, an award received, some
Information exchanged, or a completed
Job

Acknowledgements accounted for 7.2% of
the external mall.
2)

Sta tus Requests

Letters that required information on
a project

:

or Presidential activity: anything
that required Presidential reaction

m

a formal way.

Examples would be requests to do speeches,
send

representatives, send information, donate funds.

Other examples would

be letters from public citizens asking for a
clarification or for
the President’s reaction to a complaint.

Solicitations

Letters that came from people or organizations

:

offering to sell products or services.

Examples would be a bill

collection agency offering its services or someone asking for a
job.
4)

3 . 2 / of

the external mail was in the form of solicitations.

Authority Requests

:

Letters from external and internal units

seeking authorization for an exception to

a

normal operating

procedure, seeking approval for a new program, or seeking acceptance
for a decision or report.

Examples would be a dean asking for

money for a new program or a non-profit organization wanting per-

mission to start a fund-raising drive at the University.

Only a

small amount (%) of the mail was concerned with this type of request.
5)

Reference Data

only.

:

Documents that were to be used for reference

These would be in the form of agendas, vitas, annual reports,

address changes, policy statements from other organizations concerned

with their operations, and information that could be used by the
University to plan, coordinate, and evaluate programs.

Federal

affirmative action guidelines or University, college, and depart-
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mental annual reports
were examples.
6)

GeseraLReEort^,

DocuWa

ln bulk or menos Qf

^^^

pages that were concerned
with topics the Preside.
had exptessed
an interest in.
These general reports
were usually lmportant
to
a particular problem
or issue that was pending
or being resolved.
Examples would be the
enrollment statistics for
medical schools
across the state or a
report on the distribution
of salary
Increases for the University.
These reports would also
contain
analyzed options and possible
consequences of those options.
This category resulted in
the most mail: 21.4% of the
external and
39.4% of the internal mail.
Most of the internal mail in
this

category was carbon copies for
the President's information.
^

Period:i ca 1 News
-

-

-

.

This category contained newspaper,
magazines

or journal clippings that the
President either sent or received.
At times the President would send
various people clippings or

articles that expressed a point of view
or described the state of
a problem.

Examples would be articles on collective
bargaining

or on the medical school admissions
problem.
8)

Events

;

Communications concerned with keeping the President

informed of events happening internally or externally.

Calendars

or brochures, flyers, clippings, or memos announcing
an upcoming

event were included in this category.

Reports on Operations

:

Mail relating to the operations of the

University accounted for 14.2% of the external and 7.2% of the
internal mail.

This category contained letters or reports which
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^

praised or cri tlclzed
che servlces the Dnlv
. r , lty produc .
d
as feedback to the
President as to how well
the University was
operating
Examples would be consultant
reports, independent
cities' complaints
about record foul-ups,
or an ad hoc faculty
committee expressing
its
concerns about faculty
promotions.

^

10)

Advic^on^ituations:

Memos either solicited or
unsolicited giving
or seeking advice.
Examples would be a presidential
assistant suggesting
n alternative to a problem
and possible consequences
of that alternative
or another university writing for
ideas on program evaluation or faculty

salary disclosure.
11)

Ideas

:

These could be solicited but were mostly unsolicited
letters

suggesting new ideas or ways of operating.
groups.

Most came from external

Examples might be an alumni suggesting new ways to finance

football or an assistant provost suggesting a new way to advertise

continuing education.
12)

Problems and Pressures

:

Any letter that related to a clearly

defined problem, a demand, or pressure that came from either external
or internal sources.

The contact usually stated the issue as an ulti-

matum or in clearly defined behavioral terms requesting the solution to
a problem.

inequities.

Examples would be

requests by black students to address

In this case a list of thirty-three separate grievances

was presented to the President by a group of black students which required

immediate attention.

Another example would be an independent that wanted

the University to turn off the lights in the University parking lot because

the lights were keeping the independent’s family from sleeping.
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13)

Y

Self-Initiated Jan.
Ma-m
.

^

This category contained
any letter initiated

--

PreSld6nt t0

—

-m,.:-

to infers peopie
of Peering times,

t„

-is.

to ask for over .
due „ orR

inform people „ £

^

of ^

recent trip, to loh by
for or propose .
change.
Examples „ ould he .
letter written to a
legislator to loh by for
passage of a federal
subsidy
bill for handicapped
veterans or a letter
J-ercer calHno
calling ffor an interim
report
from the Long Range
Planning Task Force.
14)

Qu estionnaires:

Any letter or correspondence
designed to illicit
information from the University
in either survey or
open-ended form.
Most of the questionnaires
came from other universities
or from the
,

federal government seeking
information about programs or
college activities
15)
These were letters written
by the President or to
him giving a reference or the
qualifications of someone for a
job position or application to school
or for a scholarship.
These were times
when outside institutions were
conducting searches and solicited
the
President's opinions.
4% of the mail from the outside
was in the form
of recommendations while .08%
came from inside.

This category also

included requests to the President
to write a recommendation on
behalf
Of a particular applicant.

The mail as represented by the figures
in Chart II does not

include the mailing of mass communications
by the President, such as
a

thousand letters to National Merit Scholarship
winners asking them to

consider coming to the University or bulk mail
to parents, alumni, and
legislators
The key to the roles performed by the University
President and
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the role conflict
experienced by him -Lies
lies ln
l n the purpose
of the mall
as well as the purpose
of other forms of
communication.
I n effect,
sent roles were contained
In the purposes of
the mail, phone calls
and meetings which resulted
In Presidential activity
- l. e
purpose
.

defined the specific skills
and behaviors required
of the President.
were content and process
pressures associated with
the mall,
Phone calls, and meetings.
Content pressures were
explained as specific’
Issues or problems such as
budget or affirmative action
that were "sent"
in the mail, phone calls,
and communicated during
informal

and formal face-to-face
meetings.

Phone Calls
The President would have all
Incoming phone calls recorded
on a
form by one of the office secretaries.
If the President took the
call
only the name of the caller was
recorded and after the conversation
the

President would write the subject of
the call on the form.

If

the Presi-

dent did not take the call the secretary
would record the caller's message
and phone number.

The researcher had access to the phone
record sheets and

through this vehicle phone calls or role
expectations for the President

conveyed by phone were monitored.
It was not possible to learn the contents
of all phone calls

because the recording procedures were not followed at
the President’s
home yet large amounts of work were done by phone at home.
Of those calls that were recorded, approximately
1,230, the author

could ascertain the purpose of 797 calls.

The purpose remained unknown

for 434 calls because the caller may not have left a message or the

President did not always record the purpose of the call.

Even when the
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purpose was
or purposes.

record,

c.U. r someffme* had

fhe

In this case the author
tried to record the
most salient

purpose or the purpose
that had the most
Implications for the
University's
operations.
The purposes contained
In the phone calls were
broken down Into
fifteen categories:
1)

This category contained
phone calls concerned

with someone wanting a
Job or wanting a recommendation
for a Job from
the President.
It would also contain
calls concerning a call from
someone asking the President
for suggestions for a
candidate.
2) Adv ice or Planning
This category contained calls
In which the President gave or solicited advice
concerning a particular problem.
The
advice could be around the assessment
of a certain motive or
maneuever.
:

If the maneuever was to take
place in the future,

this could be labelled

or result in planning or strategies.
3)

G etting Resources

:

Phone calls concerning where to procure
new

personnel, needed speakers, consultants or
money for a particular project, were classified in this category.

Discussion often involved

questions of whom to contact and how to approach
the contact.

There were

calls that asked the President to mobilize the
University's resources
for a particular project outside the University.
4)

e ttln g or B reaking

-§.

-

Appointments

:

An appointment

is a formally planned

meeting either in the President's office or at the caller's
office, set

with system-relevant business or a planning purpose in mind.
5)

To Say Hello or Goodbye

:

This category contained calls with no

specific agenda other than maintaining contact or renewing channels of
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communication, personal or
organizational.
6)

The calls in this category
concerns matters of
internal operation. They
involved possible changes
in standard operating
procedures. The caller may
resist or support a present
or proposed policy
decision. These types of
calls were often concerned
with areas of personnel procurement and dismissal
or affirmative action. A
„ example would
be an outside foundation
asking the President to get
a consortium to move
in a specific direction.
7)

ComE laints or Comp liments:

policy or operations.

These types of calls were about
University

The usual caller in this category
had little organ

izational position power and was usually
an independent.

Calls that

complained about the Dean bringing his
baby to work are examples of
calls classified in this category.
8)

Co nducting Business:

This category involved calls from
external people

trying to sell a product or service to
the University or trying to get
a new program started in the University
in order to service a business

or training program.

An example would be a business executive
calling to

try to get a computer program started in night
school for his employees or

an industry trying to sell a product to the University.
T ip-°i:i: or In f rom ation-sharing

:

This is where informal contacts pass

on information before a formal announcement or publication
is made, where

informal ’’rumors" are passed on that need verification, or where
hunches
or possible tips on a strategy for acquiring resources are shared.

The

calls could result in the transfer or sharing of information about decisions

made or being made.
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}

£gaHggtlniLl n f oraatton

;

These call,
CallS „con «™ed asking

f or extensive
„
information
or reports to aid
the caller
ler iin problem-solving,
decisionmaking, or in clarifying
a situation.
.

H)

—

Speeches, Benefits,

Par. Q
-|«.
exs

-

nr Consul,
or

t-QT^.1

Th
nco calls
j-uese
concerned
in q uiries by friends,
subordinates, or outside
organisations asking the
*

»

.

President to make a
presentation in the form of
a speech, such
as the
presentation of an award at
a benefit.
Calls which asked the
President
to participate on
a panel or to act
as a consultant to a
business or
educational organization
were also clasified in
this category.
12)

These calls were invitations to events that did
not require speeches or
presentations, but at

which the President was to
"represent" the University.

An example would

be a formal "cake-cutting"
ceremony or informal cocktail
party.
13) Tjransferrals

:

These calls were those contacts
that were put through

to a subunit that could
answer the caller's question or
provide the infor-

mation needed without direct contact
with the President.
14) De cision-Makin g:

Calls in this category posed
options, resulted in

the need for the President to make
choices, to join, attend, send a

representative, or allocate resources.

These calls were usually toward

the end of a period of negotiations
with people asking for permission or

authority.
15) Admissions

:

Any phone call concerned with the caller
lobbying for

an applicant to get into the University at
the graduate or undergraduate

level was classified in this category.

The caller was not so much trying

to change policy but to get a special dispensation
or special consideration
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for the applicant.
V

“>

^^i^i^orArticle:

Any call that asked the
President to

write an article or collaborate
on

a

book was placed In this
category.

Also, calls concerned with
feedback on the President’s
writings were
contained in this category.

Face— to-Face Meetings
This study examined 293 calendar
days of which Saturdays were

counted as work days for a total
of 229 work days.

There were 37 Sundays

24 of which had meetings, 12
Sundays having two or more
work-related

meetings.

There were 27 holidays and/or
vacation days.

Those work days

averaged between 16 and 17 hours of
meetings or travel time to some workrelated meeting with between 6 and 7
formal meetings per day.
The purposes of meetings were not assess
by frequency because
a variety

of topics were talked about In most
meetings.

Therefore, the

purpose of a specific meeting was not always
clear.
Informal meeting or chance meetings such as in
the hall or at a

cocktail party were not included in Chart II because
they were impossible
to observe and record.

Many dinners or meetings were ceremonial and were often
seasonal.
For example, events that were a tradition of long-standing
such as

commencement, freshman orientation, and homecoming were included in Chart
IV.

The type of meeting that accounted for most of the President's face-

to-face meetings were appointments set in order to resolve an issue, in

other words, for planning and decision-making.
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